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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Since the 1980s, the Thai economy has gone through rapid economic development. 
Despite that, income inequality remained high, if not increasing. While there are 
numerous studies on income inequality in Thailand, the geographical dimension of 
inequality received far less attention. This study examines income per capita disparities 
across provinces in Thailand over the past two decades. It also looks at other relevant 
aspects of provincial disparities—labour productivity, government expenditure, social 
services and poverty—and how they relate to the income disparities. By utilising the 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin model for income convergence, the study investigates factors 
contributing to provincial growth as well as the impact of growth on provincial poverty. 
Finally, the study took an alternative approach of agglomeration economics to explain 
the provincial disparities in Thailand. The findings suggest that GPP per capita 
disparities widened over time with no evidence of GPP per capita convergence. 
However, when the average income from household surveys is used, there was an 
evidence of convergence. This reflects the change in income composition of farm 
households by seasonally migrating to work in industrial sector. The analysis on growth 
determinants suggested that the widening GPP per capita disparities was mainly due to 
the concentration of industrial sector in only few provinces. The agglomeration analysis 
further suggested that such concentration of industrial activities generated 
agglomeration forces, which induces faster grow in the rich provinces. These widening 
GPP per capita disparities seem to cause poverty across provinces to increase. The 
poverty-determinant regressions suggest that while higher real income reduces poverty, 
inequality increases it. Hence, an increase in GPP may not reduce poverty if inequality 
levels also increase. Accordingly, this study suggests that policies on regional 
development and inequality reduction should be seriously implemented in order to 
narrow the disparities in Thailand. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Provincial Disparities in Thailand: An Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background and Motivations 
In the second half of the twentieth century, Thai economic performance has been 
dramatic. Its four decades of uninterrupted rapid economic growth ended with the 
financial crisis in 1997. At the turn of the new century, Thailand found itself trying to 
recover from the crisis and to re-construct its economy. Now, more than a decade has 
passed since the crisis. Thai economic performance has not been as impressive as it was 
prior to 1997.  
From 1960 to 1996, economic growth in Thailand averaged 7.7 percent per 
annum. This growth benefited its people extensively. The country had moved from 
being one of the world’s poorest countries to the middle-income level. As a result, 
income per capita at current market prices increased from 2,250 Baht to 76,847 Baht 
during the period. In addition, the incidence of poverty declined remarkably from 88.3 
percent of total population in 1962 to 14.8 percent in 1996 (Warr, 2004, p. 4).  
Despite such an impressive performance, the distribution of the growth benefits 
was rather uneven. That is, part of the benefits went to a small population group, leaving 
less for the remaining larger population. This, however, should come as no surprise. 
Thailand has been characterised as having a high rate of income inequality since the 
1981 socio-economic survey data became available (Krongkaew, 1985). The inequality 
has been considered high even when compared with neighbouring East Asian countries. 
17 
The inequality, as measured by Gini coefficient was 0.513 in 1996. It is higher than that 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. The Gini index from several 
countries is summarized in Table 1.1. In fact, income inequality in Thailand rose during 
the decades of economic growth and poverty reduction. The Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.487 in 1981 to 0.513 in 1996 (National Economic and Social Development 
Board [NESDB], 2008a, Table 15).  
Table 1.1  Economic Growth and Gini Coefficient of Several East Asian Countries 
Country Annual GDP Growth   Gini Coefficient 1990-2005   1990-1991 1995-1996 2000-2001 
Hong Konga 2.4  0.476 0.483 0.488 
Indonesiab 2.1  0.320 0.360 0.330 
Malaysiaa 3.3  0.446 0.464 0.443 
Philippines*b 1.6  0.468 0.488 0.481 
Singaporea 3.6  0.436 0.443 0.481 
South Koreaa 4.5  0.295 0.284 0.320 
Thailanda 2.7   0.515 0.513 0.522 
Note:  ∗     Data is available for 1997 
a     Index using data on income 
b     Index using data on consumption expenditure 
Source:  Data for annual GDP growth are from Asian Development Bank [ADB] (2008, Table 2.14)  
Data for Gini coefficients are from sources as follows: Hong Kong: Census and Statistics 
Department (2007, Table 6.6); Indonesia: Budan Pusat Statistik (2006); Malaysia: Zin (2000, 
Table 2); Philippines: National Statistical Coordination Board [NSCB] (2000, Table 2.9; 
2003, Table 2.9); Singapore: Department of Statistics (2002, Table 4); South Korea: Choi 
(2003, Table 2), Thailand: NESDB (2008a, Table 15) 
 
Given a long period of sustained high growth, over-confidence of both investors 
and policymakers toward the Thai economic outlook had led to a bubble economy 
(Warr, 2005, pp. 19-20). This was particularly apparent in the real estate sector and 
financial markets. Coupled with a wrong policy package of financial liberalisation and 
fixed exchange rate, Thailand fell into a financial crisis in July 1997. Investment 
declined sharply and has remained stagnant since. Output contracted for the first time in 
decades and poverty incidence rose to 17.5 percent in 1998 (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2). 
Since then, the Thai economy has gradually recovered. In 2003, the gross domestic 
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product (GDP) growth reached the pre-crisis level. Poverty incidence registered even 
lower than that prior to the crisis. As for income inequality, the Gini index declined 
during the crisis from 0.513 in 1996 to 0.507 in 1998. Throughout the recovery, the 
index has stayed at a lower level than in the pre-crisis period. The Gini index for 
Thailand is summarised in Table 1.2. 
Figure 1.1 Nominal GDP of Thailand and Real GDP Growth Rate 1958-2007 
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Figure 1.2 Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product at 1988 Prices 1980-2007 
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19 
Table 1.2  Income Gini Coefficient and Income Distribution of Thailand 1988 – 2007 
Year Gini  Income Distribution 
 
Index 
  
Lowest 
20% 
Second 
20%  
Third 
20% 
Fourth 
20% 
Highest 
20% 
1988 0.487  4.58 8.05 12.38 20.62 54.37 
1990 0.515  4.29 7.54 11.70 19.50 56.97 
1992 0.536  3.96 7.06 11.11 18.90 58.98 
1994 0.520  4.07 7.35 11.67 19.68 57.23 
1996 0.513  4.18 7.55 11.83 19.91 56.53 
1998 0.507  4.30 7.75 12.00 19.82 56.13 
2000 0.522  3.95 7.27 11.50 19.83 57.45 
2002 0.507  4.23 7.72 12.07 20.07 55.91 
2004 0.493  4.54 8.04 12.41 20.16 54.86 
2006 0.515  3.84 7.67 12.12 20.08 56.29 
2007 0.499  4.30 8.01 12.42 20.22 55.06 
Note: Both Gini index and income distribution are calculated from the primary data in the household 
socio-economic surveys (SES) conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO). Data are 
not available for 2008 as household income was not included in the surveys in 2008.   
Source: NESDB (2009, Table 15-16) 
 
While it is apparent that overall poverty reduction in Thailand correlates with 
national economic growth, the distribution of income has been unaffected by economic 
circumstances (Warr, 2004, p. 11). Income inequality has remained high throughout the 
economic boom, the crisis and recovery. This has encouraged both Thai academics and 
policymakers to explore why the outcome prevails. As a result, numerous studies on 
income inequality in Thailand have been produced in recent decades. Despite that, 
almost all of them emphasised exclusively one dimension of uneven income 
distribution—the inequality between different income groups. The reason why it has 
been a focus for researchers and policymakers is that it illustrates how national income 
is distributed among populations at different income groups. Analysis in this aspect, 
however, categorises populations regardless of sectors or regions where they live. While 
this is unarguably the most important dimension to be considered, other aspects also 
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deserve attention. Perhaps the inequality persisted in Thailand partly because of the lack 
of attention on these other dimensions. One interesting aspect that should receive 
attention is the inequality across geographical areas. 
The study of geographical inequality can be traced back to the 1950s when 
economists started to notice the persistence of regional income disparities within 
national borders. Earlier works suggested that increases in regional disparities during 
the early stages of development were to be expected. It was argued that disparities 
should start to fall when a country entered a more mature stage (Williamson, 1965). 
This conclusion was later criticised, as regional income differences in developing 
countries did not show signs of shrinking even at higher levels of national per capita 
income (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992, pp. 35-36). In addition, an argument that the 
agglomeration forces in urban centres would lead toward polarisation and, thus, larger 
regional disparities has become increasingly strong. This is particularly evident in 
several rapid-growing developing countries. Widening income inequality among 
regions within a country was found in India, China, the Philippines, and the new EU 
member countries. (Ghosh, 2008; Zhao, 1996; Balisacan, 2007; Szorfi, 2007) 
Thailand is no exception. In fact, Thailand has long been recognised for its high 
concentration of development in and around Bangkok. This is because Bangkok has 
been more than just the capital city where the government is located. Its location has 
given advantages to many businesses, consequently pulling resources into it. 
Accordingly, Bangkok has grown dramatically compared with the rest of the country. In 
2000, it had around 6.3 million inhabitants, which was 17 times the number of residents 
of the second largest city (Richter, 2006, p. 38). This could hardly be missed by anyone 
looking at the regional figures or even by anyone who has been to Bangkok and the 
second-largest city, Samut Prakarn. In fact, both the second- and third largest cities in 
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Thailand are located within the vicinity of Bangkok. Only the fourth largest city, Udon 
Thani is located 564 kilometers away from Bangkok (NESDB & World Bank, 2005, p. 
57). This indicates high degree of Bangkok’s agglomeration forces.  
Despite that, regional disparities have largely been ignored by researchers as 
well as by policymakers in Thailand. Particularly, when analysing at the provincial 
level. Although some direct studies exist, only a few of them examines geographical 
disparities using the provincial data after the year 2000. This means that the effects of 
financial crisis and structural changes during the post-crisis period have not been 
evaluated. While there is a study on why Northeastern region lags behind, there are no 
in-depth studies done on regional disparities in general. That is, the factors that 
determine regional development patterns in Thailand throughout the past few decades of 
high growth, crisis and post-crisis period have not been explored. While government 
policies and agglomeration trends have usually been stressed as primary explanations of 
the regional disparities, there is no empirical evidence for this claim. It is, therefore, 
important that the relationship between the past government policies, agglomeration 
forces and regional disparities be investigated.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
This thesis sets the following objectives: 
(1) To examine provincial disparities in Thailand between 1988 and 2008. The 
analyses will cover the periods of economic boom, the crisis in 1997-1998 and 
the post-crisis period. The thesis also seeks to analyse the links between 
provincial income disparity and poverty in Thailand.   
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(2) To identify whether there is β-convergence in income per capita among 
provinces in Thailand. A country is said to exhibit regional growth convergence 
when the poorer regions grow at a faster rate than the richer ones, thus reducing 
regional disparities in the long run.  
(3) To determine factors contributing to provincial per capita income growth. 
Empirical studies have indicated several determinants e.g. physical- and human-
capital accumulation, trade openness, geography, economic structure and most 
importantly, regional development policies. (Resosudarmo & Vidyattama, 2006; 
Fujita & Hu, 2001; Garcia & Soelistianingsih, 1998; Hill & Balisacan, 2007) 
This research also intends to investigate agglomeration factors and their effects 
on the provincial disparities in Thailand.  
(4) This thesis aims to give policy implications which may come out from the 
findings on provincial disparities in the country.   
 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter Two gives an overview of regional economic theories and methodologies 
developed so far. Given the interdisciplinary nature of regional economics, regional 
disparity usually coincides with economics of agglomeration and economic geography. 
Hence, theories and methodologies on these issues will also be briefly reviewed in order 
to better utilise the techniques relevant for the analyses in this thesis. Then the empirical 
evidence will be reviewed. Previous studies carried out in countries that are comparable 
to the case of Thailand—namely the Philippines and Indonesia—will be discussed. 
Finally, the empirical studies on Thailand will be presented. 
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Chapter Three describes the historical background of Thailand’s economic 
development. Here, the study will look at the period of economic boom, namely from 
1981 to 1996, followed by the financial crisis and the post-crisis period. It is now 
widely known that the government policies were not the only major factor determining 
the performance of the Thai economy. However, several factors interplayed to produce 
both an outstanding performance prior to 1996 and the crisis. These factors will be 
analysed along with the provincial disparities. Williamson’s population-weighted 
coefficient of variation (vw) and Theil index will be employed as measures of disparity. 
Analysis will focus on per capita income differences among 76 provinces, which is the 
geographical division according to the current administrative system. As these 
provinces can be grouped into seven regions, the study will analyse differences among 
regions as well as the differences within each region. Figure 1.3 illustrates the 
administrative provinces and regions in Thailand. For the period after the crisis, the 
emphasis will be placed on whether the reforms taken so far have contributed to the 
regional disparity issues. 
In relation with the income disparities, Chapter Four looks at four other aspects 
of provincial disparities in Thailand. These aspects include sectoral distribution, labour 
productivity, government budget allocation and education- and health services. The 
former three aspects are normally considered as factors explaining the provincial 
income disparities. Meanwhile, the disparities in education and health services are 
included to show how welfare is distributed across provinces. Patterns of disparities in 
these four aspects will also be compared with that of income.   
Chapter Five investigates the evidence of β-convergence in income across 
provinces of Thailand. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, pp. 112-113), there 
are two types of convergence, σ- and β-convergence. The σ-convergence exists when 
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variation across provinces reduces over time. This is therefore the same as provincial 
disparities examined in Chapter Three and Four. On the other hand, β-convergence 
exists when initially poor provinces grew at faster rates than initially rich provinces. 
Given a close relation with β-convergence concept, Chapter Five will also examine 
factors contributing to provincial income growth. Comprehensive explanations of 
econometric methods and data sources to be used in the model will be given. It will be 
followed by an interpretation of the results.  
Chapter Six turns attention toward poverty issue. Given a wide range of poverty 
definitions used nowadays, this chapter will start with the poverty definitions and 
measurements. Both definition of poverty and construction of poverty lines in Thailand 
will be discussed. Then, provincial disparities in poverty rates will be examined and 
compared with the disparities in provincial income. As economic growth normally leads 
to poverty reduction at the national level, this chapter also investigates this relationship 
at the provincial level. Chapter Six will end with an analysis on provincial poverty 
determinants.  
Chapter Seven moves the discussion to the agglomeration analysis. The 
agglomeration forces are widely argued to play a significant role behind increasing 
regional disparities around the world. It is also expected to play as important role for the 
case of Thailand. Bangkok has been widely known to dominate the Thai economy ever 
since it became the capital city of Thailand. Bangkok and its vicinity, the so-called 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region1 (BMR) generates almost half of the country’s GDP 
(42.8 percent in 2006). Hence, the role of agglomeration around Bangkok is examined 
in this chapter. Finally, Chapter Eight summarises the findings and offers policy 
implications that are drawn from this thesis. 
                                                 
1
 The BMR comprises of Bangkok and its five bordering provinces. These are Nonthaburi, Phathum 
Thani, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon and Nakhon Pathom (Dixon, 1999, p. 192). 
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Figure 1.3 Map of Thailand showing Provincial (Changwat) Boundaries 
 
Source: NSO (2005b, p. 5) 
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CHAPTER 2 
Regional Development: Theoretical and Empirical Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The study of regional economics is a young discipline when compared to other fields of 
economics. This is partly due to lack of data during earlier periods. It is also partly 
because of the dominance of neoclassical views in the past. These views assumed that 
an issue such as regional disparities would be automatically solved by market 
adjustments (Weiss, 2007, p. 52). It was only when the available data indicated that 
regional income differences persisted and were widening that the issue started to receive 
attention.  
Despite its rather new emergence in economics, the issue of regional disparities 
has drawn considerable attention from researchers. As a result, a large amount of 
theoretical and empirical work has been developed. This chapter takes a look at both 
types of evidence. Regional development theories will be reviewed first. Then, existing 
empirical findings will be discussed with analysis of how each of them supports the 
theories.   
 
2.2 Regional Development Theories 
The study of regional economics emerged in the late 1940s when economists started to 
consider the spatial aspect in their analyses. Much of the theoretical work in this early 
period originated from location theory and international trade theory (Meyer, 1963, p. 
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26). Location theory describes how firms choose their production locations. It assumes 
that firms compete in a free market and that transport costs are the only variable cost for 
a firm. Firms thus decide to locate where their cost of transportation is minimised. This 
implies choosing a location where demand for the firm’s product is highest. Although 
the location theory focuses on the microeconomic aspect, it has a bearing on the issue of 
regional disparities. Because demand tends to be positively correlated with city size, 
most firms would want to locate in big cities. This is to capture large urban demand 
with lower transport costs. As firms increasingly locate in the cities, polarisation will 
emerge (Alonso, 1964).  
International trade theory, on the other hand, considers the issue from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint. Unlike location theorists, economists in this camp argue that 
economies develop and compete in the world market. Cities are usually established in 
response to global demand. In North America, for example, new cities sprung from their 
comparative advantage in costs of production, including transfer costs. (North, 1975, p. 
337) As exports determine the development of core areas, regions with locational 
advantages usually emerge as trading centres. Once these regions have developed, 
external economies take place and stimulate further growth. While this notion is 
consistent with location theory, the long-run result is not. Based on neoclassical 
assumptions, the theory assumed that capital and labour are perfectly mobile within the 
nation. Thus, regional income inequality is often a short-term phenomenon. Once 
adjustment mechanisms are fully in place, the disparities will automatically disappear.  
From the late 1950s, theories with emphasis directly on the regional income 
differences began to develop. Williamson (1965) suggested that there was a systematic 
pattern of regional disparities when a country proceeded along a development path. It 
took the form of an inverted U-shape. That is, regional income inequality was to rise in 
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the earlier stage of development. As rich regions grew, they attracted both capital and 
skilled labour into them. In addition, lack of interregional linkages slowed down the 
spread of technology from rich regions to poor ones. At the same time, the government 
was likely to pursue economic growth over equity as a goal during this stage. However, 
this widening disparity would not continue indefinitely. As a country developed, the 
benefits of economic growth were expected to gradually trickle down to the poor 
regions. Once adjustments in factor markets had been in place, differences in regional 
income would begin to narrow. At the mature stage of development, convergence in 
income per capita among regions should be evident.  
Several economists, however, shared different views from that of Williamson. 
Myrdal (1957) argued that not only do disparities persist, but that the gap could also 
widen. This is because there are agglomeration forces pulling resources, talent and 
surpluses to the core areas at the expense of the periphery. Thus, the gap between the 
rich and the poor regions is continuously reinforced by ‘cumulative causation’ process. 
Similarly, Hirschman (1975, p. 139) suggested that an economy usually started off its 
development process by creating regional centres. Once established, economic growth 
would be concentrated around these centres or what he termed “growth poles.” He 
further pointed out that there were two effects of the growth poles on the backward 
regions—trickling down and polarisation effects. In the end, the former effect was 
expected to dominate over the latter. The speed for this result to take place depended on 
government policy toward the development of the backward regions. 
While the debates continued, growth theorists offered an alternative approach to 
the issue of regional disparities. These theorists include Koopmans (1963), Case (1965) 
and Barro (1991). They were originally interested in economic growth and 
convergences among countries. However, the theories have implications for regional 
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growth differences within a country as well.  They suggested that there were two types 
of convergence, σ- and β-convergence. The former, σ-convergence, appears when 
dispersion of regional per capita income declines over time. This is the type that was 
considered by Williamson. The latter, β-convergence, appears when per capita income 
of poor regions catches up with the rich regions. This is the aspect that growth theorists 
were interested in. The two types of convergence do not always have to go in the same 
direction. That is, σ-convergence cannot appear if the poor regions do not grow faster 
than the rich. However, β-convergence does not always lead to σ-convergence (Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin, 1991, pp. 112-113). According to neoclassical growth theory, the per 
capita growth rate of a closed economy tends to be negatively related to initial level of 
per capita income. Thus, β-convergence is expected. In other words, economies with 
lower initial per capita income tend to grow faster than the rich ones. However, that can 
only be the case when returns to capital are declining and the poor regions have not 
reached a steady-state level. The theory also assumes that economies have similar 
preferences and technology (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1991). 
Romer (1986) challenged the neoclassical view by introducing increasing 
returns-to-scale production to the growth model. He assumed that knowledge is a capital 
good with increasing marginal productivity. However, research technology, which 
produces new knowledge, exhibits decreasing returns. That is, it takes more than one 
unit of research input to produce one additional unit of new knowledge. In addition, 
new knowledge created by one firm generates positive externalities to other firms. 
Romer then showed that competitive equilibrium could be reached with these above-
mentioned assumptions. The model thus implies that richer economies can grow faster 
than the poorer ones. As a result, there is a possibility that growth rates among countries 
would not converge.  
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Now that increasing returns can be modelled, Krugman (1993a) utilised 
increasing returns to extend the theory in the field of economic geography. His model 
assumes economies of scale in production and monopolistically competitive market for 
the manufacturing sector. Krugman, then, showed that history is an important factor 
determining location of production. Although there are multiple equilibria for firms to 
locate, they tend to cluster together at one location. That is, firms would choose the 
location where the manufacturing labour is initially concentrated. With increasing 
returns and cumulative process, this location will continue to grow and maintain its 
position as the core. In other words, the core-periphery pattern will persist when there 
are (i) strong economies of scale, (ii) low transportation costs and (iii) large share of 
manufacturing sector. This explains why major cities around the world have continued 
to grow until today. It also suggests that regional income growth convergence is less 
likely to occur.   
Krugman’s model, however, contains some limitations. His result was achieved 
under a simplified assumption that agricultural workers cannot move to manufacturing 
sector and vice versa (Krugman, 1993a, p. 102). Another limitation of the model is that 
it considers an economy with only two locations. This is difficult to apply to the case of 
several regions. Knowing these limitations, Krugman later extended his work to a linear 
spatial economy. This yields the same result. That is, production tends to concentrate in 
one location (Fujita & Thisse, 1996). Fujita and Krugman (1995) then relaxed the 
immobility assumption by allowing workers to move between regions and sectors. This 
more relaxed model suggests, however, that the agglomeration process may not 
continue when population becomes too large or when products are not differentiated 
enough. In this case, it is possible to have more than one city.  
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Being the first to introduce a full-specified model, Krugman’s work has 
triggered several subsequent developments in this area. Englmann and Walz (1995) 
assumed that unskilled workers are immobile while skilled workers are mobile. They 
proposed that R&D sector would employ only skilled workers. However, the product 
created by the sector is non-tradable. As a result, production will be concentrated in the 
area where the non-traded goods are produced.  
This new approach to the spatial analysis has sometimes been regarded as the 
“new economic geography” (Fujita & Thisse 1996). Generally, it considers the issue of 
agglomeration in a more quantitative style as compared to the work prior to the 1990s. 
Here, much attention has been paid to the two opposite types of forces influencing the 
spatial pattern. Centripetal forces intensify agglomeration while centrifugal forces 
reduce it. Because there are both types of forces interacting in each city, there are 
theorists who do not agree that agglomeration will continue infinitely. Mori (1997) 
found that firms have an incentive to locate in rural areas due to lower wages. Workers 
may also want to live in rural areas because lower agricultural prices imply higher real 
wages. Even Krugman and Venables (1995) predicted that the core-periphery pattern 
would continue only to a certain point. The core-periphery pattern first emerged when 
transportation costs began to fall below a certain critical value. However, when 
transportation costs continued to decline, the forward-backward linkages became less 
important. Once transaction costs reached sufficiently low level, the lower wage in 
periphery would offset the disadvantage of being away from markets and suppliers. As 
a result, firms would start to move out of core to the periphery. This would thus lead to 
growth convergence among regions (Krugman & Venables, 1995, pp. 859-861).  
In summary, theoretical development in regional economics has been rapid in 
the past few decades. Several tools and measures were developed to support theoretical 
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descriptions found by earlier theorists. The scope of the field has also expanded to cover 
many aspects of economic analysis. The field now coincides with urban economics, 
economic geography and is part of interdisciplinary regional science. Consequently, 
economists now have a deeper understanding of how spatial factors influence economic 
patterns around the world. In spite of that, the issue of regional disparity continues to be 
subject to debate. Economists have been unable to agree whether regional disparities 
will automatically converge or whether policy correction is necessary. Given the 
interdisciplinary nature of the issue, theoretical development may become too difficult 
to model. Here, empirical evidences can generate more understanding of how the 
theories fit with the real world. They are considered in the next section.  
 
2.3 Empirical Evidence 
Given the theoretical debates that have continued until today, there is a large amount of 
empirical work done on regional disparities so far. An important study, which marks the 
beginning of empirical work in this field, is by Williamson (1965). He employed 
regional data from 24 countries to compute the population-weighted coefficient of 
variation—a measure of level of income dispersion among regions within a country. 
The empirical results supported his hypothesis that the regional disparities formed an 
inverted U-shaped pattern as a country moved along its development path. Thus, 
convergence of interregional income differences should be expected at the more mature 
stage. These Williamson’s findings were, however, subjected to criticism as he only 
included six developing countries in his analysis (Douglas, 1990, p. 13). In addition, 
empirical evidence in later periods suggested other outcomes. Regional disparities 
within countries continued to widen even at a medium level of national income per 
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capita. Evidence of increasing disparities has been found in China, India, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines1 (Hill, Balisacan & Piza, 2007; Ghosh, 2008).   
While the debate on σ-convergence continued, Barro (1991) turned his attention 
to β-convergence instead. He used data from 98 countries to empirically verify his 
theory on β-convergence. Results showed that countries with lower initial GDP per 
capita would catch up with higher income countries only when they have a high level of 
initial human capital. In addition, determinants for high regional growth include low 
public consumption expenditures, low price distortions in markets, and political 
stability. Sachs and Warner (1995) also confirmed these results. The findings, however, 
only suggested conditional convergence. Growth rates among countries converge if 
steady-state levels and rates of technological progress were held constant. Because these 
two factors differ among countries, the above empirical results partially support the 
neoclassical growth theory.   
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) went further to support unconditional 
convergence as proposed in the theory. Instead of cross-country data, they used intra-
national data for their analysis. This is because regions within the same country tend to 
share more similar characteristics. Thus, steady-state levels and rates of technological 
advancement are expected to be similar as well. Data for 48 US States and 73 regions 
across seven European countries were employed in this case. The empirical results 
exhibit convergence, which is consistent with the theory. Not only that—the rate of 
convergence is higher in this analysis as compared to the cross-country one. This, 
therefore, confirmed the theory that higher mobility of labour accelerates the rate of 
convergence (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1991, p. 153).  
                                                 
1
 These countries are classified as lower-middle income countries according to the World Bank definition 
(see http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0) 
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The method used here has contributed greatly to the empirical researches in the 
field of regional science. In fact, much of recent empirical work has been based around 
this convergence model. Despite that, findings have received some criticisms. The 
model needs to be adjusted before it reveals strong convergence. This includes 
adjustments for sectoral composition, and shocks. Moreover, effects of capital mobility 
on β-convergence yield ambiguous results. If technologies differ among regions, then 
capital may move from poor to rich regions. In that case, there is a tendency for 
divergence rather than convergence.  
Beginning in the 1990s, a considerable amount of attention has revolved around 
the emerging theory of the new economic geography. The theoretical frameworks and 
models have been developed rapidly. This has brought about a new set of arguments to 
explain and predict the pattern of regional disparities. Despite its rapid theoretical 
development, the empirical studies relating to these theories are rather limited. This is 
partly because the quantitative techniques to investigate the issue are still in an early 
stage of development. The theoretical models available so far are either too abstract or 
over simplified, which make them difficult to be tested (Martin, 1999, p. 70). 
Accordingly, the empirical analyses are rather indirect ones—through productivity 
measures and production functions.  
Early empirical studies normally used city or industry size as determinants of 
productivity, which in turn reflects the existence of agglomeration effects. Sveikauskas 
(1975) and Segal (1976) investigated agglomeration across the Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (SMSA) of the USA. They both found that labour productivity 
increased with city size, which was measured as number of population in the city. 
Meanwhile, Handerson (1986) examined the agglomeration effects both in SMSAs of 
the USA and in cities of Brazil. Here, he used industry size, as measured by the number 
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of employees in urban areas, instead of city size. Results showed that there were 
positive relationships between industrial productivity and industry size in both 
countries.  
Ciccone and Hall (1996) argued that density, rather than size, of economic 
activity was a more accurate determinant of agglomeration. This can be examined 
through the effect of employment per physical space (acres) on Gross State Product per 
worker. Focusing on density instead of size also allowed them to use county- and state-
level data. These data normally give a more accurate measure of output than the SMSA 
data employed in earlier studies. The model, then, used the non-linear least square 
(NLS) method to estimate the coefficient representing the net effect between congestion 
and agglomeration forces. They found the evidence of agglomeration effects 
outweighing the congestion effects across counties of the USA in 1988. In addition, 
Ciccone and Hall (1996) also used their framework to show that density was more 
important in determining agglomeration than size of economic activity. Since then, the 
model developed by Ciccone and Hall (1996) has become the conventional method for 
empirical work on agglomeration.   
Given these many methods available for studying regional disparities, researches 
on specific country have grown significantly since 1990. For this study, particular 
attention is given to the researches on East Asian countries. This is because countries 
within the same region should share more similar characteristics than those from 
different regions. Hence, a review of empirical studies in neighbouring countries seems 
to be more appropriate. The cases of China, Indonesia and the Philippines will be 
reviewed below. Then, previous works on Thailand will be discussed. This will reveal 
the gap that this thesis aims to fill.  
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China 
There have been numerous studies done on regional disparities in China during 
recent decades. Tsui (1991) employed both provincial output and income statistics for 
the period 1952-1985 to calculate Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of 
variation. He found that income differences across provinces widened during the period. 
This was partly due to the fiscal decentralisation in 1958. In China, total provincial 
revenues comprise budgetary and extra-budgetary sources. Each province received the 
former from the central government while collecting the latter itself. As fiscal system 
decentralised, more revenues were classified as extra-budgetary revenues. 
Consequently, the rich provinces were able to collect more revenues, which led to 
greater regional disparities. Although central government allocated government 
transfers to the poor provinces, these transfers were not large enough reduce the 
disparities.  
Fujita and Hu (2001) looked at the issue from a coast-interior perspective. They 
found that regional disparities in China become more severe this way. It is because, 
from the 1980s, coastal provinces grew at a faster rate compared with interior provinces. 
Although inter-provincial disparities decreased during the 1980s, it was solely due to 
the catching up of many coastal provinces. In addition, there is no evidence of β-
convergence in China between 1983 and 1994. However, when considering only coastal 
provinces, convergence was exhibited. Disparity between coastal and interior regions is 
further supported by stronger agglomeration in coastal provinces. This agglomeration, 
as the authors argued, was driven mainly by globalisation and economic liberalisation. 
Moreover, a policy bias toward coastal provinces also contributed to the issue.  
The role of globalisation and economic liberalisation in stimulating 
agglomeration effects was further supported by He and Zhu (2009). They found that the 
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Gini coefficients for industrial employment as well as output considerably increased 
from 1990 onwards. The economic reform and opening-up of the coast in 1978 led to 
the rapid growth in the coastal provinces and relative decline of industrial bases in 
interior provinces. This consequently resulted in strong industrial polarisation toward 
the coastal provinces, as reflected by the rising Gini indexes.  
Meanwhile, Song (2007) reviewed several studies to determine factors that 
contributed to the regional disparities in China in recent decades. He summarised that 
these factors include geographic location, openness to trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), capital per worker, marketisation and decentralisation. In addition, 
interregional income growth convergence is found to be conditional on human capital 
accumulation and regional policy. One of the most effective policies to reduce regional 
disparities is to increase interregional migration.   
Market reforms in China did not only lead to increasing regional income 
disparities. It also affected other aspects of spatial inequality. Zhang and Kanbur (2005) 
found that education and health care inequalities increased after the reforms. 
Decentralisation of fiscal responsibilities to local governments means that they became 
providers of health and education services. With limited help from central government, 
the poor local governments were left with an inadequate budget. As a result, they had to 
cut their spending and let their people share the expenses. Hence, increasing income 
inequality translated into inequalities in these services. The study, however, focused on 
rural-urban dimension rather than inter-provincial inequality. This is because the issue 
is more severe in the former dimension (Zhang & Kanbur, 2005, p. 201).  
Due to the considerable number of studies in China, several techniques have 
been suggested to approach the problem. These studies, thus, contribute to this research 
in term of generating more options to choose from. However, given the differences of 
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geographic size, political systems and economic development between Thailand and 
China, the findings may not be well suited to the case of Thailand. Countries that tend 
to be more appropriate to compare with Thailand are Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Indonesia 
There are a smaller number of studies on regional disparities in Indonesia 
compared to China. Nonetheless, the former shares a more similar pattern of economic 
development with Thailand. Not only that, Table 2.1 shows that the problem of regional 
disparities is as severe in Indonesia as it is in Thailand. This has raised much attention 
from both researchers and policymakers in Indonesia.  
Table 2.1  Coefficient of Variation of Several Development Countries 
Country   Year 
  1996 1997 
Brazil   0.563 
China   0.692 
India   0.387 
Indonesia  0.840  
Mexico   0.473 
Nepal  0.157  
Pakistan   0.186 
Philippines   0.530 
Poland  0.206  
Rumania  0.189  
Russia   0.625 
Thailand   0.797 
Uganda   0.274 
Uzbekistan   0.353 
Vietnam     1.067 
Note: The coefficient of variation in this table may not all be weighted by population. No 
such information was given in the study.  
Source: Indonesia: Resosudarmo and  Vidyattama (2006); all other countries: Shankar 
and Shah (2003 cited in Resosudarmo and Vidyattama 2006) 
 
Akita and Lukman (1995) investigated interregional inequalities in Indonesia 
during 1975-1992. Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation was used 
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as a measure. Findings showed that the disparities across regions had gradually 
narrowed. Nonetheless, the disparities in 1992 were considered to still be large. In 
addition, the study also analysed the contribution of production sectors to the overall 
disparities. Here, the coefficient of variation was decomposed into three sectors—
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors2. The coefficients of variation for the latter two 
sectors were much higher than the former. This reflects a more uneven development of 
these two sectors across provinces. With the tertiary sector accounting for the largest 
share of GDP, it contributed the most to the overall interregional inequality. Meanwhile, 
a growing income share of the secondary sector implies that it was expected to play an 
increasing role in the future.  
In a study which sought to explain why provincial income disparities persisted 
in Indonesia, Garcia (1998) examined both types of convergence. The study covered the 
period from 1975 to 1993. Results suggested that dispersion of per capita GDP across 
provinces had steadily declined3. This is consistent with the earlier findings by Akita 
and Lukman (1995). It also implies that σ-convergence was evident during the period. 
For β-convergence, Barro-type regression models were used and the period of study was 
divided into three sub-periods, 1975-1993, 1980-1993 and 1983-1993. Results show 
that absolute convergence exists for all three sub-periods. However, the convergence 
rates became slower from the first sub-period to the last. In addition, the initial income 
only accounts for half of the explanation, and hence, conditional convergence was 
explored. Factors that significantly correlated with higher growth rates were better 
education and lower population growth. Despite having several variables included in the 
model, the significant ones still could not explain provincial growth entirely.  
                                                 
2
 For mathematic details on the decomposition, see Akita and Lukman (1995, p. 64) 
3
 There is actually a dip in 1982, which can be explained by two reasons. One is due to change of base 
year and methodology used to calculate the provincial accounts. Another is that it may reflect the oil 
shock effects. See Garcia (1998, pp. 110-111) 
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Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2006) extended the analysis to include more 
variables. The study covers the years from 1993 to 2002. Though the underlying 
concept was the same as that of Garcia (1998), the methods used here were different. 
While Garcia employed standard deviation of log of per capita GDP as measure of σ-
convergence, Resosudarmo and Vidyattama used the coefficient of variation instead. 
The findings exhibit increasing disparities among provinces since 1998. Nonetheless, 
they found conditional growth convergence among per capita GDP across provinces 
during the period. Again, while Garcia conducted analysis using an OLS estimating 
method, it is found to be inconsistent with the model used here. Thus, fixed effect 
estimation was applied to the analysis. Results reveal that the factors that significantly 
determine provincial growth include capital accumulation, trade liberalisation and the 
share of natural gas and oil production in the total provincial GDP.   
Hill, Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2008) revisited the regional disparities issue 
by covering the longest period of time possible. The study used provincial data from 
1975 to 2004. Findings indicated that there has been a clear shift of economic activity 
toward Jakarta. The capital almost doubled its share of non-mining GDP from 11.0 
percent in 1975 to 18.8 percent in 2004. Not only that, Jakarta has also been among the 
fastest-growing provinces throughout the period. Thus, Jakarta has exhibited strong 
agglomeration forces. This result was apparent regardless of the data set being used. On 
the contrary, when looking at the regional level, the disparities depend considerably on 
the choice of data. When gross regional product (GRP) was employed, the σ-
convergence could be observed over the period of study. In addition, absolute β-
convergence was detected for the period between 1975 and 1997.  However, when non-
mining GRP and consumption expenditure data were used instead of the total GRP, no 
significant convergence occurred. There was no evidence of σ-convergence for the two 
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series as the Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation exhibited stable 
trends. Likewise, the coefficients for absolute β-convergence were insignificant for both 
series. Nonetheless, evidence showed that the provinces with high growth during the 
period were those being most connected to the global economy. 
The Philippines  
Although it is an archipelagic state, the Philippines share some similar 
characteristics to Thailand. The two countries are similar in geographic size, population, 
income level as well as the economic structure. Having similar development patterns, 
both of them fell into the financial crisis in 1997. They have also been faced with 
persistent income inequality. In fact, the income Gini coefficients of Thailand and the 
Philippines are roughly at the same level.  
In examining characteristics of poverty and inequality in the Philippines, 
Balisacan (2002) identified regional inequality as one of the attributes. He then 
employed provincial panel data to investigate factors affecting the welfare of the poor 
across provinces. Regression results suggested that poverty reduction depended on the 
types of growth rather than the rate of growth. In other words, growth would benefit the 
poor more if policies were designed to favour them. Factors that affected the welfare of 
the poor include schooling coupled with infrastructure, better terms of trade for 
agricultural products, agrarian reform, and governance. More importantly, geographic 
disadvantages such as landlocked areas or regions frequently hit by typhoons also led to 
poverty traps. Hence, improving conditions in these areas would increase the welfare of 
the poor.  
A comprehensive study on regional disparities in the Philippines is summarised 
in the book edited by Balisacan and Hill (2007). Here, several factors were examined in 
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detail to see whether they determined income differences across regions. These factors 
were comprised of local governance quality, regional labour markets, decentralisation, 
infrastructure, development of rural non-farm sector and trade liberalisation. Using 
Human Development Index (HDI) scores as measures of local governance quality, no 
correlation between HDI scores and provincial economies were found. Theoretically, 
local governance and regional development can be linked in three channels—social 
service provision, social inclusion and initial level of development (Capuno, 2007, p. 
206). The study suggested that there was a relationship between poverty and poor 
quality of local governance. That is, level of development in each area determined its 
politics, which in turn determined its future development level.  
Similarly, regional labour markets in the Philippines between 1988 and 2002 
showed few signs of convergence. There was also no significant sign of divergence 
either. Although regional per capita income was not closely related with the 
unemployment rate, it had a stronger positive relationship with wages growth. In 
addition, high-income regions continued to be major destinations for migrants from the 
poorer regions. Data suggested that this was one of the most effective ways to move out 
of poverty in rural areas. While this illustrates the agglomeration force of the rich 
regions, it also implies that labour in the Philippines was quite mobile (Esguerra & 
Manning, 2007, p. 273).  
The Philippines implemented fiscal decentralisation in 1991. Theoretically, this 
should lead to more efficient use of budgets, as local governments are expected to know 
what local people want better than the central government. Nonetheless, this has not 
been evident in the Philippines particularly during 1997-2000. This was due to a 
mismatch of revenue assignment and expenditure responsibilities of local governments. 
Consequently, local governments in richer regions were in better positions to provide 
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public services. Although there were transfers from central government, they turned out 
to be positively correlated with the regional per capita income between 1995 and 1999. 
This tended to increase, rather than reduce the disparities. On the other hand, 
infrastructure investment was found to be a source of regional income growth. Since 
this type of investment had been highly uneven among regions in the Philippines, it 
explains why the country continued to have high regional disparities.  
Another factor that is expected to reduce regional income inequality is the access 
to rural non-farm income. A study by Estudillo and Hossain (2003) found evidence of 
this relationship in the Philippines. Data also reveal that non-farm income accounted for 
the largest part of rural household income. This non-farm income was comprised of 
remittances from those who worked abroad and income from rural industries. Recent 
growth in rural industries came from relocation of firms outside cities in order to access 
cheaper labour and lower land prices. Another character of rural industrialisation in the 
Philippines was the growing number of subcontracting firms. This rapid rise in 
subcontracting was a result of trade liberalisation and substantial foreign investment 
inflow in the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, to minimise transportation costs, most of these 
relocated firms and subcontractors were still in close proximity to the manufacturing 
centres. Like conventional pattern, the manufacturing sector in the Philippines was 
concentrated only in a few areas of the country.  
This point is further supported by analysis of trade liberalisation effects on 
regional disparities. Tecson (2007) found that trade liberalisation played an important 
role in reducing the primacy of the country’s capital city. However, industries appeared 
to re-concentrate in the nearby areas. To measure the concentration of industry, Tecson 
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used the Industrial Location Quotient4 and FDI. Both data revealed a high degree of 
regional concentration in production sectors and foreign investment. In fact, 
concentration of manufacturing had been encouraged by the government through export 
processing zones (EPZ). Nevertheless, increasing concentration around the capital runs 
counter to the government’s aim to disperse industry to other regions. This implies that 
agglomeration forces have taken effect here.  
Finally, Balisacan (2007) used provincial per capita income during 1988-2003 to 
empirically investigate income growth convergence among provinces. He found 
absolute convergence of per capita income growth across provinces of the Philippines. 
Furthermore, a conditional convergence model was employed to examine relationships 
between many factors and provincial growth. Results show that per capita income 
growth was significantly affected by improvements in education, health and 
infrastructure, better agricultural term of trade and land reform. The same analysis was 
also conducted with poverty reduction. However, no direct effect of the above factors 
was found on poverty reduction. With significant and positive correlation between 
income growth and poverty reduction, it implies that these policies only reduce poverty 
via their effects on income growth.   
Thailand 
The number of studies that focus directly on the regional inequality in Thailand 
has been exceptionally small. This is partly because most attention has been paid to the 
income inequality across income quintiles. A perception might be that all other 
                                                 
4
 Industrial Location Quotient or ILQ is a measure of a region’s degree of concentration in a given 
industry. Concentration of industry in location i is given by  
 
 ILQi  =  si / xi 
 
where  si  is location i‘s share of industry value added and  xi  is location i‘s share of total value added or 
employment 
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inequality dimensions will be automatically improved once inequality across quintiles is 
reduced. Moreover, regional policies have been embedded in the five-year national 
development plan since 1977 (Kmonwatananisa, 2008). As a result, it may be perceived 
by many that this dimension of inequality has been taken care of. Nonetheless, the 
increasing gap between Bangkok and the rest of the country implies that these past 
regional policies may not be sufficient.  
In a study of regional inequality, Douglass (1990) showed that the regional 
disparities were on the increase in Asian countries including Thailand. This study also 
showed that development had been concentrated only around Bangkok for decades. 
Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation was used on per capita gross 
provincial product (GPP) to measure regional disparities. Results reveal that regional 
disparities in Thailand were increasing and that Bangkok continued to be the major 
source of these disparities. Factors contributing to this high polarisation in and around 
the capital city include the geography of Bangkok, a government policy bias toward 
Bangkok and slow agricultural productivity-improvement. Given that the manufacturing 
sector clustered around Bangkok and its surrounding provinces, Douglass predicted that 
polarisation would continue. This would lead to even higher income disparities between 
regions. Government interventions were thus recommended. The conventional policy 
had been to induce industries to locate in targeted areas outside the BMR. While this 
approach was effective in slowing down the polarisation in the old cores, it does not 
always directly lead to a reduction in regional disparities. As a result, a policy to 
accelerate rural development was also recommended to complement industrial 
decentralisation policy. The logic was that towns and non-agricultural sectors in 
provinces would grow in response to higher demand. Demand could increase only in 
response to higher agricultural productivity and incomes. 
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The implementation of regional development policy was also supported by 
Booth (1997, pp. 179-185). She suggested that high regional disparity was one of the 
reasons why Thailand—though the economy grew faster—was less successful in 
poverty reduction than Indonesia. This was due to different policies toward rural 
development. In Thailand, rural areas and the agricultural sector, where majority of the 
poor were located, did not receive much attention. Indonesia, in contrast, stimulated 
growth in regions where the poor were concentrated.  
The study by Southichack (1998) provided a more comprehensive analysis to 
regional development in Thailand. He examined both σ-convergence and β-
convergence using provincial data from 1975 to 1995. Here, standard deviation of the 
log of real per capita GPP was employed as a measure of regional dispersion. Results 
showed that per capita GPP dispersion increased between 1975 and 1995. This implies 
that Thailand experienced σ-divergence during the period of study. The dispersion was 
also found to be positively correlated with the real per capita GDP growth rate. As for 
β-convergence, the regressions were estimated using NLS method. Results suggested 
that there was an unconditional β-divergence among provinces in Thailand during the 
20-year period. It was only after controlling for regional differences and structural 
changes within each province that the conditional β-convergence was detected.  
In this study, Southichack also analysed an effect of price differences across 
provinces on the convergence estimates. He compared the data deflated by province-
specific deflators and those deflated by overall GDP deflator. Evidence indicated that 
price differentials significantly affected both σ- and β-convergence results. Moreover, 
the study suggested that another factor contributing to Thailand’s divergence was the 
labour productivity divergence across provinces. Meanwhile, there was no evidence that 
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per capita labour input differentials and migration significantly affected the convergence 
pattern.  
Finally, the author investigated whether agglomeration forces contributed to 
Thailand’s divergence. Evidence showed that net in-migration was positively related to 
the per capita GPP growth. As a result, the high-growth provinces were expected to be 
associated with higher population density. Theoretically, increased population density 
creates two countervailing effects—agglomeration and congestion effects. While the 
former effect tends to raise provincial productivity, the latter reduces it. If the 
agglomeration effect outweighs the congestion effect, the provinces with higher 
population density would experience productivity gains. Evidence indicated that this 
was the case for few provinces in central and southern regions. In addition, provincial 
productivity was positively related to educational attainment of workers and per capita 
infrastructure expenditure. With more developed infrastructure and better educated 
workers in the BMR region, the agglomeration of the BMR thus contributed to the 
divergence.  
The contribution of BMR agglomeration to the divergence was also supported 
by Kittiprapas (1999a). Looking at the period 1978-1989, this study found that regional 
disparities declined after 1988. This was due to de-concentration of economic activities 
from Bangkok to its surrounding provinces. As these provinces were catching up with 
Bangkok, the difference between BMR and the rest of the country widened. Without 
using regression analysis, Kittiprapas proposed several factors contributing to the 
growing disparities. These were unbalanced public investment in infrastructure, 
centralise of powers in Bangkok, sectoral policy bias toward manufacturing which 
located around Bangkok, uneven distribution of educated labour force, and unsuccessful 
regional development policy due to budget limitation. At the same time, the σ-
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divergence findings made by Southichack were supported by Patmasiriwat and Pachuei 
(1999). They examined provincial disparities using the Theil index of Gross Provincial 
Product (GPP). They found that provincial inequality increased from 0.179 in 1989 to 
0.183 in 1995. The findings also showed that only Bangkok, its vicinity and some 
Eastern provinces had GPP higher than the national average.     
Similarly, Nantamanasikarn (2002) re-examined both types of GPP per capita 
convergence among provinces in Thailand from 1983 to 1999. Williamson’s coefficient 
of variation and Theil’s Index were used as measures of σ-convergence. Both measures 
indicated that the provincial disparities had increased during the period. This means that 
no evidence of σ-convergence was found. Decomposition of Theil’s Index further 
suggested that the main source of disparities came from income differences between 
regions—as opposed to differences within region. Unconditional β-convergence could 
not be found in this study either. This is consistent with Southichack’s findings. 
Nonetheless, conditional convergence was detected here only when the province-
specific effect was allowed. That is, each province in Thailand had its own steady-state 
level and was converging to such state. Moreover, this study employed the Markov 
transition analysis5 to predict the movement of provinces from one income group to 
another. Results revealed that provinces in the poor groups had lower probability to 
move upward than those in the richer groups. Hence, catching up of the poor provinces 
was less likely to happen in Thailand. Given that provinces were concentrated in the 
low-income group, provincial income gap was also unlikely to be narrowed.   
While earlier studies were using GPP data, Motonishi (2003) examined σ-
convergence using household socio-economic surveys (SES) instead. Consistent with 
                                                 
5
 The Markov transition analysis is a mathematical method for analysing social mobility overtime. It is 
usually represented in a form of a matrix. A Markov transition matrix is a square matrix describing the 
probabilities of moving from one state to another. See Read (1972, pp. 766-786)   
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the GPP data, inequality in household income across regions also increased over the 
period 1975-1998. Motonishi, then, went further to investigate factors determining 
regional disparities in Thailand. Results suggested that inequality between agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors played an important role in determining overall regional 
income inequality. In contrast, financial development was found to help reduce 
inequality. While this study gave an in-depth analysis on causes of disparities, it only 
looked at the regional level. This is possibly because the sample size at the provincial 
level was not large enough to represent the provincial averages until 1994.  
A research project by NESDB and World Bank (2005) took a look at more 
recent GPP data. The study examined growth convergence across provinces covering a 
period from 1975 to 2003. Figure 2.1 illustrates the results. Growth convergence among 
provinces was evident during the earlier period of 1975-1986. In contrast, no 
convergence was found during the latter period of 1986-2003 as the fitted line sloped 
upward. The graph suggests that provinces with higher per capita income in 1986 
tended to grow faster than those with a lower income. As a result, income disparities 
among provinces widened.  
Figure 2.1 also reveals that the Northeast provinces lagged behind others both in 
terms of initial income level and the growth rates. Focusing on development of the 
Northeast region, the study examined factors contributing to these results. The major 
factors include weak productivity gains, Bangkok’s agglomeration forces, inadequate 
infrastructure and relatively low amount of public spending. Weak productivity gains in 
the Northeast were due to low agricultural yields and lack of a driving non-agricultural 
sector. Strong agglomeration forces of Bangkok, meanwhile, pulled all the resources 
from other regions into it. Although many provinces have emerged as secondary cities 
and industrial zones during the past few decades, most of them are in close proximity of 
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Bangkok. As for infrastructure, inadequate facilities have neglected the Northeast region 
so as to benefit from trade with the neighbouring countries. Finally, lower government 
spending relative to other regions translated into lower spending by function.  
Alternatively, Nopkhun (2007) used provincial-level data to investigate sources 
of disparities between inland and coastal regions. In his study, he also examined 
provincial growth β-convergence between 1981 and 2003. The findings revealed that 
there was no evidence of β-convergence since the steady-growth period between 1981 
and 1986. Potipiti (2009) added more empirical details on the β-convergence as well as 
on σ-convergence. By grouping provinces into thirty poorest- and thirty richest 
provinces, he found that there was β-convergence among the richest provinces during 
the period 1990-2000. However, the convergence was no longer evident when 
considering the period 2001-2005. There was also no evidence of σ-convergence, as 
measured by variance of log of GPP per capita, between 1981 and 2005. He, then, 
performed regression analyses on determinants of σ-convergence. Results suggested 
that the group of provinces with diverse production structures was likely to converge 
while migration between provinces did not play a significant role in causing 
convergence within the group. While this study contributed greatly to the understanding 
of convergence across provinces, it grouped provinces into two-, three-, five-, seven- 
and nine-province groups. It therefore did not show the relationship across all 
provinces. 
In a review of spatial disparities in Thailand, Wisaweisuan (2009) confirmed the 
findings of the previous studies. Using regional Gini index as a measure of disparities, 
the study indicated that income gaps among regions in Thailand increased during the 
period 1981-1997. Although the index fell during the crisis, the 2005 figure remained at 
a level higher than that in 1980. This was partly due to uneven public spending which 
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was biased toward Bangkok and its vicinities. As a result, access to basic services was 
required for improving quality of life.  
Figure 2.1 Growth Convergence among Provinces 1975-1986 and 1986-2003 
 
Source: NESDB and World Bank (2005, Figure 17) 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Income inequality among regions within several developing countries has been on the 
rise (Kanbur & Venables, 2005, p. 3). Given that it has persisted, if not increased, for a 
long time in these countries, researchers as well as policymakers started to wonder how 
such an outcome prevails. As a result, the issue of regional disparities has received a 
considerable amount of attention during the past few decades. The first part of this 
chapter reviewed development of the theories and arguments from the early periods to 
the recent concerns. As the issue remains highly debatable, empirical studies were then 
reviewed to show how these findings support each theory.  
The country-specific evidence suggested that increasing regional disparity 
within a country is more a developing country phenomenon. As a result, a large number 
of country-specific researches have been available in several developing countries. 
Nonetheless, the study of regional economics has been rather limited in Thailand. The 
thorough analysis of disparity pattern among provinces and regions has not been 
investigated after Southichack (1998). Since then, the Thai economy has been through 
the financial crisis and partial recovery. These changes in economic conditions must 
affect the disparity pattern. Because no evidence is available to date, the matter of how 
much the pattern has changed and in which direction remains unknown. In addition, 
despite empirical evidence on growth convergence among provinces, determinants of 
provincial growth have never been examined.  
The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that there is room for further 
theoretical and empirical studies. Nonetheless, this thesis will focus only on examining 
regional disparity in Thailand. It aims at filling the empirical gaps in analysing 
Thailand’s recent economic development. In addition, there are limited techniques 
employed in the existing researches on Thailand. The above review of studies in other 
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countries suggests that there are now more methods available. This research, therefore, 
will also explore these methods and incorporate those that are suitable for the case of 
Thailand into the analysis.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Three Decades of Thailand’s Development and Provincial Disparities  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
During the past three decades, the Thai economy has gone through remarkable changes. 
Between 1987 and 1996, the economy grew very rapidly that the country was regarded 
as one of the Asian Economic Miracles (World Bank, 1993, p. 1). Then, the Thai 
economy fell into the crisis of 1997-1998. This raised a question of what went wrong in 
Thailand’s economic development. Since then, several reforms have been implemented. 
These reforms aimed to help the economy recover as well as to ensure that growth 
would be more sustainable in the future.  
Notwithstanding these changes, one characteristic of Thai economic 
development remained. Development has long been uneven, particularly when 
comparing across regions (Parnwell, 1996; Dixon, 1999). This chapter discusses the 
pattern of development in Thailand between 1981 and 2008, with emphasis on regional 
development. Then, the pattern of regional disparities will be examined. Given data 
limitations, the empirical analysis will only cover the period between 1981 and 2008. 
 
3.2 Thai Economy and Regional Development 
The Pre-boom (1981-1986) 
Modern economic development in Thailand started in 1957 when the government 
shifted policies toward those suggested by the World Bank (Dixon, 1999, p. 77). This 
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was followed by formulation of the First National Economic Development Plan1, 
henceforth called the Plan. The First Plan was implemented in 1961. Since then, the 
five-year National Plans have become an established feature of the Thai development 
(Dixon, 1999, p. 79). The first two Plans called for substantial infrastructure 
development and manufacturing development support. In the Third-, Fourth- and Fifth 
Plans (1972-1976, 1977-1981 and 1982-1986, respectively), several other aspects of 
development were added to the plans. All of these aimed at achieving the same goal—
overall economic growth. Due to these modern development policies, the Thai economy 
took off since 1958. Based on official GDP data from the NESDB, Thailand grew by an 
average rate of 7.1 percent per year between 1958 and 1986 (see Table 3.1).   
Table 3.1 Real  GDP Growth Rate of Thailand 1958-2008 
  
Period 
1958-1986 1987-1996 1997-1998 1999-2008 
Agriculture 4.9 2.6 -1.1 3.2 
Industry 9.0 12.8 -7.4 6.1 
    Manufacturing 8.9 13.3 -4.7 6.7 
    Construction 7.9 12.8 -31.9 0.7 
Services 7.4 9.0 -5.6 3.7 
GDP 7.1 9.5 -5.9 4.7 
Source: 1958-1979 from NESDB (1999, Table 2); 1980-1992 from NESDB (2002, Table 2) and 
1993-2008 from NESDB (2010a, Table 4)  
 
Although these Plans aimed at promoting economic growth, they did not entirely 
ignore the issue of regional disparities. Policies to reduce regional disparities appeared 
for the first time in the Third Plan (1972-1976). This was because the primacy of 
Bangkok increased significantly during the 1960s. The primacy index of Bangkok—
ratio of population in Bangkok and that in the second largest city—went up from 25 
                                                 
1
 Social development aspects were added from the Third Plan onwards. Thus, the plan has changed to 
National Economic and Social Development Plan since. For convenience, it will be called the National 
Plan or the Plan hereinafter.  
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times in 1960 to 33 times in 1970 (Dixon, 1999, p. 194). Consequently, the Third Plan 
emphasised reducing income disparities. Despite such a policy being laid out, the 
implementation was far less apparent. The share of the government budget allocated to 
the regions as percentage of the total budget fell. Thus, it could be expected here that 
not much change had taken place during the Third Plan.  
To resolve such issues, the Fourth Plan (1977-1981) proposed that regional 
cities should be developed. Due to political instability at the time, much of regional 
policy was either abandoned or scaled down. Meanwhile, the change in Thai economic 
structure began to accelerate. From 1951 to 1975, the share of the manufacturing sector 
increased from 16.7 percent of GDP to 26.7 percent. By 1979, the share rose to 30.4 
percent. This increase meant a fall in the agricultural share of GDP, which declined 
from 37.9 percent to 21.0 percent during 1951-1979. This change in economic structure 
is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Share of GDP by Sector (Real Values) 1951-2007 
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Up to 1979, the aim of the shifts toward the industrial sector was only to sustain 
the domestic market. As a result, the small-scale, low-tech manufacturing continued to 
dominate the sector. Moreover, Thai policy was still considered to be more directed to 
import substitution. Although there were moves toward export orientation in the 1970s, 
protection for import-substitution industries remained high throughout the period. 
Several subsidising policies continued to be in place. This had caused the current 
account deficit and the budget deficit to accumulate. Combined with political instability, 
investors became reluctant to invest. Thailand was thought to be heading toward an 
economic downturn. In addition, there was also concern over uneven regional 
development. This is because the shift toward the industrial sector during the 1970s took 
place mostly in and around Bangkok. Almost seventy percent of the projects approved 
by the Board of Investment (BOI) located in BMR during 1974-1978 (Dixon, 1999, p. 
232). In 1981, BMR generated 64.0 percent of total industrial output.  
Due to these imbalances, the Fifth Plan (1982-1986) proposed structural change. 
Foreign exchange controls were relaxed. Import substitution policy was abandoned and 
replaced by export-oriented policy. The Eastern Seaboard (ESB) was initiated with an 
intention to diversify economic activities away from the BMR. Along with this was the 
development of five regional cities. These were Chiang Mai, Khon Kean, Nakhon 
Ratchasima, Chon Buri and Sonkhla-Hat Yai.  
The Boom (1987-1996) 
The policy shift toward export oriented, coupled with devaluation of the Baht in 
1984 made Thailand more attractive to foreign investors. At the same time, Asian 
Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) started to lose their comparative advantage in 
low-cost labour intensive goods. As a result, investors from the NIEs—along with 
others—began to look for new locations. With structural changes and cheap labour, 
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Thailand became their prime destination. This led to a boom in labour-intensive 
manufacturing for exports and, hence rapid growth of the Thai economy. From 1987 to 
1996, an annual economic growth of Thailand averaged 9.5 percent. This growth rate 
was the world’s second fastest after China (Richter, 2006, p. 7).  
The regional development in Thailand also showed a better picture. This was 
partly because considerable attention was given to the regional issue in the Sixth- and 
Seventh Plans (1987-1991 and 1992-1996, respectively). Continuing from their 
predecessor, these Plans intensely promoted the development of the Eastern Seaboard. 
The Eastern Seaboard Development Programme, which was drafted during the Fifth 
Plan, focuses mainly on the infrastructure development. It involved the construction of 
Map-Ta-Put Port and Industrial Estate for heavy chemical industries, the construction of 
Laem Chabang Port and Industrial Estate for export-oriented industry, and the 
establishment of related infrastructure such as roads, railways, communication facilities, 
water pipelines and electricity (Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA], 2001, 
pp. 347-350).  
As part of the initiative to decentralise industries, the Eastern Seaboard was 
implemented along with BOI- and financial incentives. The BOI incentives were given 
via promotional zoning and tax privileges. Although these incentives had been given 
since the First Plan, the granting of tax exemptions had no spatial element until the Fifth 
Plan (1982-1986). In 1983, the BOI announced new criteria that made location a 
criterion for tax incentives. Despite that, BOI zones were limited to only 21 provinces. 
Hence, the incentives did not find much success until zones were extended to cover all 
provinces in 1987. Here, projects located in Zone 1 (Bangkok and Samut Prakarn) no 
longer received any tax holidays unless they met exports and employment targets 
(Biggs, Brimble, Snodgrass & Murrey, 1990, pp. 93-96). The zoning was further 
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modified such that Zone 1 covered Bangkok and five surrounding provinces in 1989. 
These changes in 1987 and 1989 coincide well with the development of the Eastern 
Seaboard, thus enhancing the de-concentration process. As for the financial incentives, 
low interest rates were given by the Bank of Thailand (BOT), the Industrial Finance 
Corporation of Thailand (IFCT) and the Small Industry Finance Office (SIFO). These 
incentives, however, did not have any location criteria.  
In addition to the continuation of the Eastern Seaboard, the Seventh Plan also 
promoted industrial development in the Central region (Kmonwatananisa, 2008, p. 8). 
As a result, the share of industrial output generated by the BMR fell considerably from 
63.9 percent in 1991 to 49.1 percent in 1996. This was replaced by increases in 
industrial output in the East and Central regions. The share of industrial output 
generated by the East and the Central regions rose from 10.9 percent and 5.2 percent of 
the total industrial output to 21.3 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively (see Table 3.2).  
While the Eastern Seaboard succeeded in diverting factories away from BMR, 
other policies to create regional centres did not show much success. This was partly due 
to poor inter-provincial transport facilities. Inevitably for overall growth, BMR 
continued to receive a large share of the infrastructure development budget at a cost of 
other provinces. In addition, regional centres in Thailand were considered small by 
international standards. In 1991, apart from Bangkok there were only 25 urban centres 
with populations higher than 50,000. Only nine of these had populations of more than 
100,000 (Dixon, 1999, p. 230). Thus, provincial markets remained small while BMR 
and the Eastern Seaboard extended. As a result, regional disparities remained high—if 
not increasing.  
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The role of BMR was further enhanced by the rapid growth of the banking, 
insurance and real estate (BIR) sector2. Between 1987 and 1994, except for 1989 and 
1991, BIR was the fastest-growing sector in Thailand (NESDB, 1996). The share of 
BIR sector to GDP rose from 2.8 percent in 1987 to 7.5 percent in 1996. With BMR 
generating more than two-third of the total BIR output, this means most of the benefits 
from the BIR sector went to the BMR.  
Table 3.2 Share of Industry Output by Region 1981 – 2006 (Nominal Values) 
   Year 
    1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
Industry       
 Northeast 6.60 6.77 5.97 6.92 4.86 5.25 
 North 5.93 6.92 6.14 6.69 5.07 5.43 
 South 6.78 4.20 3.69 5.42 5.01 5.07 
 East 8.50 12.58 11.78 19.06 21.01 27.16 
 West 4.39 3.93 3.57 3.65 3.53 3.34 
 Central 3.83 3.87 4.98 9.12 10.71 11.19 
 BMR 63.97 61.73 63.87 49.14 49.80 42.56 
 Whole Kingdom 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
        
Manufacturing       
 Northeast 4.50 3.72 3.79 4.07 3.89 4.58 
 North 4.17 3.04 3.09 4.14 3.60 4.27 
 South 3.26 2.15 2.15 4.01 4.03 4.05 
 East 9.54 11.93 10.90 21.32 18.51 24.30 
 West 3.73 3.53 3.07 3.15 2.75 2.53 
 Central 3.50 3.40 5.24 10.09 12.16 12.99 
 BMR 71.29 72.22 71.75 53.21 55.06 47.28 
 Whole Kingdom 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: 1981-1997: NESDB (1998, Table ‘Whole Kingdom’), 1998-2001: NESDB (2007a, Table 
‘Whole Kingdom’) and 2002-2006: NESDB (2010b, Table ‘Whole Kingdom’)  
 
In general, the financial system rapidly developed to facilitate stellar growth 
during the boom period. Not only did the commercial banks grow considerably, but 
                                                 
2
  Due to change in disaggregating methods, this series contain data only up to 1997. The new series re-
categorise the Banking, Insurance and Real Estate sector into two sectors. Banking and Insurance are part 
of Financial Intermediation sector. Real estate has become part of the Real Estate, Renting and Business 
Activities.   
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several financial and security companies were also established. With support from the 
Thai government, the financial market was liberalised in the early 1990s. The Bank of 
Thailand lifted controls over foreign-exchange transactions in 1990 in order to facilitate 
large movements of foreign capitals. Then, the Bangkok International Banking Facility 
(BIBF) was established in 1993. This allowed foreign institutions to set up operations 
and make loans to domestic borrowers. The low interest rates offered by these foreign 
institutions attracted many investors to borrow in foreign currency. The capital market 
openness coupled with the high returns in the Thai financial markets also attracted 
short-term portfolio investment and foreign holdings of domestic bank accounts. 
Consequently, large amounts of short-term foreign capital flowed into the Thai 
economy.  
The rapid economic growth since the late-1980s, also led to a shortage of office 
space as well as housing. With fixed exchange rates and sustained high growth, much of 
these foreign loans consequently went to real estate projects. The share of real estate 
lending more than doubled in both commercial banks and finance companies 
(Siamwalla, 2005, pp. 67-68). This real-estate boom and optimistic predictions of 
continued high economic growth finally led to a bubble economy.  
The long period of rapid growth also led to substantial increases in real wages. 
This was particularly the case for the labour-intensive export manufacturing sector. The 
supply of unskilled labour, which was abundant at the beginning of the boom period, 
had been used up. At the same time, the number of the young population entering the 
labour market started to come down. This was due to the National Family Planning 
Programme, which began in 1970. The programme was adopted to control the high 
population growth rate Thailand had experienced during the 1960s (Prachuabmoh & 
Mithranon, 2003, p. 36). As a result, number of population aged 15-24 started to fall in 
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1990 (United Nations [UN], 2009). Eventually, the labour shortages drove up real 
wages. Being a price-taker in the global market, the higher wages caused Thailand’s 
competitiveness in labour-intensive goods to fall. Consequently, exports from Thailand 
contracted in 1996.  
As exports weakened and the bubble economy continued, foreign investors 
started to consider investing elsewhere. This triggered foreign capital outflows. 
Unfortunately, there was a large volume of foreign portfolio and short-term capital in 
Thailand at the time. The rapid outflows of a sizable foreign capital means the real value 
of the Baht depreciated. Following fixed exchange rate regime, the Bank of Thailand 
had to use foreign reserves to keep the Baht stable. This raised expectations that the 
Baht would devalue in the near future. Accordingly, the Baht was speculated against, 
leading to a depletion of the foreign reserves. Finally, the Bank of Thailand decided to 
float the Baht in July 2, 1997 (Warr, 2005, pp. 21-26).  
The Crisis and the Post-crisis Period (1997-2008) 
The Thai economy fell into an economic crisis in July 1997. Immediately after 
the floatation of the Baht, the exchange rate moved from 25 Baht per US Dollar to 30 
Baht. The devaluation continued and peaked at 55 Baht per US Dollar in January 1998. 
This means financial institutions that borrowed short-term capital from abroad to lend 
domestically saw their liabilities increased drastically. In addition, a lot of their 
customers also borrowed from abroad and found themselves with larger debts. 
Borrowers, particularly those who invested in properties became unable to service their 
debts. Consequently, financial institutions ended up with significant share of non-
performing loans (NPL).  
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The devaluation of the Baht also produced adverse effects on the real sector. 
Particularly for businesses that borrowed from abroad, many of them had to either shut 
down or lay off some of their employees to cope with their financial situations. At the 
same time, the high NPL in financial institutions led to suspension of 56 out of 91 
finance companies. Consequently, unemployment more than doubled from 700,000 
persons in February 1997 to 1.48 million in February 1998 (World Bank, 1999, pp. 9-
10). Those who were still working at the time also became more cautious on their 
spending. In 1997 and 1998, private consumption fell by 1.4 percent and 11.5 percent, 
respectively. Likewise, private investment also fell. In fact, the largest contraction 
occurred in the private investment. As real estate bubble burst, investment fell by 21.9 
percent in 1997 then declined further by 50.9 percent in 1998. 
The adverse effects of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy package 
also added to the fall in domestic demand. As the Thai government accepted US$17.2 
billion rescue package from the IMF, it agreed to impose several adjustment measures 
to the economy. These included fiscal budget tightening, following the IMF requirement 
of a budget surplus equivalent to 1.0 percent of GDP. As a result, the public 
consumption fell by 2.8 percent in 1997 (NESDB, 2002, p. 12). In addition, the 
closedown of 42 finance companies3 was also believed to be the IMF pre-condition for 
Thailand to receive the rescue package (Siamwalla, 2005, pp. 70-71). This IMF 
requirement, along with other measures, was later widely criticised as causing too much 
contraction in the Thai economy.  
As a consequence of these factors, the Thai economy contracted by 1.4 percent 
and 10.5 percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively (see Table 3.1). With several measures 
                                                 
3
 On June 28, 1997 there were 16 finance companies suspended from operation. In August 5, 1997 42 
finance companies were added to the suspension. Only two of them were able to restructure and carry on 
their operations (Siamwalla, 2005, pp. 70-72).  
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and reforms being implemented, the economy gradually recovered. GDP started to grow 
again in 1999. The average GDP growth rate for the period 1999-2008 is 4.7 percent per 
year (see Table 3.1). Despite that, Thailand’s economic growth after the crisis has never 
been as fast as that during the boom. Private investment stagnated during the crisis and 
remained low since (see Figure 3.2). This was partly because banks became more 
cautious in approving loans. In addition, firms had no incentive to invest as their 
existing capacity was under-utilised. Likewise, the share of private consumption to GDP 
barely grew at all after the crisis.  
Figure 3.2 Share of Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 1980-2008 (Real Values) 
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Source: 1980-1992: NESDB (2002, Table 2) and 1993-2008: NESDB (2010a, Table 2)  
 
Despite several adverse effects, the devaluation of the Baht also produced 
positive effects for exporters. As the Baht devalued, exports from Thailand became 
more attractive. As a result, exports expanded considerably and became the major driver 
of the Thai economy after the crisis. Figure 3.2 illustrates this. The share of exports 
jumped from 46.5 percent of GDP in 1997 to 56.1 percent in 1998. Then, it has 
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continuously increased such that it accounted for 72.4 percent of GDP in 2008. This 
increasing role of exports, however, means that the economy has become more reliant 
on external factors. That is, the global economy now plays a bigger role in determining 
the direction of the Thai economy. With stagnating domestic investment and 
consumption throughout the recovery period, this recovery is only a partial one. 
Meanwhile, the national plans, the Eighth- and Ninth Plans (1997-2001 and 2002-2006, 
respectively) shifted their focus from economic growth to human development.  
Having to comply with IMF measures, the Plans also suggested that fiscal and 
administrative authorities should be decentralised. Following the Plans, the 
Decentralisation Act was enacted on November 18, 1999. The Act aims at transferring 
local duties and authorities from central ministries to the local governments—mainly at 
provincial and sub-district (tambon) levels. It also mandated that local revenues should 
be at least 20 percent of the government’s total revenue by fiscal year 2001 and 35 
percent by fiscal year 2006 (Lao-Araya, 2002, p. 7). Although the transfer of authority 
to local government had mostly been completed by 2004, the fiscal decentralisation 
process had not (National Decentralisation Committee [NDC], 2004). Revenues 
received by local governments increased from 9.8 percent of total government revenue 
in fiscal year 1998 to 16.5 percent in fiscal year 2009 (Ministry of Finance [MOF], 
2010). Despite that, out of all local revenues, the locally-collected revenue remained 
stable at below two percent of total government revenue (Amornvivat, 2004, pp. 11-12). 
Not only has the 2001 target not been met, but local governments also continued to be 
financially dependent on the central government. Hence, it can be concluded that the 
decentralisation process has been far from fully completed.  
Looking at the regional level, the BMR was hardest hit by the crisis. This should 
come as no surprise. The BMR accounted for seventy percent of the financial sector 
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output and almost fifty percent of total manufacturing output in 1996. All of the 56 
suspended finance companies were located or headquartered in the BMR. The BMR 
also hosted 53.0 percent of all manufacturing sector in 1996. As a result, per capita GPP 
in BMR fell sharply during 1997-1998. This can be depicted in Figure 3.3 and Table 
3.3. While per capita GPP of other regions also declined during the crisis, they did not 
fall as much as that of BMR. From 1999 onwards, per capita GPP of the East and 
Central regions quickly caught up with the BMR. Particularly in the East, real per capita 
GPP rose from 93,011 Baht in 1999 to 158,604 Baht in 2008. This is probably because 
the East and the Central regions housed the manufacturing for exports, which is the 
sector with considerable growth after the crisis. Between 1999 and 2008, the industrial 
output in the Central region grew by an average of 9.7 percent per year—the fastest rate 
across regions. Likewise, the industrial output in the East grew by 7.6 percent per year 
during the same period. As a result, the contribution of the East and the Central regions 
to the total industrial output increased noticeably. In 1999, the East and the Central 
regions together contributed 28.2 percent of total industrial output. By 2008, they 
accounted for 39.4 percent (NESDB, 2010b).  
While the East and the Central regions were catching up with the BMR, the 
other four regions grew very slowly after the crisis. Per capita GPP of the Northern 
region grew at the slowest rate. The Southern and the Northeastern regions also grew 
slowly. The slow growth in the South was possibly a result of increasing violence in the 
three most Southern provinces in recent years. Meanwhile, the North and the Northeast 
already had the lowest per capita production to start with. Having slow growth rates 
means that the Northern and the Northeastern regions would continue to lag behind all 
other regions (see Figure 3.3).   
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Figure 3.3 Per Capita Gross Regional Product 1981-2008 (Real Values) 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
R
e
a
l p
e
r-
ca
pi
ta
 
G
R
P 
(B
ah
t)
NE N S E W C BMR
  
Source: see Table 3.2 
 
Table 3.3 Regional Growth Rate of Thailand 1981-2008 (Real Values) 
  
Period 
1981-1986 1987-1996 1997-1998 1999-2008 
Northeast 3.7 6.3 -6.7 3.2 
North 3.6 5.6 -5.2 2.7 
South 3.0 6.4 -4.1 2.8 
East 5.8 10.7 -2.0 6.6 
West 3.6 5.7 -6.8 3.5 
Central 2.5 9.9 -4.2 7.9 
BMR 2.2 8.0 -10.0 4.9 
Whole Kingdom 3.4 9.5 -5.9 4.7 
Source: see Table 3.2 
 
In summary, Thai economic development has been dramatic in the past three 
decades. Along with it, the regional development pattern in Thailand changed 
accordingly. While evidence presented here apparently reflects uneven growth across 
regions, it does not show the magnitude of the inequality. It also cannot tell how this 
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magnitude changes over time. The next section looks particularly at the pattern of 
regional disparities as the regional development moves from one period to another. This 
will be done through disparity measures and statistics.  
 
3.3 Regional Disparities: Methods and Data 
Patterns of development in Thailand have been characterised as highly uneven since 
1940 (Dixon, 1999, p. 214). This, however, has been widely discussed without much 
empirical evidence, particularly after the crisis. This section explains the disparity 
measurement methods and the data. All of these will be used to investigate regional 
disparities in Thailand in the next section. 
Methodology 
There are many ways to measure regional income disparities. Among the 
commonly-used methods are: Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation 
( wv ), the Theil index, regional Gini index, and standard deviation of log of regional 
income per capita.  The first two measures are employed in this thesis. This is because 
Williamson’s coefficient of variation has only minor flaws in measuring regional 
inequality in small countries (Portnov & Felsenstein, 2005). Then, the Theil index is 
used as its decomposability allows for deeper analysis. 
The population-weighted coefficient of variation was first introduced by Jeffrey 
Williamson in 1965. He used the measure to support his theory on economic 
development and income inequality across regions. According to Williamson (1965), 
regional income inequality within a country was expected to rise at the early stages of 
development. The rising inequality was caused by barriers for goods and production 
factors to flow across regions within a nation. Such barriers include poor transport links, 
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difficulties to access capital, low ability for labour to move and government policy 
favouring national growth over regional equality. Regional income inequality, however, 
was not expected to rise indefinitely. When a country moved to a more advanced stage 
of development, interregional linkages improved. This would allow factors to move 
freely and markets to adjust. Consequently, regional disparities were expected to come 
down. This means that the graph of regional disparities over stages of development 
should form an inverted U-shaped curve. To prove his theory, Williamson calculated wv  
for countries which were at different stages of development.  In addition, he also uses 
state income to analyse wv  for the United States between 1840 and 1961. Since then, 
Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation has been widely used as a 
measure of interregional disparities. 
The Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation is the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the corresponding mean. The standard deviation is weighted by 
share of population in the spatial unit to the total population. It can be calculated as 
follows: 
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where fi denotes population of the ith province, n national population, yi income per 
capita of the ith province and y  national income per capita. The larger value of wv  
indicates that there is a larger dispersion.  
Another index that also measures regional disparities is the Theil index. While 
the Theil index may be less commonly used, it has an additional feature. The Theil 
index has an additive property across subgroups within the country. This means that it 
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can be decomposed into inequality within- and between regions. Hence, more 
understanding of regional disparities can be obtained using the Theil index. The Theil 
index is defined as follows: 
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where Xi denotes population of ith province over the national population and Yi  GPP of 
ith province over the national GDP. The index takes a value of zero when there is 
absolute equality across provinces. If income is not equally distributed, the index takes a 
value larger than zero. The province that is richer than the national average has a 
positive contribution to the index while those poorer than the average have a negative 
contribution. The higher value of the Theil index signifies more severe inequality. As 
previously mentioned, the index can be decomposed into inter- and intra-regional 
inequality. This is formulated as follows: 
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where j denotes region j. In case of Thailand, there are seven regions and thus j = 
1,2,…,7. The total index is equal to the sum of the inter- and intra-regional indexes. 
That is, 
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Data  
There are two sets of data to be used in this analysis. The first data set is GPP 
per capita. The NESDB publishes data on GPP annually. The complete series goes back 
to the year 1981. Due to changes in the disaggregation of production sectors, there are 
two data series available. The first set covers the period 1981-1997, disaggregating the 
GPP into 11 sectors. As for the second set, there are 16 sectors and the data runs from 
1995 onwards. The overlapping years 1995-1997 for the two series, however, differ 
significantly. This is despite the fact that the NESDB reconciled the data such that the 
national GDP data are the same in both series. The NESDB is also an official 
government agency which publishes the national GDP. Since the GPP figures are 
reconciled with that of the national GDP, GPP for all provinces always sum up to the 
national GDP.  
To arrive at GPP per capita, data on population by provinces are required here. 
There are several sources for population data in Thailand. The most complete one is 
from the population and housing census. The census is conducted and published every 
ten years by the National Statistical Office (NSO). Alternatively, the Department of 
Provincial Administration in the Ministry of Interior has population registration records. 
These data, unlike the former, are available annually. Another source of population data 
is provided by the NESDB on a five-year basis. It is, however, the estimation of 
population deriving from several indicators. With the population and housing census 
employed as a base for the estimation, these population data are considered to be 
reliable. Since they are also consistent with the GPP data, the population data by 
NESDB will be used for analysis here. The NESDB publishes provincial population and 
nominal GPP per capita in all issues of its publication Gross Regional and Provincial 
Product.  
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The second data set are the average household income and expenditure data 
from household surveys. These data are provided by NSO. The NSO has conducted a 
household survey called ‘Socio-economic Survey’ every two years4 between 1988 and 
2006. From 2007, the Socio-economic Survey has been done on an annual basis. 
However, the surveys in the even years i.e. 2008 and 2010 do not contain the income 
information. In other words, only the odd years i.e. 2007 and 2009 do the surveys cover 
both household income and expenditure. This means that the analysis on household 
income can only cover up to the year 2007.  
It is also important to note that provincial-level data prior to 1994 should be used 
with caution. Although the surveys have been undertaken since 1988, the data at the 
provincial level were not available to the public until 1994. This is possibly because the 
sample size at the provincial level may not be sufficient to be a good representation of 
each province prior to 1994. However, data for 1988-1992 will be included in the 
analysis here for the benefit of longer time series. Provincial-level data for 1988-1992 
are derived from raw data using STATA version 11. Recall from the Note on Data 
Sources that the raw SES data are available upon request at the NSO. 
In poverty and inequality analyses, choosing which definitions of income and 
expenditure to use is important. In fact, choosing whether to use income or consumption 
expenditure continues to be subject to debate. While income is a rather straightforward 
measure of welfare, it can fluctuate considerably over time. Income data also tend to be 
under-reported due to their relation to income taxes. Consumption expenditure is more 
stable across periods of time. Moreover, it is argued that an individual usually consumes 
based on his/her expected permanent income. Hence, consumption expenditure is a 
                                                 
4
 The Socio-Economic Survey has been conducted since 1957 under the name “Household Expenditure 
Survey.” The name was changed to “Socio-Economic Survey” in 1969. Between 1969 and 1987, the 
survey was conducted every five years using stratified three-stage sampling method. Since 1988, the NSO 
has conducted the survey every two years using stratified two-stage sampling method.  
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good welfare indicator. Since there are data on income and consumption expenditure 
available in Thailand, this chapter will examine both. 
For provincial income data in Socio-economic Survey of Thailand, total income 
and current income are available to the public. Total income consists of current income 
and all other receipts. Current income comprises wages and salaries, business profits, 
property income, current transfers and non-money income. Non-money income includes 
remunerations, home-produced goods and services, and imputed rental values of own 
dwellings. All other receipts include lottery prizes, insurance proceeds and all other 
income that does not fall into any of the other categories. It is obvious that current 
income captures more of the regular income of a household than total income. Hence, 
current income will be used in the analysis.  
On an expenditure side, total expenditure and consumption expenditure are 
available. Total expenditure consists of consumption and non-consumption expenditure. 
Consumption expenditure is the household expenses on goods and services purchased 
for their everyday living. It also includes imputed expenditure that a household receives 
as part of pay, is home-produced or received for free. Non-consumption expenditure 
consists of tax payments, interest expenses, insurance premium, lottery tickets and 
gambling and other expenses. The household expenditure does not include expenses on 
investment such as purchase of land or property, payments for provident or pension 
funds. Consumption expenditure will be employed in this chapter as it is widely 
accepted to be an indicator of welfare.  
The data from the Socio-economic Surveys are usually measured as averages per 
household unit. Luckily, the surveys have also published current income and 
consumption expenditure in per-capita units up to 2005. From 2006, the data on average 
household size by province are given along with the average household income and 
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expenditure. This means the per-household figures can be easily converted into per-
capita ones. Since the disparities estimates may change when different units are used, 
this chapter examines both per-capita and per-household income and expenditure. It is 
also noteworthy that the Williamson’s coefficient of variation is usually weighted by 
provincial population. This can be directly applied to the data sets with per capita unit. 
However, when the per-household data are used, the weighing of these data by 
provincial population would be questionable. Hence, for data measured in household 
unit, the ratio of provincial households to the national number of households will be 
employed as the weights. These data are available in an annual publication, Report of 
Socio-economic Surveys. 
 
3.4 Regional Disparities: the Results 
The results from using GPP data will be presented first—both the population-weighted 
coefficient of variation and the Theil index. Then the results from using the provincial 
household survey data will be analysed.  
Regional Disparities in Gross Provincial Product 
Overall Disparities 
Figure 3.4 illustrates patterns of provincial disparities in GPP per capita between 
1981 and 2008. Williamson’s population-weighted coefficients of variation show an 
upward trend from 1981 to 1993. Then, the disparities gradually decline during the 
period 1993-1996, with a small increase in 1997. However, by 1998 the disparities fell 
to the level of 1986—the year prior to the boom. This probably reflects the effects of the 
financial crisis. As Bangkok was harder hit by the crisis than other provinces, it 
probably experienced larger decrease in per capita GPP than others. Consequently, the 
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gap between GPP per capita of Bangkok and other provinces narrowed. Nonetheless, 
the disparities were on the rise once again from 1999 onwards. By 2005, they surpassed 
the peak of period 1981-1993 (see Figure 3.4A). When considered together with 
economic growth, one can easily see the correlation between them. The higher 
economic growth is accompanied by larger regional disparities.  
This trend, however, differs considerably from the trend in disparities in where 
Bangkok and BMR are excluded. When Bangkok is taken out, the disparities across 
provinces dropped sharply from 0.99 to 0.64 in 1981. It becomes even lower when the 
BMR is excluded. Without BMR, the disparities fell to 0.53 in 1981. This suggests that 
during the period 1981-1997, increases in overall disparities come mainly from 
Bangkok and its surrounding provinces.   
The overall disparities peak at 1.12 in 1993, then gradually decline between 
1993 and 1998. In contrast, those excluding Bangkok and BMR persistently increase. 
Moreover, the gap between the two has narrowed during this period. It seems here that 
the role of Bangkok and BMR as the main source of disparities has declined over time. 
In 1998, the overall disparities fell to the pre-boom level. The disparities without 
Bangkok, on the other hand, jumped from 0.75 in 1997 to 0.85 in 1998. Likewise, those 
without the BMR rose from 0.70 to 0.74. This means that the crisis caused disparities 
among provinces other than Bangkok and BMR to increase. From 1999 onwards, all 
three series of provincial disparities post upward trends. Those excluding Bangkok and 
BMR increase at much faster rates than the overall disparities. As a result, the gaps 
between the two series and the overall disparities have considerably narrowed. This 
suggests that Bangkok and its vicinity are no longer the major source of disparities after 
1997.  
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Figure 3.4 Provincial and Regional Disparities in GPP per Capita (Nominal Values) in 
Thailand 1981-2008  
A. Provincial Income Disparities of the Whole Kingdom, Exclude Bangkok and 
Exclude BMR 
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B. Provincial Income Disparities of Seven Regions  
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C. Provincial Income Disparities of Three Regions (North-Northeast, Central-
East-West and South) 
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D. Regional Income Disparities 
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Note: All data are in nominal values. 
  vw denotes the Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation. 
Source: Data are collected from several editions of Gross Regional and Provincial Product as 
follows: 1981-1997: NESDB (1998), 1998-2001: NESDB (2007a) and 2002-2008: 
NESDB (2010b) 
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More aspects of disparities can be studied by looking at the Williamson’s 
population-weighted coefficient of variation for each region. Figure 3.4B and 3.4C 
illustrate the results. It is surprising that instead of the BMR, provincial income 
differences have been the highest within the Eastern region. The disparities increase 
noticeably between 1981 and 2006. Likewise, the disparities within the Central region 
also widen significantly—but to a lesser degree. The Williamson’s population-weighted 
coefficient of variation for the Central region was only 0.20 in 1981. This is lower than 
that of the East, South, West and BMR. By 1990, it rose to the level similar to that of 
the South—surpassing disparities within the West and BMR. In 1998-1999, the 
disparities of the Central region rose dramatically and have continuously widened since. 
The disparities within the Southern region of Thailand have gradually come down 
during the period of study. As for all other regions—namely the North, Northeast, West 
and BMR—disparities within regions remain lower than 0.40. In addition, disparities 
within BMR have also been stable up until 1997 before rising gradually in the more 
recent years. 
By examining Figure 3.4A and Figure 3.4B together, some conclusions can be 
drawn on the pattern of regional disparities in Thailand. First, there is a large income 
difference between the BMR and the rest of the country. This can be seen from the high 
overall disparities while those within BMR and those excluding Bangkok and BMR are 
low. Secondly, the disparities excluding Bangkok and BMR increase significantly from 
1997 onwards. Along with this increase are the trends of disparities within the Eastern 
and Central regions. Without much change in all other regions, these widening 
disparities within the East and the Central regions emerge as the source of overall 
disparities for 1997-2008. Combining this with the regional development pattern found 
in section 3.2 leads to a third conclusion. The reason why the East and Central regions 
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became the source of disparities was that they have been catching up with the BMR. 
With all other provinces failing to do so, disparities between them and those which had 
caught up have widened. 
Intra-regional and Inter-regional Disparities 
Figure 3.4D exhibits another dimension of disparities. It compares the overall 
disparities across all provinces with disparities across regions. In other words, it exhibits 
inter-regional disparities. Results suggest that from 1995, the income differences 
between regions have notably declined. During 2002-2008, the pattern of inter-regional 
disparities contrasts with that of overall disparities. That is, while overall disparities 
continue to rise, the average income across regions has become more equal. The Theil 
index, which decomposes the overall disparities into intra-regional and inter-regional 
disparities, also supports this. Table 3.4 illustrates the outcomes.  
Table 3.4 Decomposition of Disparities in Real GDP 1982-2008: Theil Index   
Year 
 Theil: GPP  Share 
 Inter Intra Total  Inter Intra Total 
 (1) (2) (1) + (2)  (4) (5) (4) + (5) 
1982  0.131 0.022 0.153  85.9 14.1 100 
1984  0.134 0.021 0.155  86.2 13.8 100 
1986  0.131 0.019 0.150  87.1 12.9 100 
1988  0.153 0.022 0.175  87.6 12.4 100 
1990  0.170 0.024 0.194  87.6 12.4 100 
1992  0.168 0.024 0.192  87.5 12.5 100 
1994  0.170 0.027 0.197  86.5 13.5 100 
1996  0.150 0.031 0.181  82.8 17.2 100 
1998  0.137 0.040 0.177  77.2 22.8 100 
2000  0.158 0.048 0.206  76.6 23.4 100 
2002  0.155 0.052 0.207  75.0 25.0 100 
2004  0.157 0.059 0.216  72.7 27.3 100 
2006  0.158 0.064 0.222  71.3 28.7 100 
2008  0.166 0.065 0.231  72.0 28.0 100 
Source: see Figure 3.4 
80 
In Table 3.4, the inter-regional index is presented in column (1) while intra-
regional index is shown in column (2). Since the intra- and inter-regional indexes add 
up to the total, Table 3.4 also exhibits their contributions to total disparities. That is, the 
values in column (1) and column (2) add up to the third column—the total Theil index. 
Column (4) and (5) then show the contributions of the inter- and intra-regional index to 
the total Theil index. Results show that the inter-regional disparities have dominated as 
the main source of overall disparities throughout the period. The income differences 
across regions account, on average, for 86.9 percent of the overall disparities during 
1981-1994. From 1995 onwards, the inter-regional disparities have become stable. Here, 
the increase in the total Theil index has been accompanied by intra-regional disparities. 
Although the inter-regional disparities continued to be the major source, the intra-
regional index has increased its significance in more recent years.  
From the results above, the GPP data offer a good representation of regional 
income inequality across provinces. It has been argued, however, that average 
household income and expenditure by provinces are better indicators of welfare (Islam 
& Khan, 1986, p. 83; Akita & Lukman, 1995, p. 65). This is because all income from 
goods and services produced within a province does not necessarily end up in the hands 
of those living in that province. It would therefore be useful to look at the disparities in 
household income and consumption across provinces as well. The results are presented 
in the next section.   
Regional Disparities in Current Income and Consumption Expenditure 
Overall Disparities 
Provincial inequality using average current income and consumption 
expenditure during 1988 and 2007 are shown in Figure 3.5. Apparently, they exhibit 
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different results from those using the GPP data. Overall provincial disparities in per 
capita current income are smaller than the disparities in GPP per capita. From the 
previous section, we see that the population-weighted coefficient of variation has been 
ranging around 0.98-1.17 during 1988-2007 (see Figure 3.4A). Comparatively, 
population-weighted coefficient of variation in income per capita is between 0.49 and 
0.69 during the same period (see Figure 3.5A). The disparities using per capita 
consumption expenditure are even lower—with values between 0.38 and 0.58 (see 
Figure 3.5B).  
Results in Figure 3.5 show that there are similar patterns between current 
income disparities and consumption expenditure disparities. This is the case for both 
per-household unit and per-capita unit. The disparities in consumption expenditure are 
lower than those in current income. On the other hand, for both income and expenditure, 
the per-household disparities are slightly less than the per-capita counterparts. The 
household-weighted coefficients of variation in current income per household ranged 
0.45-0.57 during the period 1988-2007. The variation in consumption expenditure per 
household is between 0.35 and 0.50 for the same period.  
The provincial disparities obtained from the household survey data and those 
using GPP exhibit different long-term trends. Particularly after the crisis, the two data 
sets seem to give opposite results. The disparities in both per capita GPP and per capita 
income widened between 1988 and 1994. Then they were both declining between 1994 
and 1998. From 1998 onwards, the disparities in per capita GPP have continuously 
widened. Contrastingly, the disparities in current income and consumption expenditure 
trended downward during 2000-2007.  
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Figure 3.5 Household-Weighted Coefficient of Variation 1988-2007 
A. Using Current Income 
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B. Using Consumption Expenditure 
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Source: Data for 1988-1992 are from raw SES data (see Note on Data Sources). Data on income and 
consumption expenditure for 1994-2007 and number of households for 2006-2007 are from NSO 
(2009). Data on number of households for 1994-1998 are collected from three editions of Report 
of the Household Socio-Economic Survey: Whole Kingdom as follow: 1994 (NSO, 1996, p. 35), 
1996 (NSO, 1998, p. 56), 1998 (NSO, 1999, p. 13). As for 2000-2004, data are from Report of 
Provincial Household Income and Income Distributions as follow: 2000 (NSO, 2001, Table 1), 
2002 (NSO, 2003a, Table 1) and 2004 (NSO, 2005a, Table 1).  
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The differences between disparities using GPP per capita and those using 
household surveys can be expected. In fact, the differences in data from household 
surveys and those from the national accounts have been widely discussed (see e.g. 
Karshenas, 2003, p. 689). This will be examined in the following subsection. In 
addition, the disparities in consumption expenditure can also be expected to be lower 
than current income. This is because households with higher incomes tend to spend a 
lower proportion of their income on consumption (Akita & Lukman, 1995, p. 77). 
Once Bangkok and its vicinity are taken out of consideration, the disparities 
among provinces become lower. This is the same for both current income and 
consumption expenditure, as well as the results using GPP data. It is therefore obvious 
that Bangkok and its surrounding provinces—or the BMR—is set very much apart from 
the rest of the country. Despite that, the results from GPP data and the survey data 
exhibit different trends. The disparities in GPP per capita, excluding Bangkok and 
BMR, are both widening between 1992 and 2007. In fact, from 1998 onwards the 
disparities across provinces excluding Bangkok and BMR accelerate—thus catching up 
with overall disparities (see Figure 3.4A).  
On the other hand, disparities of current income and consumption expenditure 
are rather stable throughout the period of 1988-2007. There is a jump in per-capita 
current income disparities, excluding Bangkok, in 1996. Meanwhile, the disparities 
remained stable or have slightly declined when the BMR is excluded in 1996. This 
reflects a large income growth in Bangkok’s border provinces during 1994-1996. Then 
the crisis in 1997 had caused the disparities to be back around the 1994 level. While the 
current income disparities excluding Bangkok have slightly come down after 2002, 
those excluding BMR increase. This means that the income inequality across provinces 
outside the BMR worsened during 2002-2008. On the other hand, disparities in 
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consumption expenditure—both excluding Bangkok and the BMR—have been stable 
between 1994 and 2007. This is probably because consumption patterns of individuals 
and households outside Bangkok are not as sensitive to economic performances as those 
in Bangkok.  
Intra-regional and Inter-regional Disparities 
The overall disparities in current income and consumption expenditure can be 
decomposed into inter- and intra-regional disparities using the Theil index. The overall 
Theil indexes for both current income and consumption expenditure slightly increased 
between 1988 and 2000. Then the disparities have continuously declined from 2000 
onwards (see Table 3.5). These results are consistent with the weighted coefficients of 
variation in the previous section. The decomposition suggests that disparities between 
regions have been the major contributor to the overall disparities. The inter-regional 
disparities account for more than 80 percent of the overall disparities in both current 
income and consumption expenditure. This is shown in column (4) of Table 3.5.  
The Theil indexes obtained from the survey data are lower than that obtained 
from GPP per capita. This means that household income is more evenly distributed 
across provinces than is production. Not only do the trends differ between the GPP data 
and the survey data, the decomposed indexes also show more differences. While 
disparities in GPP per capita within regions have increased their significance overtime, 
it has not been the case for household data. The intra-regional disparities gradually 
declined between 1990 and 2002, then increased from 2002 onwards. Nonetheless, the 
average current income and consumption expenditure across provinces within each 
region are generally more equal than for average production. The factors behind this 
circumstance are discussed next. 
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Table 3.5 Decomposition of Regional Disparities: Theil Index 1994-2007 based on Current Income and Consumption Expenditure 
 
 Theil: Current Income  Share  Theil: Consumption Expenditure  Share 
Year  Inter Intra Total  Inter Intra  Inter Intra Total  Inter Intra 
 
 (1) (2) (1) + (2)  (4) (5)  (1) (2) (1) + (2)  (4) (5) 
1988  0.049 0.005 0.054 
 
90.4 9.6 
 
0.040 0.007 0.047  85.1 14.9 
1990  0.037 0.010 0.047 
 
79.7 20.3 
 
0.027 0.007 0.034  79.7 20.3 
1992  0.050 0.009 0.060 
 
84.4 15.6 
 
0.034 0.007 0.041  83.2 16.8 
1994  0.052 0.012 0.063 
 
81.9 22.1 
 
0.036 0.009 0.045  80.8 19.2 
1996  0.051 0.014 0.065 
 
78.5 21.5 
 
0.042 0.009 0.050  83.1 16.9 
1998  0.047 0.009 0.056 
 
83.6 16.4 
 
0.040 0.007 0.047  84.8 15.2 
2000  0.056 0.009 0.065 
 
86.4 13.6 
 
0.046 0.007 0.052  87.2 12.8 
2002  0.048 0.008 0.056 
 
86.3 13.7 
 
0.037 0.006 0.043  86.4 13.6 
2004  0.040 0.008 0.048 
 
83.1 16.9 
 
0.030 0.007 0.037  82.3 17.7 
2006  0.040 0.008 0.048 
 
83.6 16.4 
 
0.026 0.007 0.032  79.5 20.5 
2007  0.037 0.008 0.046 
 
81.6 18.4 
 
0.023 0.006 0.030  78 .2 21.8 
Source: see Figure 3.5 
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Per Capita GPP versus Household Survey Data 
As previously mentioned, discrepancies between income data from national 
accounts and household survey can be expected. This is partly due to the differences in 
definition and coverage5. That is, the two data sets differ in their measurement purposes. 
As part of the national accounts system, the GPP is a macroeconomic indicator. It 
measures the gross value of the total goods and services produced within one province. 
Consequently, GPP per capita is simply the gross provincial value divided by the 
provincial population. Contrastingly, the current income and consumption expenditure 
data are derived from household surveys. Here, the data represent the average income or 
expenditure of individuals and households actually residing in that province. For this 
reason, data from household surveys are considered to be a better indicator of the 
wellbeing of people in each province.  
Nonetheless, there are also weaknesses in the data from household surveys. One 
common drawback is that the non-response rate to the survey usually increases along 
with the income. This means that more observations are lost from the top of the income 
distribution. Consequently, the disparities across provinces using household survey data 
could also be underestimated. If this is the case, then the GPP data could be more 
accurate than the survey data.  
The GPP data in Thailand provides a longer and more complete time series. The 
NESDB publishes the GPP annually and the time series is available back to 1981. The 
household surveys, on the other hand, have only been conducted every two years. 
Although the surveys go back as early as 1957, the provincial data have only been 
                                                 
5
 Standardised national accounts system (SNA93) includes imputed rents of owner-occupiers, income of 
non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH), imputed financial service charges and non-exchange 
services. These items are usually left out by the household surveys. However, this is not the case in 
Thailand as the Socio-Economic Survey by NSO includes these items in the household income. For 
general arguments on this issue, see Karshenas (2003) and Deaton (2005).  
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publicly available6 since 1994. Because the more complete time series data usually 
allow for more comprehensive analysis, the GPP data should be used as a major 
indicator of average provincial income. Nonetheless, the household survey data will be 
employed further in an analysis of poverty across provinces, in Chapter 6. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
The Thai economy has gone through significant changes during the past three decades. 
With it, patterns of regional development have also changed markedly. This chapter 
examined these changes. Using the per capita GPP data, the overall provincial 
disparities went up during the period prior to 1990. In this period, Bangkok and BMR 
were the major source of the income disparities. Between 1990 and 1998 overall 
disparities declined—except for the year 1993. At the same time, disparities outside 
Bangkok and BMR gradually increased. Here, the East and the Central regions have 
emerged as new sources of disparities. After the crisis in 1997-1998, the overall income 
disparities continuously widened with accelerating disparities excluding Bangkok and 
BMR.  
An analysis drawn from this chapter suggests that the national plans have played 
a role in shaping this regional development pattern. The earlier Plans, which focused on 
infrastructure development and industrial promotion, led to an expansion of the 
manufacturing sector. Since most firms clustered around Bangkok and its vicinity, per 
capita income in these provinces rose drastically. As a consequence, overall income 
disparities increased during the 1980s and the BMR became the main source of this 
increase. By 1985, this issue was fully realised by the Thai policy makers and the Sixth- 
                                                 
6
 As mentioned earlier, data at provincial level can be obtained from 1988 onwards from the raw SES 
data. These data are available upon request at the NSO. 
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and Seventh Plans (1987-1991 and 1992-1996) aimed at decentralising industries away 
from BMR. Together with a shift toward an export-oriented policy, the Eastern 
Seaboard was developed. As a result, manufacturing firms increasingly established in 
the East and later in the Central region. Thus, per capita income in these regions caught 
up with that of BMR. They also became new sources of disparities. 
After the crisis in 1997, however, the role of the national plans was relatively 
less marked. What are the major factors contributing to these widening provincial 
disparities? Previous research in other countries has pointed to several factors. They 
include, among others, sectoral distribution, labour productivity and government budget 
allocation. Meanwhile, the disparities in household income suggested that the issue of 
provincial disparities may be less pronounced when it comes to wellbeing aspect. To 
clarify this point further, the disparities in welfare indicators such as education and 
health should also be examined. These four further aspects of provincial disparities will 
be discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Further Aspects of Regional Disparities in Thailand 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines four other aspects of provincial disparities and how they relate to 
the income disparities. The four aspects include sectoral distribution within each 
province, labour productivity, government budget allocation and variation in education 
and health services. They are selected here for many reasons. Sectoral distribution and 
labour productivity have been found to be contributing to the rising output per capita 
disparities in many countries (Akita & Lukman, 1995; Fujita & Hu, 2001). As for 
Thailand, Sarntisart (2001, p. 416) pointed out that biased policy toward manufacturing, 
which was concentrated around Bangkok, was the major cause of regional income 
disparities. Intra-sectoral productivity differences were also considered as another 
determinant of provincial income disparities. Although the above arguments sound 
rational, they still lack empirical evidence. This chapter, therefore, examines patterns of 
provincial sectoral distribution and labour productivity in Thailand.  
In other country-specific cases, the uneven distribution of government 
expenditure has also been blamed as a contributing factor to provincial income 
disparities (Blazek & Maceskova, 2009). To see if this is also the case for Thailand, 
disparities in provincial government expenditure will also be examined here. With 
availability of per capita government expenditure broken down by sectors, we can 
examine which sector contributes most to provincial disparities. Finally, provincial 
variation in education and health services are investigated here as they are good welfare 
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indicators. It is interesting that provincial disparities in these social factors are also 
considered along with the income disparities.  
This chapter begins with sectoral distribution analysis, as it is closely linked to 
the previous chapter. Then labour productivity, government expenditure and provision 
of education and health services are examined. One subsection will be dedicated to each 
aspect being considered in this chapter. It should be noted that there will be different 
methods employed for different indicators. As a result, each subsection will contain a 
discussion of methods, data and results.  
 
4.2 Sectoral Distribution 
As with national data, production activities within a province can be categorised into 
three major sectors—agriculture, industry and services. The contribution of these three 
sectors, however, varies across provinces. Because of that, variations in value-added 
across provinces also differ from one sector to the other. This section examines the 
extent to which each production sector contributes to overall disparities. It is expected 
that the provincial GDP per capita disparities come mainly from the industrial sector. In 
fact, the regional concentration of manufacturing activities has been widely viewed as 
the major cause of regional disparities in Thailand. This is because growth in the 
manufacturing sector was the main driver of the economic boom prior to the 1997 crisis. 
Concentration of the manufacturing activities in only few provinces should therefore 
translate into widening income disparities among provinces. That pattern seems to 
change after the crisis. Hence, this section looks at provincial disparities in each of the 
three major production sectors for period 1981-2008.  
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Method and Data 
To conduct the analysis, the decomposed Williamson’s population-weighted 
coefficient of variation is employed. Here, the production sectors are grouped into three 
major sectors—agriculture, industrial and services. Since GPP is the sum of sectoral 
GPP, the squared weighted coefficient of variation can be decomposed as follows: 
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jy , ky  = national income per capita of sector j and sector k, 
respectively 
jiy , kiy  = income per capita of sector j and k in ith province, 
respectively 
  
In this case, there are three sectors. Hence, equation (1) becomes: 
),(2),(2),(22222222 asCOVwzzsiCOVwzziaCOVwzzvzvzvzv assiiawsswiiwaaw +++++=  
(4.2) 
where a denotes agricultural sector, i industrial sector and s services sector. This 
decomposition allows researchers to examine how disparities in each sector contribute 
to the overall disparities. Not only that, the covariance between two sectors also reveals 
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the relationship between them. As part of the overall population-weighted coefficient of 
variation, the covariance can also indicate the magnitude and direction of covariations 
between sectors in the overall disparities (Akita & Lukman, 1995, p. 64). 
The data used in this subsection come from the same sources as those being used 
to calculate the Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation in Chapter 3. 
When NESDB publishes GPP data, it also includes GPP by production sector. They are 
available annually from 1981 onwards. Although these data are available for a long time 
series, there was a change in disaggregating methods in 1997. Prior to that, the 
production activities were categorised into 11 sectors. As the country developed, its 
economic structure had changed and new activities emerged. Consequently, the 
disaggregation of production activities was changed to 16 sectors in 1997. Because each 
annual data set usually includes the revised data of the two previous years, GPP with 16 
production sectors are available for year 1995 onwards.  
Since the analysis only looks at the three major sectors—agriculture, industrial 
and services, different disaggregating methods should not pose any problems. 
Nonetheless, due to changes in definition and estimation method for each sector, the 
two time series cannot be comparable. This means they cannot be combined into one 
long-period time series. As a result, the analysis will be divided into two time periods, 
1981-1997 and 1995-2008. For the data on provincial population, the same set of data 
from Chapter 3 can be directly employed here. The data on provincial population are 
also published by NESDB as part of the annual editions of Gross Regional and 
Provincial Product.  
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Results 
Table 4.1 and 4.2 shows the population-weighted coefficients of variation of the 
three sectors. It appears that sectoral output disparities across provinces in Thailand are 
lowest in agricultural sector. It has increased during the boom period 1989-1993 and has 
been stable around 0.8 since. Meanwhile, disparities within the industrial sector have 
been the highest among the three sectors. It began at a very high level and gradually 
declined during the boom period. Then, the disparities reversed to an upward trend from 
1997. As for services sector, the disparities have been rather stable overtime. 
Nonetheless, they were stable at a rather high level.  
Table 4.1 Weighted Coefficient of Variation and Covariation in per Capita Sectoral 
Value-added at Current Prices 1981-1997 
Year va vi vs covai covis covas vw 
1981 0.656 1.713 1.186 -0.099 1.455 -0.251 0.988 
1982 0.629 1.674 1.115 -0.116 1.334 -0.229 0.972 
1983 0.610 1.693 1.124 -0.167 1.365 -0.259 0.965 
1984 0.639 1.627 1.133 -0.155 1.286 -0.263 0.980 
1985 0.618 1.560 1.122 -0.101 1.176 -0.263 0.969 
1986 0.676 1.605 1.104 -0.037 1.224 -0.240 0.993 
1987 0.697 1.634 1.127 -0.050 1.302 -0.241 1.018 
1988 0.692 1.663 1.157 -0.109 1.359 -0.261 1.038 
1989 0.609 1.626 1.178 -0.104 1.327 -0.273 1.050 
1990 0.658 1.614 1.239 -0.132 1.385 -0.294 1.107 
1991 0.665 1.550 1.228 -0.106 1.375 -0.285 1.094 
1992 0.763 1.471 1.231 -0.120 1.343 -0.300 1.075 
1993 0.926 1.466 1.240 -0.035 1.367 -0.267 1.116 
1994 0.875 1.429 1.243 -0.007 1.227 -0.277 1.080 
1995 0.887 1.422 1.214 -0.055 1.124 -0.284 1.044 
1996 0.799 1.422 1.203 -0.056 1.060 -0.287 1.028 
1997 0.803 1.510 1.159 -0.038 1.087 -0.275 1.040 
Note: The GPP per capita by sector used here are in nominal values.  
            va = population-weighted coefficient of variation in agricultural sector 
            vi = population-weighted coefficient of variation in industrial sector 
            vs = population-weighted coefficient of variation in services sector 
            covai = weighted coefficient of covariation between agricultural and industrial sectors 
          covis = weighted coefficient of covariation between industrial and services sectors 
          covas = weighted coefficient of covariation between agricultural and services sectors 
            vw = population-weighted coefficient of variation in overall GPP per capita 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data are from NESDB (1998).  
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The coefficient of covariation (covw) adds more understanding to the analysis. 
The positive values of covis indicate that provinces with high value-added in industrial 
sector tend to have high value-added in services sector as well. Despite that, the values 
of covis had been declining over time. On the contrary, the coefficients of covariation for 
agricultural sector to both industrial and services sectors exhibit negative values. This 
reflects structural shifts from the agricultural sector to industrial- and services sectors. 
In other words, provinces with high value-added in industrial and services sectors 
tended to have low value-added in agricultural sector. Nonetheless, there were positive 
relationships between agricultural and industrial sectors in 1999-2003. After 2003, the 
covai only showed small negative values. This possibly reflects the complementary 
between agricultural and agro-industrial sectors.  
Table 4.2 Weighted Coefficient of Variation and Covariation in  per Capita Sectoral 
Value-added at Current Prices 1995-2008 
Year va vi vs covai covis covas vw 
1995 0.893 1.586 1.136 -0.066 0.741 -0.292 1.006 
1996 0.810 1.562 1.135 -0.073 0.712 -0.300 0.992 
1997 0.805 1.648 1.097 -0.045 0.721 -0.288 1.005 
1998 0.782 1.723 1.018 -0.018 0.703 -0.246 0.988 
1999 0.762 1.729 1.201 0.030 0.693 -0.315 1.057 
2000 0.808 1.831 1.246 0.044 0.702 -0.337 1.110 
2001 0.741 1.866 1.261 0.076 0.728 -0.339 1.129 
2002 0.748 1.858 1.242 0.070 0.627 -0.334 1.102 
2003 0.756 1.868 1.243 0.084 0.580 -0.347 1.097 
2004 0.808 1.880 1.254 -0.001 0.572 -0.352 1.098 
2005 0.829 1.983 1.222 -0.037 0.594 -0.341 1.133 
2006 0.863 2.030 1.183 -0.045 0.583 -0.340 1.138 
2007 0.814 2.074 1.136 -0.044 0.685 -0.331 1.166 
2008 0.814 2.046 1.112 -0.047 0.640 -0.322 1.131 
Note: see Table 4.1 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data are collected from several editions of Gross Regional and 
Provincial Product as follows: 1995-2001: NESDB (2007a) and 2002-2008: NESDB (2010b). 
95 
 
 
Table 4.3 Contributions of Squared Weighted Coefficient of Variation 1981-2008 
Year sva svi svs scovai scovis scovas Total 
1981 2.0 27.2 33.9 -1.3 43.5 -5.3 100.0 
1982 1.4 25.8 35.5 -1.3 43.3 -4.7 100.0 
1983 1.6 28.8 33.1 -2.2 44.2 -5.5 100.0 
1984 1.3 28.2 34.0 -1.8 43.2 -4.9 100.0 
1985 1.0 26.3 36.7 -1.1 41.7 -4.6 100.0 
1986 1.1 28.6 32.5 -0.4 42.1 -3.9 100.0 
1987 1.2 28.6 31.8 -0.5 42.6 -3.7 100.0 
1988 1.2 30.7 30.1 -1.1 43.0 -3.9 100.0 
1989 0.8 31.6 29.9 -1.0 42.5 -3.6 100.0 
1990 0.6 29.5 31.7 -1.0 42.3 -3.0 100.0 
1991 0.6 30.0 29.9 -0.9 43.3 -2.9 100.0 
1992 0.8 27.1 32.3 -1.0 43.9 -3.2 100.0 
1993 0.7 26.2 31.9 -0.2 43.5 -2.2 100.0 
1994 0.7 26.8 33.6 -0.1 41.5 -2.5 100.0 
1995 0.9 28.6 33.5 -0.4 40.3 -2.8 100.0 
1996 0.7 29.7 33.8 -0.5 39.2 -3.0 100.0 
1997 0.7 31.7 31.5 -0.3 39.2 -2.8 100.0 
1995 0.7 41.3 31.5 -0.5 29.7 -2.7 100.0 
1996 0.6 41.3 32.3 -0.6 29.3 -2.9 100.0 
1997 0.6 43.3 30.3 -0.3 28.9 -2.7 100.0 
1998 0.7 47.7 26.1 -0.2 28.3 -2.7 100.0 
1999 0.5 44.9 31.9 0.2 25.2 -2.6 100.0 
2000 0.4 48.0 30.3 0.3 23.4 -2.4 100.0 
2001 0.4 48.5 29.6 0.5 23.5 -2.4 100.0 
2002 0.4 51.2 29.4 0.5 21.1 -2.5 100.0 
2003 0.5 55.2 27.1 0.6 19.3 -2.8 100.0 
2004 0.6 55.2 28.0 0.0 19.1 -2.8 100.0 
2005 0.6 59.2 24.4 -0.3 18.6 -2.5 100.0 
2006 0.7 62.5 21.8 -0.3 17.9 -2.6 100.0 
2007 0.6 63.1 18.9 -0.3 20.1 -2.3 100.0 
2008 0.7 63.8 18.9 -0.4 19.5 -2.6 100.0 
Note: The GPP per capita by sector used here are in nominal values. 
svj = Share of weighted coefficient of variation for j sector 
scovjk = Share covariation between i and k sectors. 
Source: see Table 4.1 
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In addition to exhibiting the disparities by production sector, this decomposition 
method can also show the contribution of each sector to overall provincial disparities. In 
order to examine the contributions, the share of each sector in national GDP must be 
incorporated. Then, the share of each component is obtained using equation (2). For 
instance, sva in Table 4.3 is the share of 22 waa vz  to 
2
wv . The results in Table 4.3 suggest 
that covariation between industrial and services sectors dominated the overall variation 
during the early period of 1981-1995. Its contribution, however, had declined over time 
due to falling value of covariation itself. This trend continued further during the later 
period of 1995-2008. 
As for contributions by sectors, the disparities in the services sector accounted 
for the biggest part among the three sectors during 1981 and 1997. Despite that, the 
share of disparities in the industrial sector had gradually increased, owing to both 
increased share of GDP and the widening disparities. In the later period 1995-2008, 
variation in the industrial sector provided the largest and increasing contribution. This, 
again, was due to both widening disparities and increased share of GDP. The role of the 
economic structure in determining overall variation becomes more apparent when 
looking at the services and agricultural sectors. While disparities in both sectors slightly 
widened during the period, their contribution to overall disparities declined. This is 
because their shares of GDP had both fallen. Hence, it is reasonable to say that the 
sectoral share of GPD plays a significant role in determining the overall disparity.  
From the results above, some conclusions can be drawn. As expected, the 
industrial sector exhibited the highest provincial disparities when compared to the other 
two sectors. Sectoral shares of GDP play a significant role in determining overall 
provincial disparities. It is therefore important that sectoral shares are incorporated into 
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the decomposition. Having a large share of GDP, the industrial sector was the major 
contributor to the overall GPP per capita disparities.  
 
4.3 Provincial Labour Markets 
In a less developed economy, labour markets can be major determinants of economic 
change at the sub-national level (Esguerra & Manning, 2007, p. 245). The Thai labour 
markets are no exception. From the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, employment 
structure in Thailand had changed along with the change in economic structure. The 
share of labour force in agricultural sector fell from 72.3 percent of total labour force in 
1980 to 45.7 percent in 1998. At the same time, the share of labour force in the 
industrial- and services sectors to total labour force increased from 5.6 percent to 14.8 
percent and 22.1 percent to 39.5 percent, respectively (Sarntisart, 2001, Table 4). This 
shift in economic structure, however, did not take place evenly across provinces in 
Thailand. Also, despite the fact that the agricultural sector had generated the smallest 
share of GDP, it continues to be the dominant employer. These imbalances tend to 
result in a high variation in labour productivity across provinces.  
Intra-sectoral productivity differences across provinces are regarded as one of 
the determinants of regional income inequality in Thailand (Sarntisart, 2001, p. 416). 
The variation in labour productivity across regions has been considered a factor 
affecting the regional disparities since the study by Williamson (1965, pp. 79-83). In his 
work, Williamson examined labour productivity in agricultural and industrial sectors. 
He concluded that regional productivity differences in the agricultural sector are usually 
larger than those in industrial sector. Hence, agricultural labour productivity contributed 
to the income disparities. This was because regional resource endowments played a 
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bigger role in agricultural productivity. Given that geographical differences across 
regions are quite significant—though not extreme; disparities in agricultural labour 
productivity in Thailand are expected to be large. However, the previous section showed 
that disparities in industrial sector were highest among the three sectors. Since the per 
capita GPP and labour productivity are closely linked, the disparities in industrial labour 
productivity are also expected to be high. Whether the disparities in agricultural or 
industrial labour productivity would be larger seems ambiguous in the case of Thailand. 
It is therefore investigated here.  
Method and Data 
To empirically examine disparities in labour productivity, both overall 
provincial productivity and sectoral provincial productivity will be considered. 
Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation is employed, again, as a 
measure. Here, the index measures variation in GPP per worker instead of the GPP per 
capita. Accordingly, the weights being used in this section are the share of provincial 
labour to the national labour force. Data on labour force are provided by the NSO. The 
NSO has been conducting the Labour Force Survey at regular intervals since 1963. 
However, the provincial-level data have only been publically available from 1994 
onward. They are published in several editions of the Statistic Tables of Provincial 
Labour Force Surveys, available only in Thai.  
Labour force is defined as population aged 15 years or above who are employed 
or unemployed in a province. Among population aged 15 years or over, labour force 
excludes those that are either not available for work or not willing to work. Examples 
are students, disabled, works without compensation and those not willing to work. It is 
important to note that there was a change in the labour force definition in the year 2001. 
Up until the end of 2000, labour force is defined as the population aged 13 years or over 
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who contribute to the production of goods and services in the country. From 2001 
onwards, the labour force covers population aged 15 years or above.  
Note also that, although the surveys have been conducted on a regular basis, 
only data for the third quarter (July-September) can be obtained for all years considered. 
This is possibly due to the fact that third-quarter labour-force data have been widely 
used in the case of Thailand. As this period is the harvest season, using labour force 
data for July-September best reflects labour’s main occupation. Accordingly, the third-
quarter labour force data will be used in this study. In addition, the classification of the 
GPP by production sectors was also changed in 1997 from 11 sectors to 16 sectors. The 
NESDB which is the official source of GPP only publishes the data with the new 16-
sector classification from 1995. Since the data in the new classification are not 
comparable with the old one, the analysis in this section will cover the period 1995-
2008.  
Results 
Table 4.4 shows the variation in GPP per worker across provinces, reflecting 
provincial labour productivity. Results suggest that the overall inequality increased 
between 1998 and 2008. As Bangkok and the BMR are excluded, the upward trend of 
inequality took off from 1995. While disparities without Bangkok and BMR are lower 
than the overall inequalities throughout the period, the gaps between them narrowed 
over time. This suggests that the role of Bangkok in contributing to disparities has 
gradually declined. When compared to the inequality based on GPP per capita, also 
shown in Table 4.4, it is apparent that they are similar in both values and trends. In fact, 
the disparities in labour productivity are almost as high as those in GPP per capita.  
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According to Williamson (1965, p. 79), labour markets can influence regional 
disparities through two mechanisms—labour participation difference and labour 
productivity difference. To see whether labour participation plays a role in determining 
income disparities, we use the ratio of overall GPP per capita disparities to labour 
productivity disparities. It is presented in the last column of Table 4.4. The ratio 
suggests that the disparities in labour productivity were slightly lower than that in GPP 
per capita throughout the period. This implies that the labour participation rate among 
provinces played some role in determining the GPP per capita disparities in Thailand.  
 
When Bangkok and the BMR are excluded, the disparities in GPP per capita and 
those in labour productivity continued to show similar trends. The inequality of labour 
Table 4.4  Weighted Coefficient of Variation in Labour Productivity and Real GPP per 
Capita 1995-2008 
Year (1) vw in Labour Productivity  (2) vw in GPP per capita  (2) / (1) 
All No BKK No BMR  All No BKK No BMR  All 
1995 1.034 0.894 0.727  1.041 0.877 0.711  1.007 
1996 1.010 0.893 0.748  1.035 0.886 0.745  1.025 
1997 1.018 0.948 0.820  1.052 0.928 0.802  1.033 
1998 1.001 0.947 0.830  1.037 0.934 0.818  1.036 
1999 1.053 0.986 0.850  1.099 0.975 0.838  1.044 
2000 1.075 1.024 0.888  1.127 1.005 0.874  1.048 
2001 1.077 1.029 0.898  1.143 1.020 0.887  1.061 
2002 1.079 1.045 0.933  1.144 1.045 0.927  1.060 
2003 1.087 1.076 0.970  1.153 1.075 0.966  1.061 
2004 1.117 1.102 0.999  1.158 1.077 0.978  1.037 
2005 1.146 1.084 1.006  1.172 1.099 0.988  1.023 
2006 1.136 1.086 0.999  1.167 1.110 0.986  1.027 
2007 1.166 1.143 1.020  1.206 1.176 1.003  1.034 
2008 1.214 1.187 1.036  1.228 1.204 1.036  1.012 
Source: Data on GPP, see Figure 4.1. Labour force data are from several editions of Statistic Tables of 
Provincial Labour Force Surveys: Third Quarter (July-September).  
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productivity excluding Bangkok is closer to the overall inequality than those using GPP 
per capita. While Bangkok continues to contribute to inequality in GPP per capita, it has 
become less significant as a cause of inequality in labour productivity. Figure 4.1 and 
Figure 4.2 support this finding. Figure 4.1 shows the variation in labour productivity 
across provinces within each of the seven regions during 1995 and 2008. Inter-regional 
variation is also included in the figure. It appears that the disparities across regions were 
higher than any intra-regional disparities prior to the crisis and remained high 
throughout the period. As for intra-regional disparities, those within the Eastern region 
have been the highest between 1995 and 2002. Then the variation within the Central 
region surpassed the East from 2002 onwards. The fact that variation in labour 
productivity within the BMR was relatively low may be surprising at the first glance. 
However, it is more likely that these provinces had a similar level of productivity. This 
also does not mean that the BMR does not contribute to the overall inequality in labour 
productivity.  
Figure 4.1 Weighted Coefficient of Variation in Labour Productivity by Region 1995-2008 
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Figure 4.2 clarifies this point by showing the value of the average labour 
productivity by region in 1995-2008. While the variation in labour productivity within 
the BMR has been low, the average labour productivity for the region was the highest—
except for 2003-2004. Throughout the period, the labour productivity in BMR was more 
than double the national average. The average labour productivity of the East and 
Central regions has also been catching up quickly with the BMR. However, the high 
intra-regional disparities for these regions, as shown in Figure 4.1, mean that only some 
provinces in these regions actually caught up with the BMR. In addition, the labour 
productivity in the BMR, the East and Central regions deviated largely from the rest of 
the country. Thus, the high values of labour productivity of the BMR and some 
provinces in the East and Central regions contributed to the overall labour productivity 
disparities.  
Figure 4.2 Gross Provincial Product per Worker (Real Values) by Region 1995-2008 
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Many studies that examine regional disparities in labour productivity also 
analyse the labour productivity by production sectors (Williamson, 1965, pp. 76-79; 
Hashim, 1998, pp. 142-148). This analysis can be done in the case of Thailand as well. 
The provincial-level data, both the GPP and the labour force, come with the breakdowns 
into production sectors. For consistency with the previous analyses, three major 
sectors—agriculture, industry and service—will be examined. It should be noted that 
the classifications for the GPP data and the labour force had not been the same 
throughout the 1995-2008 period1. The GPP data have followed the International 
Standard of Industrial Classification, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3) since 1995. On the other 
hand, data from the Labour Force Survey only began to use ISIC Rev.3 from 2001. 
These classification differences, however, should not affect the analysis. This is because 
only the lowest level of breakdown—the three major sectors—will be considered here.  
Table 4.5 illustrates the variation in labour productivity across provinces in 
agricultural, industrial and services sector during 1995-2008. The variation is highest in 
industrial sector, followed by agricultural and services sectors, respectively. This is 
different from the results found by Williamson (1965, p.77). In his empirical 
investigation, the variation in agricultural productivity was found to be the largest. Here, 
however, the higher disparities in industrial sector occurred as a result of uneven 
industrial distribution across provinces. When the Thai economy moved from labour-
intensive to capital-intensive industries, the shift only took place in a few provinces. 
Consequently, the productivity of provinces dominated by labour-intensive industries is 
much lower than the few provinces with capital-intensive industries.  
 
                                                 
1
 Prior to the change to current classification, NESDB and NSO used their own classifications for GPP 
data and labor force survey, respectively. The NESDB used the Thai Standard of Industrial Classification 
(TSIC) while NSO separately developed the classifications based on ISIC 1958.  
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Results within each sector also reveal many interesting points. For agriculture, 
Bangkok and BMR have not played much role in determining the disparities in labour 
productivity. This also applies to the industrial sector. In fact, the overall disparities in 
industrial sector became even higher when Bangkok and the BMR are excluded. This is 
because the highly capital-intensive industries have been concentrated outside Bangkok 
and the BMR. The development of the Eastern Seaboard has driven the high-tech 
manufacturing sector to locate in the East. Throughout the period, industrial labour 
productivity had been the highest in Ranong, followed by Chonburi and Chacheongsao. 
As for the services labour productivity, the disparity pattern differs noticeably from 
those of agricultural and industrial sectors. In the services sector, Bangkok has 
continued to be a major contributor to the labour productivity disparities. This is 
Table 4.5 Weighted Coefficient of Variation in Labour Productivity by Sector 1995-2008 
Year Agriculture  Industry  Services 
 All No 
BKK 
No 
BMR 
 All No 
BKK 
No 
BMR 
 All No 
BKK 
No 
BMR 
1995 1.043 1.037 0.978  0.945 1.081 0.976  0.542 0.339 0.341 
1996 0.978 0.979 0.929  0.959 1.065 0.931  0.471 0.317 0.320 
1997 1.001 1.001 0.923  1.038 1.162 1.097  0.413 0.312 0.317 
1998 1.042 1.044 0.898  0.978 1.116 1.111  0.391 0.284 0.285 
1999 0.936 0.938 0.862  1.080 1.207 1.196  0.524 0.366 0.369 
2000 1.049 1.050 0.845  1.059 1.187 1.170  0.509 0.372 0.368 
2001 1.010 1.009 0.823  1.156 1.297 1.281  0.544 0.376 0.383 
2002 0.970 0.971 0.848  1.222 1.373 1.366  0.568 0.394 0.400 
2003 0.986 0.987 0.814  1.245 1.395 1.401  0.561 0.387 0.395 
2004 1.015 1.015 0.874  1.253 1.387 1.374  0.608 0.411 0.423 
2005 1.007 1.007 0.914  1.154 1.258 1.316  0.701 0.419 0.421 
2006 0.984 0.985 0.881  1.119 1.210 1.267  0.659 0.420 0.419 
2007 0.962 0.963 0.866  1.153 1.243 1.306  0.651 0.516 0.427 
2008 0.935 0.936 0.866  1.136 1.228 1.245  0.702 0.531 0.447 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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probably because the retail and wholesale trade, finance, transportation and 
communication have remained highly clustered in the capital city (Kittiprapas, 1999b, 
pp. 19-20). 
Earlier in this section, results showed that the overall disparities in labour 
productivity and in GPP per capita display similar trends. This similarity has not 
occurred when comparing disparities at the sector level. In other words, the disparities 
in labour productivity for each sector do not have the same trend as their GPP per capita 
counterpart. This reflects the variation in labour market structure across provinces. In 
addition, the analysis on sectoral labour productivity here and the sectoral 
decomposition in section 4.2 serve different purposes. The sectoral distribution of GPP 
per capita disparities was brought into the analysis to show how value-added of each 
sector contributes to overall disparities. It inevitably ignores the fact that provinces 
differ in their labour market structures. The disparities in sectoral labour productivity, 
on the other hand, incorporate sectoral labour force into the analysis. However, it cannot 
show how each sector contributes to overall labour productivity disparities.  
In summary, the provincial disparities in overall labour productivity in Thailand 
have been high and increasing. The results exhibit similar levels and trends as the 
provincial disparities in GPP per capita. When considering disparities by sector, it 
appears that provincial disparities in value-added per worker have been high for all 
three sectors. This means that, aside from income disparities, labour productivity also 
varied greatly across provinces. The simple correlation between GPP per capita and that 
in labour productivity is 0.952. This suggests that the variation in labour productivity is 
one of the major determinants of provincial income disparities.  
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4.4 Public Expenditure 
Uneven spatial distribution of public expenditure is another factor being cited as one of 
the causes to the regional income disparities (Kataoka, 2005, pp. 115-117; Blazek & 
Maceskova, 2009, p. 694). In case of Thailand, the allocation of budget has always been 
biased toward Bangkok (Wisaweisuan, 2009, p. 190). Based on NESDB data, the 
budget for Bangkok accounted for 36.7 percent of the total government budget while 
the city contained only 10.4 percent of the national population in FY2001. As of 
FY2007, the government budget allocated to Bangkok rose to 58.3 percent of the total 
budget while its share of population remained stable at 10.4 percent of the national 
population. This section explores disparities in budget allocation in different 
government functions as well as the overall picture. 
Government Administrative Structure in Thailand 
The Kingdom of Thailand is a unitary state. Prior to 1997, the Thai government 
administrative system had been highly centralised. Despite the existence of regional and 
local governments, they only acted as branch offices of the central government. 
Ministries normally dispatched their officers into provinces to carry out their local 
duties. However, most policies and budget allocations either were formulated or had to 
be approved by the central government in Bangkok (JICA, 2007, pp. 9-11). In 
accordance with this highly centralised administrative system, the local governments 
had only been allocated around 10.0 percent of the total government budget.  
At the same time, there also exists another type of local system in Thailand. That 
is, the local autonomy system, which is made up of 7,800 units throughout the country2 
                                                 
2
 These Thai local autonomy units can be classified into five types. They are namely (1) Provincial 
Administrative Organizations; (2) Thesaban or Municipalities; (3) Tambon Administrative Organization 
at the sub-district level; (4) Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and (5) the City of Pattaya. In 
contrast, the Thai local administrative governments consist of provincial governors and district officers. 
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(Nagai, Funatsu & Kagoya, 2008, p. 5). These local autonomy units coexist along with 
the local administrative governments for all provinces except Bangkok. Unlike the local 
governments, officers in these units are locally hired. Their authority, however, is under 
the supervision of provincial governors and district officers, who were appointed by the 
Ministry of Interior.  
In October 1997, the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution stressed 
decentralisation as one of the “national basic policies.” As a result, the Decentralisation 
Act was enacted at the end of 1999. The Act aimed at transferring authority, finance and 
human resources from local administration system to the local autonomy system. The 
share of local government expenditure to the total budget was targeted to be at least 20.0 
percent in FY2001 and 35.0 percent in FY2006 (JICA, 2007, pp. 7-14). Despite such an 
ambitious goal, the decentralisation process, particularly the fiscal part, has been slow. 
As of August 2003, there were 5,029 government employees transferred to the local 
government. Most of them were generalists while the target was to transfer 8,000 
technical employees (Amornvivat, 2004, p. 14). Similarly, the local government share 
of total government budget only reached 25.3 percent in FY2009 (Bureau of Budget 
[BB], 2010). This means that the 2006 target has not even been met.  
In addition, increased budget comes mainly from shared taxes and general grants 
allocated from the central government. The general grants are normally assigned based 
on a set of indicators that change from one year to another. Consequently, although the 
local governments can now make their own spending decisions, the uncertainty on the 
amount has made it difficult for them to plan ahead (JICA, 2007, p. 24). Not only that, 
there are also conditional grants distributed among local authorities. These grants 
consist of three types: block grants, project grants and matching grants. Block grants are 
                                                                                                                                               
Governors and district officers have authority to direct and supervise officials at the provincial and district 
levels, respectively. See JICA (2007) for detailed explanation.   
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given to local governments to use in order to meet certain broad objectives—regardless 
of how to achieve them. Project grants, on the other hand, are allocated to local 
governments to spend on activities predetermined by central government. Matching 
grants are used to provide public services (Lao-Araya, 2002, p. 16). The recent attempts 
to increase these grants by the central government simply lowered the authority of the 
local governments (Thammasat University Research and Consultancy Institute [TU-
RAC], 2009). 
Despite the decentralisation attempts in Thailand, the government administrative 
system seems to still be very much centralised. This is particularly true when it comes 
to the fiscal system. Given this type of system, the government budget is expected to be 
highly concentrated in the capital city. As Bangkok houses all the Thai ministries, it is 
likely that Bangkok would be the major contributor to the provincial government budget 
disparities. In addition, with the little progress in transferring human resources and the 
fiscal budget, the decentralisation effects on provincial expenditure disparities are 
expected to be small.   
Method and Data 
For consistency, the Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation 
is employed again in this section. Data on government budget is available mainly in 
fiscal years. These government budget data are provided by the Comptroller-General’s 
Department of the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of Budget. Although the data at 
the national level have long been available to the public, the provincial-level data are 
not. From 2000 to 2007, the NESDB had compiled the government budget classified by 
province and function. These data are no longer available to the public. They can only 
be obtained on request. Its primary source of data came from the Comptroller-General’s 
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Department. Since the data source is an official one, the government budget data 
compiled by NESDB are considered reliable.  
These data are also quite comprehensive. In addition to budget by province and 
purpose, the budget was also broken down into current and capital expenditure. The 
current and capital expenditure was, again, classified by province and function. This 
allows deeper analyses to be possible. For instance, disparities in expenditure on some 
specific functions or on either current or capital expenditure can be examined. Data on 
expenditure per head are also available at all classification levels. 
Because the Thai government budgeting system is highly centralised, it is 
possible that the data by NESDB may include all budget allocate to central government 
as part of Bangkok’s budget. This is due to the fact that all the central ministries are 
located in Bangkok. To make sure that the analysis is not misleading, the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration’s (BMA) Budget will also be used. The BMA Budget 
Department publishes the Budget Plan every fiscal year. The data are available on 
request from 2000 onwards. These data, however, cannot be broken down into sub-
categories as do the NESDB data. This means that only the aggregate provincial budget 
will be analysed when the BMA Budget is incorporated.  
Results 
The provincial disparities in government budget allocation for FY2000-2007 are 
displayed in Table 4.6. The disparities in capital expenditure and current expenditure, 
which comprise overall government expenditure, are also shown in the table. According 
to the Bureau of the Budget, the capital expenditure is expenditure on acquiring tangible 
assets such as land, buildings, machinery and equipment. It also includes expenditure on 
repairing tangible assets and spending on intangible assets such as copyrights, 
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trademarks and land concessions. Current expenditure, on the other hand, is expenditure 
on goods and services that are necessary for administration. It covers all the remaining 
items not included in capital expenditure. Wages and salary is also included as part of 
this category.  
Table 4.6 Provincial Disparities in Per-Capita Government Expenditure FY2000-2007, 
Nominal Values 
FY 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Gov. Exp.         
   All 0.884  0.859  0.941  1.408  1.414  1.735  1.790  1.913  
   Excl. BKK 0.290  0.271  0.327  0.317  0.287  0.293  0.256  0.257  
         
- Education         
     All 0.406  0.352  0.250  0.321  0.183  0.919  1.037  1.076  
     Excl. BKK 0.188  0.192  0.186  0.174  0.174  0.184  0.192  0.194  
- Health         
     All 0.376 0.575 0.508 0.608 1.093 0.950 0.984 2.002 
     Excl. BKK 0.318 0.292 0.578 0.242 0.268 0.246 0.218 0.341 
         
Current Exp.         
   All 0.811  0.858  1.077  1.474  1.483  1.939  1.982  2.139  
   Excl. BKK 0.255  0.250  0.328  0.312  0.292  0.330  0.320  0.330  
         
Capital Exp.         
   All 1.118  0.866  0.647  1.119  1.131  0.892  1.043  0.869  
   Excl. BKK 0.573  0.483  0.431  0.462  0.367  0.299  0.193  0.226  
         
- Transport & 
Comm.         
     All 1.353  1.112  0.984  1.660  1.262  1.204  1.421  1.801  
     Excl. BKK 0.930  0.764  0.566  0.641  0.550  0.521  0.543  0.599  
Source: Data are obtained on request at the NESDB  
 
The provincial disparities in overall per-capita government expenditure 
continuously increased during FY2000-FY2007. It more than doubled over this seven-
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year period. By comparing disparities across all provinces to those excluding Bangkok, 
it is apparent that Bangkok was the major cause of the disparities. Using this set of data, 
Bangkok alone accounted for more than one-third of the overall government budget. 
This large gap between expenditure that stayed in Bangkok and the rest of the country 
did not occur only at the aggregate level of government expenditure. It can also be 
found in both current and capital expenditure.  
It is likely that such results were due to the centralised nature of the Thai 
government system. In Thailand, all ministries are located in Bangkok. This means that 
the majority of government officials—particularly the high ranked officials—work in 
the capital city. Since wages and salary accounts for one-third of the total budget, a 
considerable share of the budget certainly remains in the central ministries. There are 
also some expenditure items which are normally kept at the central ministries but are 
spent elsewhere. An example is the budget allocated for contingency situations such as 
floods. This type of expenditure is normally drawn out of the central government budget 
to be spent on the flooded areas. Since there is no certainty on where the spending will 
be, it has to be kept at the central government. In addition, the government service 
centres in Thailand tend to be located in big cities or more developed areas. This is 
because it is more costly for the government to set up operations in the remote areas. 
Consequently, a large part of the current expenditure occurs as a part of spending of the 
big cities—particularly Bangkok (Rachatatanun, 2002, pp. 44-45). 
In addition to the disaggregation into current and capital expenditure, the 
government expenditure data by NESDB were also broken down by function. For 
Thailand, government functions can be classified into 14 functions. These functions are 
(1) general public services, (2) defence, (3) public safety, (4) education, (5) health, (6) 
social security, (7) housing and community, (8) religious, culture and recreation, (9) 
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energy, (10) agriculture, (11) mining and mineral resources, (12) transportation and 
communication, (13) other economic affairs and (14) miscellaneous items. The large 
disparities in government expenditure at the aggregate level do not necessary mean that 
expenditure disparities of all functions must also be uneven. Hence, disparities of 
expenditure at a disaggregated level are examined next.  
Among the fourteen functions, the per-capita government expenditure on 
education and health services are investigated. This is because they are normally 
regarded as important monetary tools which have a direct impact on the poor. Results 
suggest that the disparities in health services spending across all provinces continuously 
widened. This is partly due to the fact that the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) is 
situated in Bangkok. It is also because the budget allocation is based on to the capacity 
of service-provider. In Thailand, large public hospitals are concentrated in Bangkok and 
its vicinity. Since large hospitals have more advanced technology and more specialised 
doctors, they normally require much more budget support than the smaller hospitals 
(Rachatatanun, 2002). This consequently causes the disparities to be high. The 
disparities increased during the period as the continuously increasing amount of the 
MOPH budget was kept at the ministry’s headquarters.  
Meanwhile, the disparities in education spending were relatively low and 
decreasing between 2000 and 2004. Then, the disparities jumped from 0.18 to 0.92 in 
2005 and have remained high since. This was because educational institutions at all 
levels are concentrated in the capital city. With priority given to the primary and lower-
secondary education, disparities declined during 2000 and 2004. The disparities rose in 
2005 as the budget allocation shifted in favour of tertiary institutions. Because Bangkok 
houses one-fourth of all tertiary institutions, its share of the budget increased more than 
those of other provinces. In addition, there was also a major salary-base adjustment in 
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2005. It is possible that the additional remuneration for teachers throughout the country 
was drawn out of Ministry of Education’s (MOE) budget. When Bangkok is excluded, 
the disparities of both functions were low and rather stable.  
Another factor that is usually related to regional development is infrastructure. 
Efficient infrastructure and communication systems lead to a more integrated national 
economy and stimulate economic growth (Williamson, 1965, pp. 7-10; Hill, 2007, p. 
82; Llanto, 2007, p. 316). Government expenditure on capital investment is usually 
employed as a measure of infrastructure investment. However, the capital expenditure 
covers many investment items including machinery, office furniture and equipment. 
These items do not contribute much to the regional development compared to roads, 
irrigation and communication systems. Fortunately, disaggregated data of the 
government expenditure on capital investment into functions are available for Thailand. 
Hence, the capital expenditure on transportation and communication is used here as a 
measure of infrastructure expenditure. The results show that disparities across all 
provinces had been high, and slightly increasing over the period 2000-2007. Despite 
that, disparities across provinces excluding Bangkok narrowed considerably during the 
same period. This, again, means that the infrastructure investment was also skewed 
toward Bangkok—causing large overall disparities.  
The main reason for this, again, was that the budget was kept mostly at the 
Ministry of Transport (MOT). In the MOT Budget, the Department of Highways and 
the Department of Rural Roads together received around 60 percent of the budget 
(Ministry of Transport [MOT], 2010). Given their main duties as building roads across 
towns or provinces, allocating the budget to provinces can be problematic. As a result, 
the budget for them normally remains at the Departments in Bangkok. Hence, the 
disparities across provinces were high compared to those excluding Bangkok. 
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In summary, the data showed that per-capita government expenditure for 
Bangkok was noticeably higher than the national average. It occurs at all levels and 
dimensions of disaggregation. The major contributor to such results is the centralised 
system in the Thai government budget. Although the decentralisation has been on 
process, only responsibilities and authorities have been devolved to the local 
governments. The budgeting system remains under the central government’s control. In 
other words, the majority of budget has continued to be kept at the central ministries 
located in Bangkok. To see how much the budget was actually allocated to Bangkok 
itself, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration’s (BMA) budgets for FY2000-2007 are 
considered.  
The total budget for BMA in FY2000 was only 18,947 million Baht. This is very 
small compared to the NESDB data set which has 312,333 million Baht stated under 
Bangkok in FY2000. It is probable that the NESDB data must have included the budget 
for central ministries as part of Bangkok’s budget. This largely distorts the real situation 
of the government finances in Thailand. Obviously the budget allocated specifically to 
Bangkok is much smaller than the amount stated in the NESDB data set. This 
significantly supports the assumption that the large government expenditure disparities 
were due to the inclusion of the central ministries’ budgets into Bangkok’s budget.  
By replacing Bangkok’s budget allocation stated in the NESDB data with the 
BMA’s Budget, the disparities across all provinces dropped considerably. Results are 
displayed in Table 4.7. Here, the disparities across provinces become very close to those 
excluding Bangkok. This means that the government expenditure was actually quite 
evenly distributed across provinces. When the expenditure allocated to the central 
ministries is excluded from the Bangkok’s budget, the per-capita expenditure for 
Bangkok was only 2,919.2 Baht in FY2000 and 4,854.0 Baht in FY2007. In fact, 
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Bangkok had had the lowest per-capita expenditure among all provinces throughout the 
period. This further confirms that the large disparities in government expenditure were 
due to the inclusion of central government spending into Bangkok’s budget.  
Table 4.7 Provincial Disparities in Per-Capita Government Expenditure 
FY2000-2007 using BMA’s Budgets for Bangkok 
Fiscal Year  All Provinces  Exclude 
Bangkok 
 NESDB Data BMA Data  
2000  0.884 0.352   0.290 
2001  0.859 0.360   0.271 
2002  0.941 0.413   0.327 
2003  1.408 0.386   0.317 
2004  1.414 0.353   0.287 
2005  1.735 0.357   0.293 
2006  1.790 0.335   0.256 
2007  1.913 0.323   0.257 
Source: For Bangkok, data are obtained from several editions of Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration Budget. For other provinces, see Table 4.6. 
From the results above, it can be assumed that the difference between the BMA 
and the NESDB dataset is the budget allocated to central ministries. This implies that a 
large part of the national budget had still been under the central government’s control. 
To analyse the government expenditure across provinces, the BMA Budget should be 
used. Given the rather equal distribution of budget across provinces, this implies that the 
relationship between provincial budgets and the provincial income disparities is rather 
moderate. The average simple correlation between provincial GDP per capita across all 
provinces and per-capita government expenditure across all provinces was 0.209 for 
period 2000-2007. Therefore, the provincial distribution of government expenditure 
does not appear to have played a significant role in determining provincial income 
disparities.  
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4.5 Education and Health 
Along with analysing income disparities across provinces, it is also important to 
consider disparities in social aspects. This is because a high level of income inequality 
does not necessary mean that inequality in other dimensions has to show similar trends 
(ADB, 2007, p. 6). Moreover, high social inequality can have adverse affects on 
economic development. Thus, it is important that these social dimensions are 
investigated. Health and education will be examined in this section as they are usually 
regarded as important well-being indicators. 
Education and Health in Thailand 
Education policy has been important in Thailand since it shifted from absolute to 
constitutional monarchy in 1932. The National Education Development Schemes 
(NEDS) have been implemented since 1960. The first two NEDS (1960-1968 and 1969-
1976) emphasised an expansion of primary education. As a result, the primary school 
dropout rate fell from 60 percent of total enrolment in the 1960s to 42 percent in 1977 
(Sattar, 1984, p. 11). The NEDS of 1977-1991 changed the education structure from 
4:3:3:2 to 6:3:3 where the 6-year primary education was compulsory.  
In the 1980s, the government further intensified its efforts to achieve universal 
primary education. At the same time, tertiary education had also been promoted 
considerably. This included allowing for the establishment of private universities and 
setting up colleges in provinces around the country. During this period, however, 
secondary education had been neglected. Then, in 1990, the cabinet approved in 
principle the extension of compulsory education from six to nine years. Accordingly, 
since 1991 there were increasing numbers of primary schools opening lower secondary 
classes on a free-of-charge basis (Jones, 2003, p. 11). As a result, the net enrolment 
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rates in lower secondary education went up from 36.5 percent of total school-aged 
children at appropriate levels in 1992 to 55.1 percent in 1997 (Jones, 2003, p. 14). 
Despite that, compulsory education remained at 6 years. The official raise of 
compulsory education from 6 to 9 years came about under the enactment of the National 
Education Act 1999. The Act enforced parents to keep their children in schools until 
they graduated from lower secondary level. In addition, the government was also 
obligated to provide twelve years of education free of charge (Kirtikara, 2001, p. 6). In 
2003, the former teacher colleges, the Rajabhat Institutes and Rajamonkol Institute of 
Technology were converted to university status. Given that most of these institutes were 
established outside Bangkok, this transformation would help close the access gap in 
tertiary education. Inequality at provincial educational level is therefore expected to 
come down over the years.  
As Thailand has had a long period of educational expansion policy, the literacy 
rates are expected to be equally high across provinces. In contrast, due to unequal access 
to education in the past, provincial differences in years of schooling may be expected. 
Likewise, given the increasing disparities in the per-capita government budget for 
education, disparities in the teacher-student ratios are also expected to be high.   
Thailand’s public health development dates back to 1918 when the Public Health 
Department was established. Since then, the expansion of health infrastructure has been 
rapid. While there were only two hospitals in 1914, all provinces had their own 
provincial hospitals by 1950 (Ministry of Public Health [MOPH], 2006, p. 2). In 1942, 
the Public Health Department was converted into the Ministry of Public Health or 
MOPH. From 1961 onwards, the National Health Development Plans have been 
formulated in accordance with the National Economic and Social Development Plans. 
The first three Plans (1961-1966, 1967-1971 and 1972-1976) focused on further 
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extension of infrastructure as well as on basic health programmes. These programmes 
include family planning, child health and disease control. Then, the Fourth Plan (1977-
1981) introduced decentralisation of health management. This was followed by a 
change in the national health system to be more primary health care-based in the Fifth 
Plan (1982-1986).  
During the Sixth- to Eighth Plans (1987-1991, 1992-1996 and 1997-2001), the 
policy focus was shifted toward training in health economics and financing. Human 
resource training in these areas was much emphasised. As the economy was booming, 
the number of private hospitals in big cities expanded rapidly (MOPH, 2001, pp. 413-
414). At the same time, the allocation of the budget to the MOPH constantly increased 
during 1989-1997. The MOPH then spent the majority of its budget on health personnel. 
This was particularly to counter the brain-drain problem toward private hospitals in the 
big cities. From 1993 onwards, the MOPH also allocated resources to expanding 
community hospitals. Its aim was to have hospitals for every district in Thailand 
(MOPH, 2008, pp. 274-275). As a result, disparities in health personnel during this 
period are expected to be either stable or increasing. At the same time, the inequality in 
number of beds should also fall. Nonetheless, the 1997/98 crisis led many private 
hospitals to shut down. This could, in turn, reduce the unequal distribution of health 
personnel. The crisis also forced the health sector to reform along with other public 
sector reforms.  
The Ninth Plan (2001-2006) put emphasis on health security and a universal 
health care system. In April 2001, the “30-Baht Universal Coverage of Health Care 
Policy” was implemented. By April 2002, Thailand claimed “Universal Coverage” 
(MOPH, 2006, pp. 27-30). Continuing from the Ninth Plan, the Tenth Plan (2007-2011) 
set strategies to enhance the development of e-health, high quality health care and health 
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research centres. With the MOPH’s awareness to create more equal health services 
across regions, the regional disparities in health personnel should decline during this 
period.  
Methods and Data 
To measure the disparities in education and health, the same methods as 
measuring income disparities can usually be employed. For education, the widely used 
measures were the standard deviation of schooling and Gini coefficients. The standard 
deviation measures dispersion in absolute terms while Gini coefficient measures relative 
inequality. Since it is more meaningful for this study to analyse inequality in relative 
terms, only the Gini coefficient will be examined here. The Gini index has also 
commonly been used as a measure of health disparities across provinces (Nishiura et al., 
2004; Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). For comparability with provincial income inequality, the 
Gini index for GPP per capita will also be examined. Calculation of the Gini coefficient 
can be found in Appendix A.  
The health and education Gini can be estimated following Zhang and Kanbur 
(2005). Student-teacher ratios and literacy data will be used to calculate an education 
Gini index. However, literacy rates in Thailand are expected to be rather equal across 
provinces for the past two decades. For this reason, inequality in average years of 
schooling for population aged 25 years or over by province will also be examined. As 
for health, population per physician, health personnel and patient beds will be analysed. 
In addition to the Gini index, the Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of 
variation can also be used as a measure of health and education inequality. It is, 
however, less popular. Following Hill (1992), this section will also employ the 
Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation. The health and education 
indicators used to calculate the Gini coefficients will be used here.  
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For education data, the NSO has conducted a Population and Housing Census 
every ten years since 19603. The provincial data on literacy rates have been included as 
part of the census since the first publication by the NSO. However, except for the 
Census 2000, these data are only available in hardcopies. This means it is time-
consuming to obtain data for all provinces even in one year. Given the limited time for 
this research, this analysis covers the years 1980, 1990 and 2000.  
It is important to note that there was a change in the literacy rate definition in 
1990. Up until the 1980 Census, the literacy rate was measured as the share of 
population aged 10 years or above who can read and write. From 1990, literacy is 
measured from population aged 6 years or above. Notwithstanding the fact that this may 
cause some inconsistency in the data, the analysis will still cover the year 1980. This 
way, the analysis will give more understanding of the changes in education disparities 
over time.  
The data on average years of schooling by province can be obtained from the 
raw data of Socio-economic Surveys. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the NSO has 
conducted the surveys every two years since 1986. The surveys, however, cannot be 
classified by province until the year 1988. The analysis therefore covers the period 
1988-2008. Each survey asks household members of all ages for their highest level of 
education they are attending or have finished. Following Barro and Lee (1996), only 
population aged 25 years or over will be considered for estimating years of schooling.  
The data on student-teacher ratios come from several provincial issues of the 
Statistical Report of Province. This report series are published by Provincial Statistical 
                                                 
3The Population and Housing Census were originally conducted by the Ministry of Interior under the 
name “Housing Census”. The first round of census was done in 1909. Then the census took place every 
ten years on the years that end with zero e.g. 1920. The Ministry of Interior was in charge of the census 
only for the first five issues before transferring the authority to the NSO in 1960.  
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Offices (PSO) around the country. For each province, the overall ratio is usually 
reported along with the ratios for primary and secondary levels. For this reason, this 
analysis will examine disparities in student-teacher ratios at both levels. There are, 
however, some issues regarding this set of data. Firstly, the data for all provinces in 
each year are hardly complete. Because the PSOs were only encouraged—not 
obligated—to publish the reports, not all PSOs produced a report every year. For the 
years prior to 1990, data were available for half of all provinces, if not less. As for the 
more recent years, more than 60 out of 76 provinces published the data each year. Even 
so, it is still time-consuming to collect data for all data-available provinces. For this 
reason, only three periods with the most complete data are selected—1990, 2000 and 
2007. Nonetheless, there are still many provinces missing each year. Since it is likely 
that the student-teacher ratios do not vary much from one year to the next, data from a 
year-before the selected years are used for the missing data. In addition, Bangkok does 
not have its own PSO. This means that the student-teacher ratio is not publicly available 
for Bangkok. Although the numbers of teachers and students are available, their 
disaggregation into education levels is not. With all the efforts, there are 66 out of 74 
provincial data to be used for 1990 and 75 out of 76 provincial data for 2000 and 2007.  
As for health services data, health personnel and patient beds will be used to 
calculate the health inequality. The MOPH has annually published the report Public 
Health Resources since 1994. All issues of the report contain provincial data on the 
number of hospitals, patient beds, physicians, dentists, pharmacists and nurses. This 
study, therefore, covers health inequality across provinces for period 1994-2008. Since 
population per patient bed is probably more meaningful as a well-being indicator than 
the population-per-hospital ratio, only the former will be examined here. Population per 
physician and population per trained health personnel will also be analysed. Numbers of 
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trained health personnel are obtained by summing the number of physicians, dentists, 
pharmacists and nurses.  
Results 
Table 4.8 and Figure 4.3 show that the Gini index for GPP per capita increased 
between 1981 and 2007. This trend is consistent with the GPP per capita inequality 
using Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation as a measure. 
However, the role of Bangkok as a cause of disparities differs between the two 
measures. According to the Williamson’s measure, Bangkok had contributed 
significantly to the overall inequality prior to the crisis. They are also shown in Table 
4.8 and Figure 4.3. Nonetheless, the Gini coefficient in GPP per capita barely changed 
when Bangkok is excluded from consideration. This is because the provincial shares of 
population were not entered as weights in the calculation of Gini index. 
Education 
In addition to the Gini index and Williamson’s coefficient for GPP per capita, 
Table 4.8 also show both inequality indexes for literacy rates for 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
As expected, the inequalities for literacy rates have been very small compared to those 
of per capita GPP. In both cases, Bangkok does not seem to play a significant role in 
causing the literacy inequality. This is consistent with the Thai educational development 
previously mentioned. As primary education had been made compulsory since the 
1960s, the literacy rates from 1980 onwards are expected to be equally high throughout 
the country.  
Looking at trends, the Gini and Williamson’s coefficient for literacy rates 
exhibit similar trends. Like disparities in GPP per capita, the values of Williamson’s 
coefficients are larger than the Gini index. Inequalities in literacy rate declined between 
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1980 and 1990. Nonetheless, it slightly increased in 2000. This was possibly due to the 
migration of illiterate unskilled labour back to their hometowns as a consequence of the 
crisis. According to Nanthamongkolchai (2001), 65.2 percent of all workers returning to 
their hometowns had primary education or less.  
Table 4.8 Gini Coefficient and Williamson’s Coefficient for GPP per Capita, Literacy 
Rate and Student-Teacher Ratio Year 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2007  
Year 1980 1990 2000 2007 
Gini for GPP per capita     
    All 0.3579a 0.3903 0.4643 0.4830 
    Excl. BKK 0.3415a 0.3692 0.4553 0.4791 
Gini for Literacy Rate     
    All 0.0415 0.0267 0.0303 n/a 
    Excl. BKK 0.0418 0.0266 0.0306 n/a 
Gini for Student-Teacher Ratio     
    Primary Level n/a 0.0705b 0.0878 0.1202 
    Secondary Level n/a 0.0659b 0.0698 0.1602 
     
Vw for GPP per capita     
    All 0.9885a 1.1068 1.1081 1.1604 
    Excl. BKK 0.6418a 0.7081 0.8987 1.0974 
Vw for Literacy Rate     
    All 0.0685 0.0475 0.0571 n/a 
    Excl. BKK 0.0709 0.0473 0.0575 n/a 
Vw for Student-Teacher Ratio     
    Primary Level n/a 0.1133b 0.1472 0.2085 
    Secondary Level n/a 0.1542b 0.1111 0.3487 
Note: (a) Data from year 1981 is used instead of 1980 in case of GPP per capita. This is because the 
GPP data are only available from 1981 onwards.  
            (b) For year 1990, only 66 out of 74 provinces were used to calculate inequality of student-
teacher ratio. This is due to the lack of data for some provinces.  
Source: Data on GPP per capita, see Figure 3.4. Data on literacy rates and student-teacher ratios are 
from several editions of Population and Housing Census and Statistical Reports of Province, 
respectively.  
 
While the overall trends of literacy inequalities are in a downward direction, 
inequalities in student-teacher ratios show an opposite trend. The provincial inequality 
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in provision of education had increased over the period 1990-2007, for both primary 
and secondary levels. Note that there was a slight decline in Williamson’s coefficient 
for secondary education between 1990 and 2000. This probably reflects that provinces 
which deviated largely from the national average were those with small population 
share. Nonetheless, the long-term trends of the Gini index and Williamson’s coefficients 
are the same. The disparities in student-teacher ratio jumped considerably between 2000 
and 2007. This was due to increasing numbers of students attending schools over the 
period. As the government raised the compulsory education from 6 to 9 years in 1999, 
parents were enforced to enroll their children in school until they finish the lower-
secondary level. When the numbers of teachers in some provinces did not increase 
along with the students, the disparities widened. 
From results above, it is apparent that Thailand’s development in education has 
progressed to the point where illiteracy rates are now low throughout the country. For 
this reason, using literacy rates as indicators of educational differences across provinces 
may be inappropriate. The years of schooling for the population aged 25 years or over 
can better reflect the educational inequality in Thailand. Table 4.9 illustrates the Gini 
and Williamson’s coefficients in years of schooling for the period 1988-2008.  
The results in Table 4.9 show that the national average years of schooling for 
population aged 25 years or over constantly increased during the period 1988-2008. The 
differences in years of schooling across provinces also came down during the period. 
This implies that the population throughout the country has become increasingly 
educated. This is, again, consistent with the fact that primary education was promoted 
since the 1960s and the compulsory education was raised from 6 to 9 years in 1999. 
According to the joint NESDB-World Bank report (2005, p. 93), the share of workers 
with primary education or less dropped throughout the country between 1991 and 2004.  
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Table 4.9 Average Years of Schooling and Inter-provincial Inequality Indexes for 
Years of Schooling for Population Aged 25 Years or Over 1988-2008 
Year Average Years of 
Schooling 
 Inter-provincial Gini in 
Years of Schooling 
 Inter-provincial vw in 
Years of Schooling  
 All Excl. BKK  All Excl. BKK  All Excl. BKK 
1988 5.328 4.907  0.077 0.072  0.192 0.127 
1990 5.640 5.089  0.088 0.083  0.220 0.159 
1992 5.943 5.401  0.086 0.081  0.210 0.154 
1994 5.925 5.754  0.075 0.071  0.179 0.123 
1996 6.157 5.997  0.072 0.068  0.177 0.125 
1998 6.520 6.318  0.075 0.071  0.190 0.130 
2000 6.958 6.775  0.067 0.063  0.166 0.120 
2002 6.680 6.530  0.065 0.062  0.160 0.113 
2004 6.982 6.819  0.062 0.058  0.155 0.107 
2006 7.649 7.508  0.059 0.056  0.136 0.116 
2008 7.847 7.683  0.057 0.054  0.134 0.105 
Source: Several editions of NSO’s Socio-Economic Survey, which is conducted every two years. 
 
Notwithstanding such improvement, the average educational level in the overall 
Thai labour force has remained low. This is because most of the labour force had been 
born before the expansion policy was implemented. In 2008, there was 56.3 percent of 
the labour force with complete primary education or less. Even in Bangkok, the share 
was 38.5 percent (NSO, 2008, Table 2). This partly explains the rather low inequality in 
provincial years of schooling across Thailand. As majority of worker in all provinces 
had an educational level of primary school or lower, the mean years of schooling cannot 
vary much between provinces.  
The fact that a large part of population has primary education or lower also 
explains the low average years of schooling. With the rise in compulsory education 
being implemented only ten years ago, its effect cannot yet be evident when considering 
all age groups. It can possibly be seen more clearly if only the younger group of 
126 
 
population is considered. By looking at the population aged 25-30 years, the average 
years of schooling went up from 7.1 years in 1988 to 9.3 years in 1998 and 11.2 years in 
2008. Only 22.4 percent of this cohort has less than 9 years of schooling in 2008.  
The average years of schooling and its inequalities across provinces became 
slightly lower when Bangkok is excluded. The gap between the national years of 
schooling and that excluding Bangkok also continuously narrowed over time. By 
looking at the Gini index, Bangkok seems to play a small and decreasing role in 
determining inequality in educational levels. Contrastingly, Bangkok has played 
significant role in determining education disparities when using Williamson’s 
coefficient as a measure. This reflects the fact that the inter-provincial Gini index does 
not take into account the population weights. As a result, Bangkok is entered into the 
calculation with equal weights as every other province. 
The results of Williamson’s coefficient in years of schooling are consistent with 
the perception of educational disparities in Thailand. Ever since the beginning of 
educational development, Bangkok has been the educational hub of the country—
particularly at the tertiary level. As of 2008, Bangkok still housed almost half of all 
tertiary institutions in Thailand (Ministry of Education [MOE], 2009, Table 1). In 
addition, highly-educated workers tend to stay or come into the big cities such as 
Bangkok to find jobs. According to the 2008 Labour Force Survey, 25.1 percent of all 
the labour force with university degrees resided in Bangkok. Nonetheless, the regions 
around Bangkok and the East have been catching up with Bangkok in the recent 
decades. These provinces increasingly attract highly-educated workers away from 
Bangkok, hence reducing the role of Bangkok as a cause of inequality. This situation is, 
again, illustrated clearly by the Williamson’s coefficient. The gap between disparities 
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across all provinces and those excluding Bangkok has continuously narrowed over the 
period of study. 
Health Services 
Inequalities in health services across provinces are shown in Figure 4.3. The 
graphs include the Gini index and Williamson’s coefficients for population per 
physician, health personnel, patient beds as well as GPP per capita. There are some 
differences between the Gini index and the Williamson’s coefficients. Firstly, similar to 
the results in education inequalities, the values of Williamson’s coefficients are higher 
than the Gini. It is probably because provinces that deviate largely from the national 
averages are those with large population share to the total population. The share of 
provincial population to the national population seems to play a significant role in 
determining inequality results here.  
Another difference between the Gini index and Williamson’s coefficients occurs 
when comparing the inequality in health services to that in per capita GPP. For Gini 
index, the inequality in all health services had been lower than the income inequality 
throughout the period 1994-2008. Contrastingly, the Williamson’s coefficient in 
population per physician had been much larger than the income disparities up until 
2003. Despite that, the Gini index and Williamson’s coefficients show similar trends in 
both health service inequalities and per capita income disparities. For both measures, 
the inequality in all three health indicators exhibit long-term downward trends. The 
inequalities in population per physician and per health personnel showed a slight 
increase at the beginning before falling during 1996-1999.  
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Figure 4.3 Gini Coefficients for GPP per Capita, Population per Physician, Population 
per Health Personnel and Population per Patient Bed 1994-2008 
a. Across all Provinces 
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These results are consistent with the Thai situation. During the boom, rapid 
expansion of private hospitals in urban centres must have worsened the distribution of 
doctors and health personnel. Toward the end of the boom period, the MOPH policy to 
counter the brain-drain problem might have helped improve the distribution. As 
Thailand fell into crisis in 1997, many private hospitals were shut down. This further 
improved the distribution of health personnel across provinces—reflected by the further 
decline in inequalities in 1997-1998.  
There was a jump in the inequalities in population per physician as well as 
population per health personnel in 2000. This is a bit surprising at the first glace. 
Nonetheless, it can be explained by looking at the number of physicians and health 
personnel. In 2000, there were large shifts in physicians and health personnel from all 
other provinces toward the Eastern and Central regions. This coincides with the 
catching-up of these provinces with Bangkok in term of economic growth. Then, the 
inequalities were on downward trends from 2001. The Williamson’s coefficient in 
population per physician even fell below the GPP per capita disparities in 2003 
onwards. This was due to increases in both MOPH budget and health personnel, 
coupled with the implementation of universal health care in 2001. As for the 
inequalities in population per patient bed, they have continuously come down between 
1994 and 2004. This reflects the government policy to build community hospitals in 
every district during these years. The inequalities, however, fluctuates from 2004 
onwards. As the number of hospitals in many provinces also fluctuated during this time, 
the fluctuation in both the Gini and Williamson’s coefficient were possibly due to this. 
The third difference between the Gini index and Williamson’s coefficients is the 
contribution of Bangkok to the overall disparities. For the Gini index, the inequality in 
health services barely changes when Bangkok is excluded. The same is true for the Gini 
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index of GPP per capita. This differs considerably with the results using Williamson’s 
population-weighted coefficient of variation. Particularly for population per physician, 
Bangkok was apparently the main cause of inequalities. This is consistent with 
Thailand’s situation. In 1994, there were 1,019 persons per physician in Bangkok, 
which were 3.7 times lower than the national average. In 2008, Bangkok was still the 
province with the lowest population per physician ratio. However, the ratio in Bangkok 
fell to 2.7 times lower than the national average. Here, we can conclude that the 
Williamson’s coefficient of variation seems to better reflect the health situation in 
Thailand. This, again, was due to the fact that Gini index does not take into account the 
provincial share of population.  
In summary, the inequalities in health services and educational attainment have 
declined markedly from the 1990s. It reflects the government’s attempts to improve the 
well-being of people throughout the country. These trends, however, contradict with the 
inequality trend in GPP per capita. This leads to the conclusion that while inequality in 
economic development worsened over time, the government did try to provide social 
services more equally across provinces. Despite saying that, the education and health 
data here do not reflect any quality of the services. It therefore cannot tell whether the 
quality of education and health services have also become more equal along with their 
quantity over time. Further studies regarding quality of these services should be 
benefiting. However, it will not be covered here.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter adds more understanding to provincial disparities in Thailand by 
investigating four aspects of disparities. The findings showed that the industrial sector 
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was the main contributor to the overall provincial income disparities. Likewise, labour 
productivity—particularly in the industrial sector, also affected the disparities in GPP 
per capita. Not only that, the variation in labour participation rates across provinces 
played some role as well. The contribution from disparities in government expenditure, 
on the other hand, was less marked. For government expenditure in FY2000-2007 using 
NESDB data set, the allocation had been highly biased in favour of Bangkok. This, 
however, was due to the inclusion of budgets allocated to central ministries as part of 
expenditure for Bangkok. When adjustment is made for this, the budget was rather 
equally distributed across the country.  
Looking at social inequality across provinces, results show that literacy rates, 
years of schooling and health services became more equal over time. Although this is an 
opposite trend from the GPP per capita disparities, it coincides with the disparities in 
household income. Recall from Chapter 3, while the disparities in GPP per capita were 
widening, those in household income and consumption narrowed from the year 2000 
onwards. This shows that income redistribution and social development policies have 
become more equal across provinces. The geographical dimension seems to have been 
given some attention when it comes to social policy. 
So far, this study looked at provincial disparity patterns through many data sets. 
The disparity measures indicate the size of inequality and the trend of that inequality 
over time. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), these disparities show the 
evidence of σ-convergence in Thailand. The σ-convergence exists when disparities 
across provinces decline over time. There are also another dimension of convergence—
the β-convergence.  The β-convergence occurs when the poor provinces grow faster 
than the rich. To understand provincial development thoroughly, it is thus important that 
β-convergence is also examined. This will be carried out in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Investigating Convergence and Provincial Growth Determinants 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In studies of inequality across regions, the concept of convergence is normally 
employed to show whether inequality has been narrowing down. There are two types of 
income convergence, the σ- and the β-convergence. The σ-convergence occurs when the 
deviation of average income across geographical areas declines. The β-convergence 
occurs when income of the poor areas grows faster than the rich. The former type of 
convergence was already examined in the previous chapter. It was done using the 
Williamson’s coefficient of variation as the measure. This chapter investigates the latter 
type of convergence. 
According to the neoclassical growth theory, the average incomes of the poor 
regions tend to grow faster than those of the rich. Nonetheless, empirical results have 
been rather mixed, particularly when looking at developing countries. Fujita and Hu 
(2001) found no evidence of β-convergence among provinces in China during 1984-
1994 and 1990-1994. Meanwhile, Balisacan (2007) found conditional convergence of 
provincial incomes in the Philippines during 1988-2003. Resosudarmo and Vidyattama 
(2006) also found conditional convergence for Indonesia during 1993-2002. Recall that 
the details of their findings were previously discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
As for the case of Thailand, the results often contradict neoclassical growth 
theory. Southichack (1998) found unconditional divergence in GPP per capita in 
Thailand for the period 1975-1995. Nonetheless, when divided into four sub-periods, 
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unconditional convergence occurred only in the years 1980-1985. A study by NESDB 
and the World Bank (2005) also gave similar results. Unconditional convergence was 
found for the period 1975-1986 while unconditional divergence was apparent for period 
1986-2003. Meanwhile, Potipiti (2009) showed that there was no evidence of 
unconditional convergence for any of the four periods, 1981-2005, 1981-1990, 1991-
2000 and 2001-2005. Despite several studies on convergence in Thailand, none of them 
has taken into account the financial crisis. This study, therefore, examines β-
convergence in Thailand for the period 1981-2008.  
In relation to the β-convergence, this chapter also examines the factors 
contributing to provincial growth. As the method for β-convergence is based on a 
growth model, the extension of this model can be used to find provincial growth 
determinants. Given a large number of worldwide empirical studies on growth 
convergence and determinants, several factors have been found to be significant 
including population growth, within-province income inequality, physical- and human-
capital accumulation, resource endowment, government consumption, infrastructure, 
FDI and international trade. These factors will be examined in this chapter—except for 
the physical capital, international trade and government consumption. The physical 
capital and trade data are not available at the provincial level while the government 
consumption data are problematic. In addition, there are also other factors which might 
be relevant to the Thai provincial growth. These include initial share of agricultural 
sector, labour productivity and share of industrial sector. They will also be examined in 
this chapter.  
 This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 discusses methods and data to 
be employed in the chapter. Section 5.3 presents the results on β-convergence. Here, 
evidence of convergence on both GPP per capita and per capita income from 
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household’s surveys will be investigated. Then, section 5.4 analyses provincial growth 
determinants. Finally, section 5.5 concludes.   
 
5.2 Methods and Data 
Methods 
The concept of β-convergence was developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) based 
on the Solow growth model (see Appendix B). Since then, the concept has been adopted 
by many scholars for testing convergence as well as finding growth determinants. This 
analysis follows the model specification of Balisacan (2007). The average growth rate 
of per capita income during the period T is given by 
vyy
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   (5.1) 
where:  
0iy  = initial per capita income 
iTy  = per capita income of the final year 
*
iy  = the steady-state level of per-capita income 
v  = error term 
The coefficient β represents the speed of convergence. Per capita income convergence 
exists when the value of β > 0. It is important to note that equation (5.1) also includes 
the term )log( *iyδ . This implies that the per capita income growth rate also depends on 
the steady-state level of income. The positive value of β, therefore, means that the 
poorer economies grow faster than the rich after controlling for the steady state. 
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The long-run steady state of an economy is normally determined by the 
technological level, preferences and the institutional setting. These factors tend to be 
very much the same across provinces within a country. Consequently, the steady-state 
levels among provinces are expected be similar. For this reason, the within-country 
analysis usually assumes *y  to be the same across provinces. This means that the 
steady-state term can be dropped and the equation (5.1) becomes 
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where c = α + )log( *iyδ  and wi is an error term. Here, “absolute convergence” exists if 
the value of β > 0. As this research focuses on provincial indicators within Thailand, 
equation (5.2) will be employed for the β-convergence analysis. 
In addition to the analysis on β-convergence, the above model can also be 
adopted to examine growth determinants. Regardless of the steady-state levels, there are 
other factors influencing per-capita income growth of provinces. Based on Garcia and 
Soelistianingsih (1998), the model can be reformulated as follows: 
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where Zi represents other selected variables that determine provincial growth rate. 
Through numerous empirical works on growth determinants, there are several factors 
found to influence provincial growth rates. Following neoclassical growth theory, 
factors commonly considered as determinants are population growth rate, and capital 
stock accumulation including human capital (Mankiw, Romer & Weil, 1992; Barro, 
1996; Resosudarmo & Vidyattama, 2006). Population growth and human capital stock 
accumulation will be examined in this chapter as it would be interesting to see whether 
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such theory holds in the case of Thailand. Unfortunately due to the lack of provincial-
level data, physical capital stock accumulation will not be included in the analysis.   
There are also other factors used in many growth regression analyses. Examples 
of these variables include government consumption, rule of law variable, terms of trade 
(Barro, 1996), inequality (Balisacan & Fuwa, 2000), FDI, openness to trade 
(Resosudarmo & Vidyattama, 2006), political setting, geography (coastal area as 
opposed to landlocked area) and infrastructure (Balisacan, 2007). Not all of these 
factors are relevant to the case of Thailand. Rule of law and political setting are not 
relevant for intra-country analysis as they are the same across provinces. As for 
government consumption, terms of trade and openness to trade, though seem important, 
data are either erratic or not available at provincial level. Recall from Chapter 4 that due 
to centralised budgeting system, data for government consumption do not reflect where 
the spending actually ends up. Data on trade are not available at provincial level. For 
geography, Nopkhun (2007) examined per capita GPP convergence during 1981-2003 
by sub-dividing provinces into inland and coastal provinces. He found that coastal 
dummy did not significantly affect provincial growth in Thailand. Given his evidence, 
the variable will not be examined here. This leaves three variables—inequality, FDI and 
infrastructure as possible determinants for estimation.  
Do these three factors seem to be valid for the Thai provincial growth 
determinants? Kittiprapas (1999a) identified unbalanced infrastructure development as 
one of the major causes of unbalanced growth. However, no empirical analysis was 
taken to support the claim. Adding infrastructure as a determinant will give empirical 
evidence on the infrastructure-growth relation. For FDI, Chowdhury and Movrotas 
(2006) found positive relationship between FDI and growth in Thailand during the years 
1969-2000. They also found that the causation occurred in both directions. Despite that, 
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the analysis only looked at the relationship at the national level. Hence, investigation in 
this chapter will show whether the same relationship applies at the provincial level. For 
inequality, Deolailikar (2002) found that lagged inequality had strong negative effect on 
provincial income growth for 1992-1999. However, he used per capita income from 
household surveys rather than the GPP per capita. This analysis differs from Deolailikar 
in the time period of study as well as the measure used for provincial income growth. 
Initial inequality as measured by Gini coefficient will therefore be examined as one of 
the growth determinants.    
There are also some additional factors that may be important growth 
determinants in Thailand. Southichack (1998) found that the initial agricultural share to 
GPP was a significant determinant of provincial growth in Thailand during the years 
1975-1995. It is, however, expected to play a more moderate role in the period 1994-
2008. This is because the Thai economy had gone through structural change toward the 
industrial sector since the late 1980s. Consequently, agricultural sector’s contribution to 
growth has constantly declined (Siamwalla, 1996, p. 3). Initial agricultural share will be 
considered here to see whether the above statement is empirically supported. Comparing 
to the period 1975-1995, the variable is expected to become less significant, if any, in 
determining the growth during 1994-2008.  
On the other hand, the role of the industrial sector in determining growth is 
expected to increase. For this, the initial share of industrial sector to GPP will be 
considered in the regression. It is expected that provinces with initially higher share of 
industrial sector to GPP would grow faster than those with a lower share. In addition, 
Southichack (1998), using a sector variable, found that provinces that went through 
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rapid structural change grew faster during the period 1975-19951. Likewise, Sarntisart 
(2001) identified expansion of the manufacturing sector in Bangkok and surrounding 
provinces as a key factor for growth. This means that provinces experiencing a large 
increase in industrial sector share of GPP would grow fast. To examine this point 
empirically, the change in industrial share of GPP over the years 1994-2008 will be also 
included as a determinant.  
Another variable that will be considered in this chapter is provincial agricultural 
productivity. The joint-study by NESDB and World Bank (2005) indicated that low 
agricultural productivity was one of the causes for Northeast economy to lag behind 
other regions. Although agricultural sector as a share of GDP has become smaller over 
time, it continues to employ the largest share of labour. As of 2008, 42.5 percent of total 
labour force was still in agricultural sector (NSO, 2008, Table 4). To see whether 
agricultural labour productivity empirically plays a role in determining provincial 
growth, it is included in the regression. Details of all variables to be used in this chapter 
will be discussed in the next subsection. First, there are few points that need attention 
here.  
For human capital stock, there were several indicators that can be employed as 
proxies. These indicators include school enrolment, the ratio of investment in secondary 
education to the gross provincial product, the share of labour force with post primary 
education, average years of education and literacy rates. Nonetheless, not all of them are 
                                                 
1 Sector variable is an index capturing the composition of production sectors within each province. 
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), it is defined as follows: 
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where wijt is the share of sector j in province i’s GPP at time T and yjT is the national average per capita 
value-added of sector j at time T. The index represents the per capita GPP growth rate of province i 
between time 0 and T if each sector in the province were to grow at the national average rate. In other 
words, the variable reflects shocks and structural changes within each province over the study period. 
Provinces with large shares of fast-growing sectors are expected to grow fast.   
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appropriate to the level of development in Thailand. The school enrolment and ratio of 
investment in secondary education to the GPP are not available at the provincial level. 
The literacy rates seem irrelevant for the case of Thailand. Recall from Chapter 4 that 
the Thai government had focused on expansion of primary education since 1960. 
Consequently, the literacy rates were high throughout the country from 1980 onwards. 
In addition, the 6-year primary education was made compulsory since 1977. As a result, 
the labour force with primary education made up the largest share of the total labour 
force. It was therefore labour force with post-primary education that seems to differ 
across provinces. The same is true for average years of schooling. Accordingly, these 
two variables should be good proxies for provincial human capital stock in the case of 
Thailand. Given availability of the data, both the share of labour force with post-
primary education and average years of schooling will be used as measures of initial 
human capital stock.   
Similarly, there are many indicators that can be proxies for infrastructure 
development. Among the most commonly used are the ratio of capital formation to 
GPP, road density and public spending on infrastructure. Unfortunately, the first two 
data are not available while the last one is erratic. Balisacan (2002) introduced the share 
of households with electricity as one of the infrastructure variables in his growth-
determinant analysis. He found the variable to be significant for provincial growth in 
the Philippines during the years 1988-2003. As the level of development of Thailand is 
similar to that of the Philippines, the variable should serve as a good proxy for 
infrastructure for Thailand as well. Consequently, the ratio of households with 
electricity to the total provincial households will be employed as one of the 
determinants.   
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For all regression analyses in this chapter, the estimations will be done using 
STATA programme version 11. Based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), the method 
to be employed here is a cross-sectional “level” analysis. Although there were growing 
attempts to estimate β-convergence using panel-data estimation, it will not be used here. 
The panel estimation has an advantage as it allows for province-specific factors to be 
analysed. However, there is also a drawback in the panel data estimations. To use the 
method requires many time-series observations. This can be done by considering short-
term growth rates, i.e. annual growth instead of the long-term growth, i.e. 14-year 
growth between 1994 and 2008. The variable on the left hand side will no longer be 
(1/T)· log [yiT /yi0]. It will become log (yt-yt-1 /yt-1).  In other words, the period of study 
will change from a 14-year period for each province to a 1-year period for each 
province for 14 periods. This short time span often involves short-term fluctuations, 
which is not of interest to long-term analysis (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004, pp. 495-
496). Since a long-term period is the interest of this study, only cross-section “level” 
estimation will be analysed.  
Data 
The data for the absolute β-convergence analysis covers the period 1981-2008. 
As for the growth determinants, the analyses start from 1994. This is because provincial 
data for some of the variables are either unavailable or incomplete prior to 1994. In 
addition, there were many provinces created between 1975 and 1993. This means the 
number of provinces was not stable during the period2. From 1993 up until the present 
day, Thailand consists of 76 provinces. As the absolute β-convergence analysis covers 
the period prior to 1993, it will use 72 provinces in place in 1981. The GPP and 
                                                 
2
 In 1982, Mukdahan was separated from the province of Nakhon Phanom. Then in 1993, three additional 
provinces were established. They are Am Nat Charoen (splitting from Ubon Ratchathani), Nong Bua Lam 
Phu (splitting from Udon Thani) and Sa Keaw (splitting from Prachin Buri).  
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population of the four newly-created provinces will be consolidated to their original 
provinces. Hence, the 72 provinces comprise the whole country. For all other analyses 
in this chapter, the 76 provinces are used.   
For analyses in which the period of study is 1994-2008, two sub-periods will be 
considered. One is the entire period between 1994 and 2008. Another is from 2000 to 
2008. The second sub-period is added to consideration because the Thai economy went 
into crisis during 1997-1998. Then, many reforms took place causing the structure of 
Thai economy to change after 1998. It is therefore interesting to investigate the growth 
determinants after the crisis.  
As stated earlier, there are 10 factors to be examined for provincial growth 
determinants in Thailand. The detailed definitions and the data sources for these 
variables are given below. Note that many of the data used in this chapter have already 
been introduced in earlier chapters. For these data, only short descriptions will be given 
here with references to the chapter where the data were introduced. The descriptive 
statistics for all regressions are separately displayed in Appendix C.  
Provincial income per capita (GPP and Income): as previously mentioned in 
Chapter 3, there are two measures of per capita income. One is per capita GPP compiled 
annually by the NESDB. Data are available from 1981 onwards, both in nominal- and 
1988-price real terms. Another is the nominal per capita current income from the SES. 
The current income3 is defined as all kinds of income received on a regular basis. It 
                                                 
3
 As the per capita current income data are derived from household surveys, the definition is based on 
household income definition. According to NSO, household total income includes the following items: 
(1) Wages and salary, tips and bonuses 
(2) Net profit from farming and businesses 
(3) Income from properties e.g. rent, copy rights, interest and dividends 
(4) Income from pensions, annuities, scholarships and assistances 
(5) Income in-kind e.g. estimated free-occupied housing, unpaid goods and services 
(6) Other income e.g. from inheritance, proceeds from insurance, lottery prizes.     
Household current income includes all items except (6).  
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includes wages and salaries, net profit from business, pensions, assistance and transfers, 
income from properties, interest and dividends as well as income in-kind (NSO, 1998, 
p.33). Recall also from Chapter 3 that the surveys are conducted every two years by the 
NSO, with provincial-level data4 available from 1988. In 2007, the NSO has changed 
the frequency of the survey to an annual basis. The NSO no longer surveys on income 
for even years, e.g. 2008. Only in the odd years does the SES cover both household 
expenditure and income. As a result, the analysis using per capita income can only 
cover the period 1988-2007. Given that the values are in nominal terms, the per capita 
income has to be converted to the real values. This will be done using the provincial 
GPP deflators.  
Rate of population growth (PopGr): is the growth rate of provincial population.   
Data are obtained from the NESDB’s Gross Regional and Provincial Product report 
series. As mentioned in Chapter 3, these data are compiled using both registration data 
from the Ministry of Interior and the SES as bases. The SES normally records 
household data according to their current location, implying that migration has already 
been accounted for. In result, the NESDB’s population data should already include 
migration between provinces.  
Initial income inequality by province (Gini): the data on provincial Gini index 
will be used as a measure of this variable. The Gini index can be computed from the raw 
data of the Socio-economic Surveys (see Chapter 3 for details). Since the provincial-
level data are available from 1988 onwards, the provincial Gini can be computed for the 
same time period. It is important to note that the Gini indexes can be computed from 
both per capita income and per capita consumption expenditure. For consistency with 
the previous chapter, the income Gini index will be used here.  
                                                 
4
 Note again here that sample size of the SES 1988-1992 may not be sufficient for representing the true 
situation at the provincial level. However, they are included for the benefit of seeing the long-term trend. 
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Initial share of labour force with post-primary education (PostPrimaryLF): is 
defined as the ratio of labour force that graduated lower secondary school or higher to 
the total labour force. Data can be obtained from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) 
conducted by the NSO. The details on these data can be found in section 4.3 of Chapter 
4. In addition to disaggregation by production sectors, the LFS also provides data by the 
highest educational award achieved. As this research is interested in the labour force 
with post-primary education, the lowest award after primary school is the lower 
secondary. This means that each labour had to graduate the lower secondary school to 
be counted here. As a measure of initial human capital stock, this variable is expected 
have positive effect on provincial growth.   
Initial educational attainment (EduAttain): is measured as the average years of 
education in population aged 25 years or over. As these data have already been 
introduced in Chapter 4, the details of data sources can be found there. As a measure of 
human capital accumulation, this variable is expected to positively determine provincial 
growth.  
Share of households with electricity (Electricity): is defined as the ratio of 
households with electricity to the total number of households in the province. The 
change is measured between 1994 and 2008. These data are included as a part of the 
Socio-economic Surveys and, hence, are available every two years from 1988 onwards. 
It is entered here as a proxy for provincial infrastructure development. As argued 
earlier, infrastructure development is expected to enhance provincial growth in the case 
of Thailand. 
Initial share of agricultural sector in GPP (AgrShare): is defined as the ratio of 
provincial agricultural value-added to GPP at the beginning of the study period. Data on 
agricultural value-added are available as part of the GPP data set. Hence, they were 
144 
 
already introduced in Chapter 4. Like GPP, agricultural value-added can be obtained 
from NESDB for the period starting from 1981. The provinces with initially higher 
share of agriculture to GPP are expected to grow at slower rate than those with lower 
share.  
Initial share of industrial sector in GPP (IndShare): is defined as the ratio of 
provincial industrial value-added to GPP at the beginning of study period. In the same 
manner as the previous variable, data on industrial value-added are published as part of 
GPP data and are available since 1981. Details can be found in Chapter 4. Provinces 
which started off with higher share of industrial sector are expected to grow faster than 
those with lower share. 
Change in industrial share of GPP (∆IndShare): is measured as the difference 
between the industrial share of GPP at the first year and the last year of study period. 
Provinces with a large increase in industrial sector during the period are expected to 
grow faster than those with smaller increase. 
Agricultural labour productivity (Agperlabor): it is defined as provincial 
agricultural value-added per agricultural worker. Data sources are the same as those in 
Chapter 4. Because agricultural labour accounts for the largest share of total labour 
force, agricultural labour productivity should be important for income growth. Based on 
a study by NESDB and World Bank (2005), provinces with lower agricultural 
productivity are expected to have lower provincial growth.   
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): is defined as the ratio of FDI to GPP. The 
value of FDI in each province is represented by the value of FDI projects that obtain 
newly-issued certificates. Although it is better to use the value of implemented FDI 
projects, such data are not available in Thailand. Thailand Board of Investment (BOI) 
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only publishes data on project applications, the approved projects, and the projects 
issued with certificates. According to the BOI, after receiving the project approval, the 
applicant must set up the company within six months. Then the company must apply 
and receive the Investment Promotion Certificate before the factory can legally start its 
operation (Board of Investment [BOI], 2009, pp. 53-55). These data are available from 
1993 onwards. It is expected that FDI induces growth through knowledge spillovers, 
technological transfers and capital formation (Tanna & Topaiboul, 2005, p. 1). 
Consequently, FDI is expected to have positive effect on provincial growth. 
 
5.3 Results: Absolute β-Convergence 
Following equation (5.2), the regression results are shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. 
Table 5.1 exhibits the estimates using the real GPP per capita data while Table 5.2 
shows those using SES per capita income data. The first two rows of Table 5.1 show the 
estimates for the entire period of study from 1981 to 2008. The results suggest an 
evidence of absolute divergence in per-capita GPP growth among provinces. However, 
the estimate is statistically insignificant at the ten percent level. This means that the 
growth rate of GPP per capita is independent from initial level of GPP per capita. The 
results are consistent with those found in Southichack (1998), both in trends and 
explanatory powers i.e. the value of R-squares. Regardless of the statistical 
insignificance, the trend of β-divergence here is consistent with the σ-divergence results 
found in Chapter 3. Recall that the σ-divergence was illustrated by the widening trend 
of Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation in GPP per capita during 
1981-2008. This suggests that the gap between the rich and the poor provinces was 
widening over time.   
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Figure 5.1 further illustrates the estimation results for the full period of 1981-
2008. The figure shows weak evidence that provinces with initially low income tended 
to grow slower than the initially richer provinces. It is apparent that the high-growth 
provinces are those in the Eastern and Central regions. Notice that Bangkok seems to 
grow quite slowly over the period. This is also consistent with the provincial disparity 
trend discussed in Chapter 3. Recall that during 1981-2008, the provincial disparities 
excluding Bangkok had been catching up with the overall disparities. This must be due 
to the high growth rates of Eastern and Central provinces, coupled with the slower 
growth of Bangkok.  
Table 5.1  Absolute  β-Convergence on Real GPP per Capita  for Thailand’s 72 Provinces 
1981-2008 
Dependent Variable  Explanatory Variable 
Log of Annual Growth 
Rate of Real GPP per 
Capita 
 (Log of Initial Real per Capita GPP)  
 Constant  β  Adjusted R2 
1981-2008  -0.0168  0.0048  0.01 
  (0.0603)  (0.0063)   
1981-1985  0.1988  -0.0172  0.07 
  (0.0674)***  (0.0070)**   
1986-1996  -0.0860  0.0156  0.08 
  (0.0570)  (0.0058)***   
1997-1998  0.1997  -0.0280  0.10 
  (0.1048)**  (0.0101)***   
1999-2008  -0.0737  0.0101  0.15 
  (0.0298)**  (0.0029)***   
1988-2007  -0.0478  0.0084  0.04 
 
 (0.0431)  (0.0044)*   
Note:   Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level and * 10 percent level.   
For all regressions, number of observations is 72 for the 72 provinces of Thailand. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data are collected from several editions of Gross Regional and 
Provincial Product as follows: 1981-1997: NESDB (1998), 1998-2001: NESDB (2007a) and 
2002-2008: NESDB (2010b) 
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Figure 5.1  Initial Real GPP per Capita and Average Annual Growth Rate 1981-2008 
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The insignificance of β-convergence results may be due to the fact that the Thai 
economy has gone through several phases during the period. It can be divided into four 
phases: steady growth (1981-1985), the boom years (1986-1996), the crisis (1997-1998) 
and the post-crisis years (1999 onwards). The results suggest that convergence trends 
vary considerably between the four sub-periods. During the years of steady growth, 
there was an absolute convergence of real GPP per capita across provinces. The 
convergence occurred at a rate of 1.7 percent per year. During the boom, however, the 
real GPP per capita diverged at the rate of 1.6 percent per year. Convergence then 
occurred again during the two years of the crisis. After that, the real GPP per capita 
diverged at the rate of 1.0 percent. The estimates are statistically significant for all sub-
periods. For 1981-1985, the estimate is significant at a five percent level. The estimates 
of the rest of the sub-periods are significant at the one percent level. Since both periods 
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of divergence are longer time periods than those of convergence, the provincial 
dispersion of per capita GPP widened. This is, therefore, consistent with the results in 
Chapter 3.  
Another set of provincial income measures is derived from the household survey 
data on per capita current income. As already stressed in Chapter 3, this indicator has a 
somewhat different meaning compared to the GPP per capita. The GPP per capita 
represents the values of produced goods and services within the province. The current 
income, on the other hand, represents the incomes actually received by those living in 
the province. The time periods for data using household surveys differ slightly from that 
of GPP per capita. Here, the full time period of study is from 1988 to 2007. This is due 
to the availability of the data. Results of absolute β-convergence with this second data 
set are shown in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2. Note that in order to make the results from 
two data sets comparable, the β-convergence of GPP per capita during the period 1988-
2007 is also considered. The results are shown in the last two rows of Table 5.1.  
Table 5.2 Absolute  β-convergence on Real Income per Capita for Thailand’s 72 
Provinces 1988-2007 
Dependent Variable  Explanatory Variable 
Log of Annual Growth 
Rate of Real Income per 
Capita 
 (Log of Initial Real per Capita Income)  
 Constant  β  Adjusted R2 
1988-2007  0.1843  -0.0203  0.11 
  (0.0432)***  (0.0063)***   
1988-1994  0.5248  -0.0681  0.12 
  (0.1436)***  (0.0209)***   
1996-1998  0.4544  -0.0615  0.06 
  (0.1994)**  (0.0269)**   
2000-2007  0.1663  -0.0172  0.04 
  (0.0656)**  (0.0088)*   
Note:   Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level and * 10 percent level.   
For all regressions, number of observations is 72 for the 72 provinces of Thailand. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Data are from NSO (2009).  
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The results indicate evidence of absolute convergence in provincial per capita 
income for all periods of study. The convergence rates are 2.0 percent per year for the 
entire period, 6.8 percent during the boom, 6.2 percent during the crisis and 1.7 percent 
between 2000 and 2007. The estimates are statistically significant at the one percent 
level for 1988-2007 and 1988-1994. For 1996-1998 and 2000-2007, they are significant 
at the five percent level and ten percent level, respectively. Obviously, the results here 
differ considerably with those using the real GPP per capita. For the entire period of 
1988-2007, the per capita current income converged at the rate of 2.0 percent per year. 
The real GPP per capita, on the other hand, diverged at 0.8 percent per year. The 
estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level (see Table 5.1). As for the 
sub-periods, the per capita GPP diverged during the boom and the post-crisis. The per 
capita current income, on the contrary, converged for all sub-periods.  
Figure 5.2  Initial Real Current Income per Capita and Average Annual Growth Rate 
1988-2007 
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The difference between the results of the two data sets can be explained as 
follows. Recall that per capita current income includes incomes other than wages and 
salary e.g. profits as well as all types of transfers. The results simply show that 
provinces where income is generated differ from those where it is received. This can 
most likely be explained by the change in income composition of rural households. In 
the 1980s, there had been rapid structural changes in the Thai economy. The agricultural 
expansion slowed down due to the exhaustion of the land frontier and declining 
agricultural terms of trade (Krongkaew, 1985, p. 334; Siamwalla, 1996, pp. 3-10). At 
the same time, the industrial sector grew rapidly—particularly from the mid-1980s 
onwards. This created job opportunities in the non-farm sectors, even in the rural areas. 
Rural farmers started to diversify their income by becoming actively involved in the 
non-farm sectors (Cherdchuchai & Otsuka, 2006, pp. 409-410). This change in income 
composition can be observed by looking at the household survey data.  
Table 5.3 presents the structure of household incomes derived from the 
household surveys of 1988, 1996 and 2004. Data show that farm income as a share of 
total money income has fallen in all types of households. Even within rural farm 
households, farm income declined from 68.4 percent of their total money income in 
1988 to 50.8 percent in 2004. At the same time, the share of wage and salary incomes to 
total money income substantially increased from 17.5 percent to 28.5 percent. Current 
transfers also increased during the period. Since current transfers include government 
transfers as well as remittances, these two items therefore help equalising household 
income across provinces.   
Evidence here suggests that farm households diversify their incomes mainly 
through engaging in wage-labour activities. Previous studies on Thailand also supported 
this. Krongkaew, Tinakorn and Suphachalasai (1992, p. 216) found that farmers 
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normally migrated to find work during the slack seasons. Long-term migration was also 
apparent across the country. Since the mid-1980s, the economic boom caused the 
demand for manufacturing labour to increase dramatically. As these manufacturing jobs 
offered higher and more-stable income than did agriculture, rural workers migrated to 
urban centres. Not surprisingly, Bangkok and its periphery—where the industries 
concentrated—have been major destinations. In 1994, there were 1.9 million employed 
internal migrants out of 31.0-million labour force in Thailand. By 2002, the number of 
internal migrants around the country rose to 6.3 million out of 47.9-million labour force 
in the whole kingdom5 (NSO, 2003b, Table 15). 
Migration has been perceived as means to escape poverty and achieve better 
living standards in Thailand (Krongkeaw et al., 1992, pp. 215-216; Sussangkarn & 
Chalamwong, 1994, p. 24; Tsay, 2002, p. 379; Osaki, 2003, pp. 214-217; Guest, 2003, 
pp. 11-17). The seasonal migrants bring back income to home regions while many of 
the long-term migrants send remittances home. In fact, there is evidence that 
remittances contributed significantly to reduce poverty and equalise income among 
households in Thailand (Guest, 2003; Osaki, 2003; NESDB & World Bank, 2005, p. 
107). For households outside Bangkok and vicinity, more than one-third of all 
households received remittances in 1996. The share was highest in the Northeast region, 
with around 45 percent of the households receiving remittances (NESDB & World 
Bank, 2005, p. 108). Studies also show that the amount remitted has been significant to 
the receiving households. Even in 1992, the remittances accounted for almost a quarter 
of the household income in receiving households6 (Guest, 2003, p. 13; Osaki, 2003, p. 
                                                 
5
 There was a change in labor force definitions in 2000. Prior to 2000, labor force is defined as population 
aged 13 years or above. From 2000 onwards, it is defined as population aged 15 years or above.  
 
6
 Data derived from the 1992- and the longitudal follow-up 1994 National Migration Surveys. The 
Surveys were conducted by the Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University.  
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215). Osaki (2003) also found that, the poorer the origin households, the more likely the 
migrants were to send remittances. This therefore helps explain the contradictory trends 
between the divergence in GPP per capita and convergence in current income per capita.   
Table 5.3 Structure of Household Income 1988, 1996 and 2004 
   1988  1996  2004 
   Rural Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Urban 
Average household annual 
income (Baht)  28,424 80,445  73,451 192,157  118,938 247,980 
Farm households  25,899 39,453  61,861 91,901  100,930 137,884 
As % of money income  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
1.wage and salary  17.5 24.1  22.6 28.3  28.5 37.4 
2.farm income  68.4 62.9  58.7 57.8  50.8 42.3 
3.nonfarm income  3.1 3.4  3.0 3.3  3.1 3.8 
4.current transfer  8.4 6.6  11.4 6.8  14.3 12.9 
5.other income  2.6 3.0  4.3 3.8  3.3 3.6 
Nonfarm households  34,620 84,460  94,964 208,182  138,717 256,445 
As % of money income  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
1.wage and salary  49.6 61.3  48.4 53.7  52.1 61.8 
2.farm income  4.2 0.2  3.4 0.3  2.4 0.2 
3.nonfarm income  30.6 26.9  34.5 36.0  29.2 26.0 
4.current transfer  10.5 8.4  8.6 5.0  12.9 9.5 
5.other income  5.1 3.2  5.1 5.0  3.4 2.5 
Note: A farm household is a household with an agricultural enterprise (Krongkaew, 1985). 
Source: All primary data are from Socio-Economic Surveys, conducted by NSO. For year 1975/76, data 
are obtained from Krongkaew (1985, Table V). For other years, data are from author’s own 
calculation. 
 
In addition to the migration within the country, international migration also 
plays an important role in income-equalisation in Thailand. Owing to the oil boom since 
the 1970s, Middle Eastern countries started to demand foreign workers. Accordingly, 
the number of Thai overseas workers increased during the 1980s and the 1990s (see 
Table 5.4). As the number of overseas workers increased, the amount of remittances 
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inflow has also risen. The remittances reached 1 billion US Dollars in 1992 and 
continued to exceed that amount since (see Table 5.4)7. Like internal migrants, the 
majority of Thai overseas workers also came from low-income households (Wong, 
2000, pp. 60-61; Tsay, 2002, pp. 378-379; Jones & Kittisuksathit, 2003 cited in Huguet 
& Punpuing, 2005, p. 30). This means that remittances seem to benefit those at the low 
income distribution. Nonetheless, these households were not likely to be those at the 
bottom. Tsay (2002) surveyed Thai workers in Taiwan in 1999 and found that majority 
(58 percent) of the Thai construction workers in Taiwan came from households with 
income less than 10,000 Baht per month. He estimated incomes of these households to 
be around 5,000 Baht per month. Most of them had a rural agricultural background. 
Given that the overall poverty line for rural Thai household was 3,633 Baht per month8, 
these Thai overseas migrant workers certainly came from low-income households that 
were not poor.  
It is common among developing countries that migrating abroad normally 
involves paying commission fees to the sending agencies. Overseas migration from 
Thailand is no exception. Studies suggested that most migrants borrowed money from 
private lenders to pay for these fees (Sussangkarn & Chalamwong, 1994, p. 29; Tsay, 
2002, p. 18). As a result, an average of 45.2 percent of remittances was used to repay 
loans and commission fees. Then, the rest of remittances were used for consumption, 
                                                 
7 It is important to note that both official figures of overseas workers and remittances through formal 
channels are underestimated (Sussangkarn & Chalamwong, 1994, p. 25-28). There were roughly 40,000-
60,000 Thai workers migrated to Japan in most years between 1988 and 1995 (Chantavanich, 2001 cited 
in Huguet & Punpuing, 2005, p. 52). In addition, there were around 45,000-50,000 Thais illegally 
working in Singapore in 1996 (Wong, 2000, p. 59). Likewise, Kassim (1998) estimated the number of 
Thai illegal workers in Malaysia to be approximately 80,000. As for remittances, the figures only 
represent those remitted through formal, recorded channels. It is widely accepted that the true figures 
covering remittances through all transfer channels would be much larger (Sussangkarn & Chalamwong, 
1994, p. 28; World Bank, 2006, p. 193).  
8
 This value of poverty line is based on poverty line for rural area in 2000, which is 1,009 Baht per person 
per month, times average household size for whole kingdom in 2000, which is 3.6 persons.  
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savings and investment, respectively (Poapongsakorn, 1989 cited in Sussangkarn & 
Chalamwong, 1994, pp. 29-30).  
Table 5.4 Number of Thai Workers Overseas and Remittances Received 1977-2004 
Year  Thai Workers Overseas 
(1,000 persons) 
 Remittances 
(million US Dollars) 
1977  3.8   45  
1980  n.a.   376  
1982  117.3   618  
1989  123.1   943  
1992  71.7   1,127  
1995  202.3   1,695  
1996  185.4   1,806  
1997  183.6   1,658  
1998  191.7   1,424  
1999  202.1   1,460  
2000  137.8   1,500  
2001  165.0   1,117  
2002  160.8   1,481  
2003  147.8   1,304  
2004  148.6   1,509  
 
Note: Data are collected from sources as appeared below. The data on the number of Thai Workers 
Overseas are considered consistent as the primary data source is the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare. The data on remittances are treated with caution as data for 1977-1992 are available in 
Thai Baht while the rest are in US Dollars. For those in Thai Baht, they are converted by author’s 
own calculation using annual averaged exchange rates from Dixon (1999, Table 4.1a). Dixon’s 
primary source is the Bank of Thailand.   
Source: Data are collected from two sources as follows; 1977-1992, data are from Sussangkarn and 
Chalamwong (1994, Table 3.2-3.3). From 1995 onwards, data are from Huguet and Punpuing 
(2005, Table 8).  
 
It is apparent that remittances from overseas migration did benefit the low 
income group, though not the poorest. This means that the overseas migration might not 
contribute as much to poverty reduction as did the internal migration. Despite that, since 
majority of overseas workers came from low-income households, it certainly helped 
improve income distribution. Similarly, as majority of these workers came from the 
Northeast—the poorest region, overseas migration seemed to also help narrow regional 
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household income disparities. This consequently contributes to explaining the 
contradictory trends between GPP per capita divergence and per capita income 
convergence.          
In summary, the results for absolute β-convergence in Thailand exhibit different 
trends when different data sets are used. By looking at per capita income between 1988 
and 2007, the β-convergence is evident. However, evidence of long-term convergence 
cannot be found in GPP per capita. Rather, the result suggests a β-divergence for the 
period of 1988-2007. This means that the initially poor provinces grew at a slower rate 
than the initially richer provinces. In order to improve the performance of the poor 
provinces, it is important that the provincial growth determinants are considered.  
 
5.4 Results: Provincial Growth Determinants 
Table 5.5 shows results for cross-section regressions on provincial growth 1994-2008, 
using ordinary least-square (OLS) estimation methods. The results in column (1) 
suggested that GPP per capita diverged at 0.87 percent during the period. This is 
consistent with the results in Table 5.1. In growth-determinant context, it also means 
that provinces with higher initial GPP per capita would grow faster than those with 
lower initial GPP per capita.  The low adjusted R-squares suggest that initial GPP per 
capita contributes weakly in explaining growth during 1994-2008. There must be other 
variables that are more important in determining provincial growth.  
Column (2) and (3) show the OLS estimates with all factors considered in this 
chapter. Regression in column (2) examined the effect of the agricultural share of GPP 
on growth, among many other variables. Then, analysis in column (3) replaced 
agricultural share of GPP with industrial share of GPP and its change over the study 
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period. Results in column (2) suggest that, aside from initial GPP per capita, three other 
factors significantly determine growth during 1994-2008. These factors are population 
growth, initial inequality and initial FDI. All three factors show expected signs. 
Provinces with slow population growth, low initial inequality and high initial FDI 
would grow fast.  
Meanwhile, infrastructure, agricultural labour productivity, initial agricultural 
share of GPP and initial human capital stock were found to be insignificant for 
provincial growth. Recall that there are two measures of human capital stock used in 
this chapter—educational attainment and share of labour force with post-primary 
education. Both of them are found to be insignificant for provincial growth. Given that 
the two measures do not give results that are significantly different from one another, 
only the regressions using educational attainment are shown.  
The insignificance of education and infrastructure might be due to the fact that 
these two aspects had already been extensively developed prior to the economic boom. 
Infrastructure development was highlighted in the First National Development Plan 
(1961-1966). It continued as a mean to accelerate growth during the Second-, Third- 
and Fourth Plans (1967-1971, 1972-1976 and 1977-1981 respectively). From the Fifth 
Plan (1982-1986) onwards, although the policy shifted toward building the Eastern 
Seaboard, expansion of infrastructure to reach rural areas continued (Bhokha, Sangtian, 
Pannikul & Subsomboon, 2009). As a result, all regions became adequately equipped 
with basic infrastructure particularly electricity, telephone and roads (NESDB & World 
Bank, 2005)9. In 1994, except for Mae Hong Son, Chumphon and Surat Thani, at least 
80 percent of all households in each province had electricity. For this reason, the 
                                                 
9
 While the basic infrastructure seems to become more equally accessible across provinces, the more 
advanced infrastructure relevant for industries still differs largely. With limitations in statistical 
availability, such differences and their effect on growth cannot be captured here.   
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infrastructure variable—change in share of households with electricity—does not play 
an important role in determining provincial growth.  
As for education, it has been an integral part of national development even 
before the First Plan (1960-1965). Since 1960, the policy focused on expanding primary 
education throughout the country. Then from 1990 onwards, the secondary education 
was extensively promoted. As a result, literacy rates and educational attainment have 
become similar across provinces over time. Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000) found 
narrowing overall educational inequality in Thailand during 1960-2000. Meanwhile, 
differences in GPP growth were large and increasing over time. As the two trends did 
not go in the same directions, educational attainment was not the major cause of GPP 
growth.  
It is important to stress here that the insignificance of education and 
infrastructure on provincial growth does not mean they are not essential to growth in 
general. It can hardly be denied that education and basic infrastructure are important for 
long-term economic development. Nonetheless, when the levels of education and 
infrastructure are similar while the growths differ, the major causes for growth have to 
be something else. It is likely that the results here reflect the fact that all provinces had 
similar levels of educational attainment and basic infrastructure. Consequently, they 
cannot be major factors causing growth to differ largely among provinces.  
In addition to education and infrastructure, agricultural productivity and initial 
agricultural share of GPP were also found to be insignificant determinants of growth. 
As earlier stated, the initial agricultural share of GPP was included in the regression to 
see how its role changed over time. Unlike results from Southichack (1998), initial 
share of agriculture sector to GPP no longer contributes to provincial growth for period 
1994-2008. Such result is, however, expected. The role of agricultural sector to the Thai 
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economy has become smaller over time. With this, the role of agricultural labour 
productivity also declined. At the same time, Thailand has seen industrial sector 
increasingly risen as a main driver for growth since the late 1980s. This is further 
supported by the results in column (3).  
By replacing agricultural share with industrial share of GPP, it is apparent that 
industrial sector was a key factor determining growth. With both initial share of 
industrial sector to GPP and its change over the period included as determinants, the 
explanatory power increases from 37 percent to 70 percent. In fact, a single regression 
suggests that the change in industrial share of GPP alone accounts for 53 percent of the 
observed differences in growth rates. Both variables show expected signs. Provinces 
with larger increase in industrial share of GPP would grow faster than those with lower 
increase. Those that had a head start in industrial share would see even faster growth.  
Notice that once industrial variables are included, initial FDI became 
insignificant. Although it continues to show positive relationship with growth, its 
magnitude fell from 0.07 to 0.02 percent. It is apparent that initial FDI plays only minor 
role in determining growth when compared to industrial sector. This is possibly because 
the measure for initial FDI used here is the value of FDI projects that obtain newly-
issued certificates to GPP. Not all certified FDI projects went on to setting up their 
operations. Only those that actually completed the set up and continued to operate seem 
to matter for growth. Since most projects are in manufacturing sector, the ongoing FDI 
projects were already included as part of the industrial sector value-added. 
Consequently, when the industrial variables are added to the regression, FDI became 
insignificant.  
Similarly, initial GPP per capita becomes negatively related to growth after the 
industrial variables are included. This could imply that once the initial share of 
159 
 
industrial sector to GPP is kept constant, there was an evidence of income convergence 
among provinces. Nonetheless, the coefficient was significant at the ten percent level 
and its explanatory power was quite weak. Alternatively, the change in coefficient sign 
could reflect the high collinearity between initial GPP per capita and initial share of 
industrial sector to GPP. The simple correlation between the two is 0.74. Moreover, 
there is also a high correlation (0.66) between initial GPP per capita and initial 
educational attainment. This may explain the change in sign and lack of significance of 
coefficient for initial educational attainment as well.   
To eliminate the collinearity, initial GPP per capita is omitted from the 
regression. The results in column (4) suggest that explanatory power only declined by 
one percent when initial GPP per capita was dropped. All variables show expected 
signs. Initial inequality and educational attainment are insignificant at the ten percent 
level. On the other hand, share of households with electricity and change in agricultural 
labour productivity became significant at the ten percent level. Nonetheless, the 
magnitudes of their effects on growth are very small.   
Aside from the full period of 1994-2008, an analysis for period 2000-2008 is 
also considered. This is to examine the growth determinants after the 1997/98 financial 
crisis. The results are displayed in Table 5.6 in the same manner as those in Table 5.5. 
The single regression in column (1) shows that provinces with higher initial GPP per 
capita continued to grow faster after the crisis. The coefficient is significant at a one 
percent level for this post-crisis period. However, when other factors are included, the 
initial GPP per capita became insignificant, as shown in column (2) and (3). In general, 
the regression results in column (2) (3) and (4) show similar results to those in Table 
5.5. One exception is that population growth was no longer a significant determinant of 
growth during the period 2000-2008. It is also interesting that the effect of the industrial 
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sector on growth became stronger after the crisis. For the period 1994-2008, every one 
percent increase in industrial value-added would raise GPP growth by 0.14 percent. 
That effect has increased to 0.21 percent for period 2000-2008.  
Table 5.5 Regression Results for Provincial Growth in Thailand 1994-2008 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: GR 9408 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
GPP 94 0.0087  0.0089  -0.0079   
 (0.0038)**  (0.0051)*  (0.0047)*   
PopGr 9408   -0.0006  -0.0004  -0.0005 
   (0.0002)***  (0.0001)***  (0.0001)*** 
Gini 94   -0.1018  -0.0309  -0.0375 
   (0.0409)**  (0.0290)  (0.0291) 
EduAttain 94   -0.0008  0.0049  0.0022 
   (0.0035)  (0.0025)*  (0.0020) 
Electricity   0.0004  0.0006  0.0005 
   (0.0004)  (0.0003)**  (0.0003)* 
Agperlabor   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)* 
FDI 94   0.0007  0.0002  0.0002 
   (0.0002)***  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
AgrShare 94   -0.0002     
   (0.0002)     
IndShare 94     0.0006  0.0005 
     (0.0001)***  (0.0002)*** 
∆ IndShare     0.0014  0.0014 
     (0.0002)***  (0.0002)*** 
Constant -0.0665  -0.0067  0.0745  0.0171 
Adjusted R2 0.05  0.37  0.70  0.69 
Note:  Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level and * 10 percent level. 
Number of observations for all regressions is 76 for the 76 provinces of Thailand 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Table 5.6 Regression Results for Provincial Growth in Thailand 2000-2008 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: GR 0008 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
GPP 00 0.0084  0.0042  -0.0004   
 (0.0029)***  (0.0041)  (0.0043)   
PopGr 0008   -0.0002  0.0001  0.0001 
   (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0004) 
Gini 00   -0.0914  -0.0407  -0.0404 
   (0.0468)*  (0.0357)  (0.0354) 
EduAttain 00   -0.0021  0.0003  0.0003 
   (0.0029)  (0.0021)  (0.0019) 
Electricity   0.0004  0.0005  0.0005 
   (0.0005)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Agperlabor   0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
   (0.0000)**  (0.0000)**  (0.0000)** 
FDI 00   0.0004  0.0002  0.0002 
   (0.0002)**  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
AgrShare 00   -0.0001     
   (0.0002)     
IndShare 00     0.0003  0.0003 
     (0.0001)***  (0.0001)*** 
∆ IndShare     0.0021  0.0021 
     (0.0003)***  (0.0003)*** 
Constant -0.0552  0.0415  0.0353  0.0318 
Adjusted R2 0.09  0.23  0.56  0.57 
Note:  Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level and * 10 percent level. 
Number of observations for all regressions is 76 for the 76 provinces of Thailand 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
The regression results in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 seem to fit well with the 
common understanding of the growth-engine of Thailand. Impressive growth 
performance was driven mainly by industrialisation starting in the 1960s 
(Poapongsakorn & Fuller, 1997, p. 145; Richter, 2006, p. 7). This phenomenon, 
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however, occurred mainly in and around Bangkok. Despite attempts to disperse 
industries out of this area, the government policies could only succeed in moving 
industries to the Eastern and Central regions. Both areas are still in close proximity from 
Bangkok. Accordingly, provinces that were able to expand industrial sector grew fast. 
The failure to draw industries toward other regions far from Bangkok was believed to 
be due to Bangkok’s agglomeration economies. The issue of agglomeration will be 
examined and discussed in details in Chapter 7. 
The role of industrial sector to economic growth became even more important 
after the crisis. In the post-crisis period, the Thai economy has been driven mainly by 
exports, which was increasingly dominated by manufacturing products. Share of exports 
went up from 45 percent of GDP before the crisis to around 65 percent after the crisis. 
At the same time, manufacturing accounted for 87 percent of total exports in 2004, 
increasing from 80 percent in 1993 (NESDB & World Bank, 2005, p. 65). Within 
manufacturing, high-tech products saw its share of production increased while textiles 
declined. These high-tech firms preferred to locate in Eastern and Central regions. This 
is because these provinces are close to Bangkok, allowing firms to benefit from strong 
enterprises linkages, better infrastructure and easy access to major ports and export 
facilities. At the same time, not being in Bangkok itself means that they could avoid 
high land prices and congestion (Richter, 2006, p. 38). As a result, provinces where 
these high-tech firms were concentrated grew fast after the crisis.  
It is apparent that the industrial sector played a major role in determining growth 
in Thailand. As the industrial sector is only concentrated in certain part of the country, 
only provinces in this part grew fast. This consequently led to an increase in provincial 
disparities in GPP per capita. Recall from Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, the provincial 
disparities in industrial value-added trended upward since 1997.  Provincial disparities 
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in GPP per capita also showed the same trend (see Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3). The 
disparities excluding Bangkok and BMR seemed to be catching up quickly with the 
overall provincial disparities after the crisis. This reflects the growth of fast-growing 
manufacturing sectors in the Central and Eastern regions, particularly after the crisis.   
In summary, the analyses in this section reveal factors that contributed to the 
provincial growth in Thailand during the two periods. While 1994-2008 covers the 
entire period studied, the 2000-2008 period is added to see if the growth determinants 
changed after the crisis. Results did not differ significantly between the two periods. 
The industrial sector dominated as growth-determinant for both the entire period and 
post-crisis period.     
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began by examining the existence of β-convergence in Thai provincial 
income. Using per capita income data from household surveys as a measure, β-
convergence occurred in all sub-periods. That is, the boom, the crisis and the post-crisis 
years.  On the other hand, when data on per capita GPP were used, there was no 
evidence of β-convergence among provinces during the boom and post-crisis periods. 
This means that provinces with initially low GPP per capita did not grow faster than 
those with initially higher GPP per capita. The analysis then moved to examine whether 
the initial per capita GPP contributed to provincial growth at all. Ten other variables 
were also added to the estimation. For the entire period of 1994-2008, population 
growth, initial industrial share to GPP and its change over time were found to be 
significant determinants for provincial growth in Thailand. After the crisis, the 
population growth did not continue to be a significant determinant. Meanwhile, the 
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importance of industrial sector to provincial growth has increased. This is because 
exports in high-tech manufacturing products have become a growth-engine of the post-
crisis period. As these high-tech firms concentrated in Eastern and Central regions, 
provinces in these areas grew much faster than the rest. This consequently widened the 
provincial disparities, which is consistent with the results in Chapter 3.   
There is no doubt that the investigation of provincial growth determinants is 
important for a country’s development direction. Perhaps a more important issue is the 
extent to which provincial growth affects poverty reduction. Although it is no longer 
debatable that economic growth helps reduce poverty, the magnitude of its effect differs 
across cases. For this reason, poverty in the Thai provinces and its relationship with 
provincial growth will be examined in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Pre- and Post-Crisis Poverty Situation across the Thai Provinces 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The issue of poverty has always been at the centre of development. Thailand is no 
exception. Poverty reduction has been incorporated into the national development plans, 
particularly since the Fourth Plan (1977-1981). Despite impressive records of poverty 
reduction over the last four decades, problem of poverty continues to challenge 
Thailand’s development process. This is particularly true when looking at the 
geographical aspect. Poverty in Thailand is a rural phenomenon, highly concentrated in 
the Northeastern and Northern regions (Warr, 2004, p. 6; Jitsuchon & Richter, 2006, pp. 
242-243). This chapter looks at poverty in Thailand in detail.  
The chapter will begin with the definition and measurement of poverty used in 
Thailand. At first glance, poverty seems to be a general term in which most people 
know the meaning of. However, its definition and measurement concept have been 
subject to much debate. As the problem of poverty persisted through development 
process, both definitions and measurements of poverty have evolved greatly over time. 
Consequently, there are now several definitions and approaches of poverty in use by 
scholars and policy-makers around the world. It is important that both of them are 
identified clearly in this chapter. This is because different definitions and measurement 
methods can lead to different individuals and groups being considered as poor (Stewart, 
Laderchi & Saith, 2007, pp. 1-2).  
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Once the definition and measurement of poverty are clearly specified, we can 
then look at the poverty situation in Thailand. Here, the overall picture of poverty in 
Thailand over the past four decades will be examined. Given that the focus of this 
research is at the provincial level, particular attention will be paid to provincial poverty. 
The disparities in provincial poverty rates between 1988 and 2008 will be considered. 
Their trends over time can reveal how concentration of poverty changed along with 
different stages of the Thai economy. In addition, the Thai economy had also gone 
through structural changes during the past two decades. An analysis of how these 
changes affect the provincial poverty disparities will also be made. 
It is no longer debatable that economic growth leads to overall poverty reduction 
at the national level. However, there was little evidence on this relationship at the 
provincial level. Using per capita income from household surveys, Deolailikar (2002) 
found a positive relationship between provincial average per capita income growth and 
poverty reduction in 1992-1999. Meanwhile, NESDB and World Bank (2005) used GPP 
data as a measure of income growth. The study found similar relationship for period 
1988-1996. However, it did not find the same evidence for period 1996-2002. Given 
that data in more recent years are now available, the growth-poverty relationship, 
particularly in the post-crisis period should become clearer. This will be investigated as 
part of this chapter.  
In relation to the growth-poverty relationship, most studies also analyse the 
extent to which provincial growth contributes to poverty reduction. Some research 
works went further to include other factors as the determinants of poverty. This latter 
analysis is probably the most essential part for solving the poverty problem. To tackle 
the problem, it is important to know what causes poverty. Given such importance, the 
poverty determinants will also be analysed in this chapter.  
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This chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 discusses the definition and 
measurement of poverty used in Thailand. Then methods and data for analyses in this 
chapter will be explained in section 6.3. Section 6.4 examines poverty in Thailand with 
an emphasis on poverty across provinces over the period 1988-2008. Section 6.5 and 
section 6.6 explores the contribution of provincial growth to poverty reduction and other 
poverty determinants, respectively. Section 6.7 discusses the anti-poverty programmes 
implemented in Thailand so far. Finally, section 6.8 summarises the findings in this 
chapter. 
 
6.2 Poverty Definitions and Measurements 
Definition 
Like in the rest of the world, the definition of poverty in Thailand has been subject to 
intense debate (Jitsuchon, 2001, p. 6). At the international level, the term ‘poverty’ 
traditionally referred to material deprivation. That is, as UN describes, “inability to 
obtain food and other basic necessities.” This is still the definition most commonly used 
today. However, it has become widely accepted that poverty also involves other 
dimensions beyond monetary. The concept of poverty has been extended to include all 
aspects that constitute well-being1. Here, poverty also covers the lacks of opportunity 
for education and health, voicelessness as well as powerlessness (World Bank, 2000).  
For Thailand, the term ‘poverty’ generally refers to the lack of sufficient income 
for an individual to enjoy the minimum standards of living in the society (NESDB, 
2008b). As with the wider academic world, the Thai scholars have also included other 
                                                 
1
 The broadest approach is introduced by Amartya Sen (1987). He suggested that well-being is reflected 
in capability to function in society up to the minimum level. All these approaches are discussed in details 
in Stewart et al. (2007). 
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dimensions into the poverty definition in recent decades. Jitsuchon (2001) found that the 
Thai academics and experts viewed attributes of social, economic and political 
structures as part of the poverty definition. These include, for example, social 
acceptance, basic public services, voices to be heard and opportunities in life. Despite 
that, the monetary dimension continued to dominate among policy-makers. As official 
poverty data are compiled by the policy-making agency—the NESDB, the official 
poverty definition in Thailand is limited to the monetary or income poverty2.  
To measure income poverty, poverty lines are needed as a threshold. Following 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concept, income poverty can be 
classified into extreme poverty and overall poverty. Extreme poverty is defined as lack 
of income sufficient to obtain minimum nutrition required for living. Overall poverty, 
on the other hand, is defined as lack of income sufficient to obtain all basic needs i.e. 
cloths, medicine, shelter as well as food. The official poverty lines in Thailand follow 
this latter concept of income poverty.  
Poverty Lines  
The measurement of poverty in Thailand can be compiled since 1962. This was 
made possible when the National Statistical Office (NSO) first conducted the household 
surveys. (Warr, 2004, pp. 2-4). During the early years, the Thai poverty lines were 
estimated by several different researchers. Nonetheless, the poverty lines based on basic 
needs did not come along until the World Bank introduced it in the late 1970s 
(Krongkaew et al., 1992, p. 202). For around two decades since then, the Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI) was the source for the Thai poverty incidence 
data.  
                                                 
2
 It is important to stress here that income poverty means the monetary aspect of poverty, as opposed to 
other dimensions. This is a different issue from whether income or consumption approach is used to come 
up with the headcount ratio.  
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Over time, the TDRI approach received increasing criticism for not realistically 
reflecting the true poverty situation. In response, the NESDB issued new poverty lines 
under the recommendations proposed by Kakwani and Krongkaew (2000). Under this 
new method, the NESDB also revised the poverty lines back to the year 1988. 
Accordingly, the NESDB became an official source of poverty data since. Albeit with 
changes in the methodologies, the data source used to construct poverty lines remained 
the same, the SES. Given that the NSO conducted these surveys every two years during 
1988-2006, poverty lines and all poverty measures are available at two-year intervals. 
From 2007 onwards, the surveys are done annually—hence poverty measures are 
available on an annual basis.  
Before moving on, it is important to note that in 2004, the NESDB made a 
revision on the poverty line methods. The preliminary research for this revision was 
conducted by the TDRI with technical assistance from the UNDP (see Jitsuchon, 
Plangpraphan & Kakwani, 2004). The revised methods are still based on those proposed 
by Kakwani and Krongkaew (2000). However, due to changing consumption patterns 
and more up-to-date primary data, the revision was considered necessary. Among 
several changes made in this revision, the major change was the base year from 1992 to 
2002. Upon the release of the new poverty lines in 2004, the NESDB revised all the 
poverty lines back to year 1988. This means that the poverty data are consistent 
throughout the time series. Since then, there has not been any further change to the 
poverty-line construction methods. To prevent confusion, only the current methods are 
discussed below.  
The official poverty lines for Thailand reflect the minimum standard of living, 
which is divided into food and non-food poverty lines. The food poverty line is 
calculated from the minimum nutritional requirements. This is based on the assumption 
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that an individual has adequate food if he or she obtains sufficient nutrition. To come up 
with the monetary equivalent of nutritional requirements involves several steps. The 
first step is to calculate per capita household calorie requirements by summing up the 
calories per day each member needs according to age and sex. Then, the food baskets to 
meet requirements are estimated. Taking into account the differences in consumption 
patterns across regions, nine food baskets were estimated for Thailand. These nine 
baskets are for rural and urban areas of the four regions plus a separate one for 
Bangkok.  
The third step is to calculate calories obtained from each of these nine baskets. 
This can be done by multiplying each food item in the basket by its calories value. The 
calories data are provided by the Nutrient Division, Department of Health at the 
Ministry of Public Health. Then, calories cost can be calculated by diving total food 
expenditure by calories obtained. For the total food expenditure, only per capita food 
consumption expenditure of population in the lowest income quintile is used here. This 
is because it best represents the cost incurred by the poor. Here, calories cost is 
calculated for each food basket and hence there are nine sets of calories costs. The sum 
of these nine calories costs weighted by population share of each corresponding area 
gives the national average calories cost.  
The fourth step involves deriving spatial food price indices. While the nine food 
baskets reflect different consumption patterns, they do not take into account the price 
differentials across the geographical areas. Given that prices do vary from one region to 
another, it is crucial that the price differences are allowed for in the calculation. The 
spatial price indices (SPI) measure the relative cost of food across community types and 
regions (Kakwani & Krongkaew, 2000). The SPI were calculated from food prices of 
2002 supplied by the Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices, Ministry of Commerce. 
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Data contain prices of 125 food items, which cover almost all food consumed by Thai 
households. In consistence with the number of food baskets, nine SPI—for rural and 
urban areas of the four regions and Bangkok—were calculated. For detailed method, see 
Appendix D. 
Finally, the food poverty line is estimated as monthly calorie requirement 
multiplied by the calories cost. As for non-food poverty lines, they are estimated from 
expenses on nine non-food categories occurred in households whose food expense was 
at food poverty lines. The nine categories are clothing, shelters, fuel and lights, home 
appliance, medicine, personal expense, transportation, telecommunication and 
education. Here, some non-food items in which low-income individuals are unlikely to 
consume e.g. necktie, swimsuit and housecleaning service have already been taken out 
of the calculations. Summation of food- and non-food poverty lines produces the total 
poverty lines.  
Price Adjustments for Non-base Years 
The current set of poverty lines uses 2002 as the base year. As mentioned earlier, 
the NESDB revised all poverty lines back to year 1988 for consistency throughout the 
time series. In other words, the current poverty lines for the years 1988-2000 are based 
on the 2002 poverty lines, with price-adjustment using consumer price indices (CPI). 
Likewise, poverty lines from 2004 onwards are also products of price-adjustments from 
the 2002 poverty lines. The price adjustments are made at two steps of poverty-line 
construction—the calories cost calculation and each item of non-food basket. That is, 
non-base year calories cost is a product of the 2002 calories cost adjusted by food CPI 
of that year. Meanwhile, each of the nine non-food categories is adjusted using each 
corresponding non-food CPI. This way, the purchasing power is kept rather constant 
over time.  
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6.3 Methods and Data 
Methods 
The poverty analyses in this chapter consist of two parts. The first part gives overview 
of poverty situation in Thailand, together with the provincial disparities in poverty. The 
Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation (vw) will be used as a 
measure of disparities. Defined in the similar way as vw in Chapter 3 and 4, the measure 
is calculated as follows: 
WK
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where fi denotes population of the ith province, n national population, pi poverty rate of 
the ith province and WKp  national poverty rate. The larger value of wv  indicates that 
there is a larger dispersion. 
The second part examines relationship between poverty and provincial income 
growth as well as the poverty determinants. Simple OLS estimation will be used to 
investigate the poverty-growth relationship. For poverty determinant, the analysis will 
follow Deolailikar (2002) which examined poverty determinants for period 1992-1999. 
The model specification is as follows: 
iiiii vXybPov +++= ∑ δα log     (6.2) 
where iPov  is the poverty headcount ratio of province i, yi per capita income of 
province i, and vi error term. Also, Xi represents other selected variables that determines 
provincial poverty rate. The estimation will be done using the pooled data least-square 
method. The coefficient b represents the growth elasticity of poverty. Based on 
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Deolailikar (2002), variables included as additional determinants are income inequality, 
average years of schooling, mean age of household head, percent of population residing 
in female-headed households, percent of urban population, mean household size, 
percent of population aged 0-15 years and those aged 60 years or over. All of them will 
be considered in this chapter. This is because these factors had been commonly cited as 
factors causing poverty at the national level (Krongkaew, 1993). It is therefore 
interesting to see if they are also relevant to poverty at the provincial level. More 
importantly, by including all of the above variables as poverty determinants, the results 
can be comparable to those of Deolailikar. Deolailikar’s analysis covered the years 
1992-1999 while this chapter considers the sub-period 2000-2007. With same source of 
data and same variables included in the models, the results should be consistently 
comparable. This way, we can see whether poverty determinants have changed after the 
crisis. For all regression analyses in this chapter, the estimations will be done using 
STATA programme version 11.  
Data 
Data in this chapter came from two major sources, the NESDB and the NSO. 
The GPP growth and the poverty measures are from the NESDB. Recall that GPP data 
are available on an annual basis from 1981 onwards. Meanwhile, data on per capita 
income and all other factors to be included in the poverty-determinant analysis are from 
the NSO. The details of these data are described below: 
Poverty headcount ratio ( iPov ): is defined as the share of population whose per 
capita expenditure are below the provincial poverty line to the total provincial 
population. The official figures are provided by the NESDB. They are compiled based 
on household consumption, which is drawn from the SES. In accordance with the SES, 
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the provincial headcount poverty ratios can be computed every two years between 1988 
and 2006 and every year from 2007. Despite that, the official data at provincial level are 
only available from 1994 onwards. They are published in the reports Data/Indicators 
for Poverty and Income Distribution, available only in Thai. For 1988-1992, the 
provincial poverty rates are computed using the raw SES data and each year’s 
provincial poverty lines. These data are available at the NESDB for internal use. It 
should be noted that the provincial-level data prior to 1994 may have to be analysed 
with caution. This is because the sample size may not be sufficient to truly represent the 
situation at such a disaggregated level. Nonetheless, data for 1988-1992 are included as 
they allow the analysis to cover a longer time period.  
For the remaining factors, which are described below, data are from the same 
sources. They can be obtained from the SES and, therefore, are available from 1988 
onwards. The NSO usually publishes these data as part of the reports on the Household 
Socio-economic Survey. Nonetheless, only data at the national- and regional levels are 
reported. Since the interest of this research is at the provincial level, data has to be 
drawn from the raw SES. Hence, the following data are the products of the author’s own 
calculation using the STATA programme on the raw SES data sets.  
Provincial income per capita (Income): is the average nominal per capita current 
income of households within a province. Recall that in 2007, the NSO has changed the 
frequency of the survey to an annual basis. The NSO no longer surveys on income for 
even years, e.g. 2008. Only in the odd years does the SES cover both expenditure and 
income. As a result, data on per capita income are only available for the period 1988-
2007. Given that the values are in nominal terms, the per capita income has to be 
converted to the real values. This will be done using the provincial GPP deflators which 
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can be easily derived from the GPP figures. Recall that GPP data are provided by the 
NESDB every year from 1981 onwards.  
Income inequality by province (Gini): the data on provincial Gini index will be 
used as a measure of income inequality. The Gini index can be computed from the raw 
data of the SES (see Chapter 3 for details). Recall that Gini indexes can be obtained 
from both per capita income and per capita consumption expenditure. For consistency 
with the previous chapter, income Gini index will be used here.  
Educational attainment (EduAttain): is measured as the average years of 
education in population aged 25 years or over3. As these data have already been 
introduced in Chapter 4, the details of data sources can be found there.  
Mean age of household head (HeadAge): is defined as the average age of 
household head of each province.  
Share of population residing in female-headed households (FHead): is measured 
as a percentage of an entire provincial population.  
Percent of urban population (Urban): is the percentage of population in urban 
areas to the total provincial population. Prior to 1999, areas within a province were 
divided into three subcategories—municipal areas, sanitary districts and villages. While 
it has always been clear-cut that the municipal areas are considered urban and villages 
are rural, it has not been so for sanitary districts. The areas designated as sanitary 
districts were normally semi-urban areas (Nagai et al., 2008, p. 1). Their sizes were 
normally bigger than village but too small to be a municipal. In May 1999, all the 
                                                 
3
 In Deolailikar (2002), the years of schooling covers population aged 18 years or over. However, the 
population aged 25 years or over is used here for consistency with the measurement used in Chapter 4 and 
5. In regression analysis in this chapter, the author tried both the years of schooling of population aged 18 
years or over and that of population aged 25 years or over. The results of the two measures did not 
significantly differ from one another. Therefore, only the regression results using years of schooling of 
population aged 25 years or over will be shown and analysed here.   
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sanitary districts were converted to municipal areas under the Act on Conversion of 
Sanitary Area Status to Municipality, B.E. 2542 (1999). This means that from 1999 
onwards, surveys such as the SES no longer distinguished sanitary districts from the 
municipal areas. Hence, the sanitary districts would be considered as urban areas. For 
consistency throughout the time series, all sanitary districts prior to 1999 have to be 
considered as urban.  
Mean household size (HHsize): is defined as an average number of household 
members for each province.  
Share of population aged 0-15 years (PopUnder15): is measured as a percentage 
of provincial population aged 0-15 years to the total provincial population.  
Share of population aged 60 years or over (PopOver60): is measured as a 
percentage of provincial population whose ages are 60 years or over to the total 
provincial population. 
 
6.4 Poverty in Thailand 
Overview  
In the 1960s, when poverty started to be measured, Thailand was considered a poor 
country. As much as 57 percent of total population was poor4 in 1962 (Meesook, 1979, 
Table 3.1). However, due to the implementation of the National Development Plan, the 
economy experienced steady growth during the 1960s and the 1970s. This was followed 
by rapid growth during 1987-1996. As a result, the poverty rate considerably declined. 
In 1981, 24 percent of the Thai population lived in poverty (Krongkaew, 1985, Table 1). 
                                                 
4
 Data was based on poverty line of 1,981 baht per person per year in villages and 2,961 baht per person 
per year for municipal areas and sanitary districts (Meesook, 1979, Table 3.1). 
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The rate was further reduced to only 14.8 percent in 1996 (NESDB, 2009, Table 2). 
Although the crisis had an adverse effect on poverty, the headcount ratio started to 
decline again in 2000. As of 2008, 8.6 percent of population was considered poor 
(NESDB, 2009, Table 2).   
In addition to the headcount ratio, poverty gap and severity of poverty5 also 
declined largely over time. Poverty gap measures the magnitude to which income of the 
poor fall below the poverty line. Severity of poverty, on the other hand, measures how 
income is distributed among the poor. Income poverty gap fell from 19.3 percent in 
1986 to 3.8 percent in 2002. This means that the gap between income of the poor and 
the poverty lines narrowed over time. Similarly, severity of poverty fell from 9.5 
percent to 1.5 percent during the same period (Jitsuchon et al., 2004, Table 15 and Table 
17). This means that the distribution of income among those that fell below poverty 
lines improved over the period. 
Despite the rapid rate of poverty-reduction at the national level, poverty 
continued to be concentrated in certain areas and household types. Poverty incidence in 
Thailand has been a rural phenomenon. Poverty was also found to be concentrated in 
the households engaged in agricultural production. Moreover, households with low 
educational-level heads were more likely to be poor than others. Households with larger 
size were more likely to be poor than the smaller households (Krongkaew, 1993; Warr, 
2004). 
                                                 
5
 Poverty gap )1(
1
ii
n
i
i y−=∑
=
ϕα  while severity of poverty 2
1
)1( ii
n
i
i y−=∑
=
ϕα
 
where yi  = xi/zi, xi is the income of household i, zi poverty line, αi population ratio and φi an index which 
takes a value of 100 if income is below poverty line and 0 if income is above poverty line (Jitsuchon et 
al., 2004).
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As for the geographic dimension, impressive poverty-reduction at the national 
level has also not been evenly experienced across regions and provinces. Figure 6.1 
exhibits trends in headcount poverty rates by region over the period 1988-2008. The 
results suggest that there are large differences in both levels and trends of poverty rates 
among regions. Bangkok started off with the lowest poverty ratio in 1988 and 
experienced a continuous fall in poverty rate throughout the period. Meanwhile, the 
Northeastern region had the highest poverty ratio in 1988 and seemed to be most 
affected by the crisis. From 2000 to 2008, although all regions showed long-term 
downward trends, their short-term trends differed noticeably. For instance, during 2006-
2007, poverty rates in the Northeast and Central declined while those of the North, 
South and Bangkok went up. This implies that there are disparities in poverty reduction 
across regions.  
Figure 6.1 Headcount Poverty Rate by Region 1988-2008 
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Source: NESDB (2009, Table 2) 
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Provincial Disparities in Poverty Rates 
The disparities in poverty rates across provinces can be depicted in Figure 6.2. 
Using Williamson’s population-weighted coefficient of variation, the results show that 
disparities in provincial poverty rates trended upward during the boom period 1988-
1996. Between 1998 and 2000, the disparities across provinces narrowed slightly. This 
is likely due to the effect of the crisis. As the richer provinces were harder hit by the 
crisis, they experienced larger increases in headcount poverty ratios. Hence, the 
disparities across provinces declined. From 2000 onwards, the disparities continuously 
widened. This coincides with the trends in GPP per capita disparities (see Table 3.4 in 
Chapter 3). 
When Bangkok and the BMR are excluded, the magnitude of the disparities 
becomes lower. Nevertheless, the disparities exhibit the same trends. The upward trends 
in poverty disparities here also imply that the rates of poverty reduction vary across 
provinces. If the poverty-reduction rates were the same for all provinces, the disparities 
would have remained constant. An upward trend in disparities therefore reflects the 
different rates of poverty reduction across provinces.   
Considering the two figures together, it is clear that the results in Figure 6.2 
differ from those suggested in Figure 6.1. The gaps between regional poverty rates seem 
to narrow over time, whereas those across provinces have widened. This implies that the 
poverty ratios across provinces within each region vary quite significantly. In this case, 
the regional-level figures hide the great differences among provincial poverty within the 
each region. Bangkok and the BMR do not play as much role in contributing to the 
variations in poverty rates among provinces as they appear to do at the regional level.  
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Figure 6.2 Disparities in Provincial Poverty Rate in Thailand 1988-2008 
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Source: Author’s own calculation. Provincial poverty headcount ratios used to compile Williamson’s 
population weighted coefficients here are from NESDB (2008a, Table 4). 
It is now clear that poverty ratios differ significantly across provinces and the 
differences have widened over the past two decades. Moreover, the rates of poverty 
reduction also differ across provinces. An investigation of factors that cause such large 
provincial differences in poverty and poverty reduction is therefore important. This 
issue will be examined in the next section. 
 
6.5 The Poverty-Growth Relationship 
As an important aspect of economic development, poverty has been studied quite 
extensively in Thailand. Most studies, however, analysed poverty from the national-
level perspective. At the national level, it has become widely accepted that economic 
growth is crucial for poverty reduction (Warr, 2004, p. 10; Deolailikar, 2002, p. 8). 
Some other factors, such as education have also been found to play a role. But the 
number of studies at the provincial level has been exceptionally small.  
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The provincial growth-poverty relationship can easily be examined using scatter 
plots. Figure 6.3 illustrates the scatter plots between average annual real GPP per capita 
growth rate and the average annual rate of change in headcount poverty ratios. The 
results suggest that sustained growth over a twenty-year period was highly associated 
with the provincial poverty reduction (see Figure 6.3a). The fitted line is significant at 
the one percent level. Figure 6.3 also shows scatter plots for three sub-periods.  Here, 
the entire period is divided into pre-crisis (1988-1996), the crisis (1996-2000) and the 
post-crisis (2000-2008). It is obvious that provincial growth had a positive relationship 
with poverty reduction during the pre-crisis period (see Figure 6.3b). Nonetheless, such 
relationship was not evident during the crisis years (1996-2000). The fitted trend line 
was not significantly different from zero at the ten percent level (see Figure 6.3c).   
As for the post-crisis period, the results in Figure 6.3d imply that provincial 
growth was not related to poverty reduction. In fact, it weakly suggests that provinces 
with higher growth rates experienced slower rate of poverty reduction. The fitted line is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level. Although surprising, this is consistent 
with the results found in the joint-research between the NESDB and World Bank (2005, 
pp. 50-52). Using provincial data, they also found that growth was not associated with 
poverty reduction during 1996-2002.  
There may be many factors contributing to such results. One possible factor is 
the high level of income inequality in Thailand. Deolailikar (2002) found increasing 
income inequality to be a major obstacle to poverty reduction for the period 1992-1999. 
In his poverty-growth-inequality relationship study, he concluded that both income 
growth and inequality played major roles in poverty reduction in Thailand. Their 
relationships with poverty were, however, in opposing directions. While income growth 
had a strong positive effect on poverty reduction, inequality had an even stronger 
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negative effect. An income growth associating with an increasing inequality may cause 
poverty rate to remain the same or even increase. Accordingly, it is therefore possible 
that the result in Figure 6.3d was due to an increase in inequality during the post-crisis 
period. This issue will be analysed in more detail in the next section.   
Figure 6.3 Provincial Poverty-GPP Growth Relationship in Thailand 1988-2008 
a. period 1988-2008 b. period 1988-1996 
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Source: Author’s own calculation. Data on poverty and GPP per capita from NESDB.   
Another possible explanation is that the poverty ratio may be more closely 
linked to household income than per capita GPP. Recall from Chapter 5 that per capita 
income and GPP of the same province can differ due to the Thai household income 
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composition. Figure 6.4 shows how household income growth associates with 
provincial poverty reduction. Recall that the SES did not collect data on income for year 
2008, so the analysis only covers the years 1988-2007. 
Figure 6.4 Provincial Poverty-Income Growth Relationship in Thailand 1988-2007 
a. period 1988-2007 b. period 1988-1996 
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Source: Author’s own calculation. Data on per capita current income from NSO, converting to real income 
using GPP deflator from NESDB.   
The scatter plots show similar results with the poverty-GPP per capita growth 
relationship. This is particularly true for the entire period, the pre-crisis and the crisis 
sub-periods. However, the results differ noticeably when it comes to the post-crisis 
period. Here, the fitted line has a downward slope—contradicting the result from GPP 
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per capita. Using SES data, real per capita income growth rates continued to be 
positively associated with poverty reduction after the crisis. Nonetheless, the 
relationship became less strong, when comparing to other sub-periods. The fitted line 
for 2000-2007 was significant at the five percent level. This could also be due to the 
increase in inequality—which is expected to have an adverse effect on poverty 
reduction, during the period. Other factors may also contribute to poverty reduction. 
Both inequality and other factors are examined next.  
 
6.6 Poverty Determinants 
For the analysis of poverty determinants, my work directly follows Deolailikar (2002). 
He analysed poverty, growth and inequality in Thailand at the provincial level using 
SES data for 1992-1999. All variables used in his model can be extracted from the raw 
SES data. These variables are mean household size, mean age of household head, share 
of population residing in female-headed households, share of urban population, share of 
young population (aged 0-15 years old) and share of population aged 60 years or over. 
All of the above variables will be included in the regression. The data used here are 
from the same source as those in Deolailikar’s work but with different time periods. 
Given the consistency in the data, the regression results should therefore be comparable 
between the two studies. In addition, this chapter also considers the sub-period 2000-
2007. The comparison between this post-crisis period and Deolailikar’s results (1992-
1999) can show if poverty determinants have changed between the two periods.  
In addition, variables that were included in Deolailikar (2002) are those 
normally considered as poverty determinants at the national level. Municipal areas, 
household size, dependencies in the households and educational attainment were often 
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seen as factors distinguishing the poor and the non-poor. In Thailand, relations of these 
factors to poverty at the national level have been clear and consistent over time. The 
relations of gender and age of household heads to poverty, on the other hand, have been 
ambiguous. The young and the male-headed household were more likely to be poor in 
1981 but did not seem to be significantly affecting poverty in 1996 (Krongkaew, 1993; 
Shetty, Subbarao, Tzannatos, Rudra & Poshyananda, 1996). These are, again, from 
analysis at the national level. Therefore, by including all these variables in the analysis 
here, results will show whether these factors affect provincial poverty and, if so, in 
which directions.  
It is important to note that, albeit the availability of raw data from 1988, the 
analysis will start from 1994. This is because the number of provinces was not stable 
prior to 1993. Recall from Chapter 5 that four additional provinces were created 
between 1981 and 1993. Moreover, it is more interesting to analyse the more recent 
years as the earlier years were already examined by Deolailikar (2002). Accordingly 
this chapter will cover the period 1994-2007. The sub-period 2000-2007 will also be 
analysed to show the poverty determinants for the post-crisis period.  
The results for pooled data ‘level’ regressions between 1994 and 2007 are shown 
in Table 6.1. The coefficients of per capita income and Gini variables represent the 
growth- and inequality elasticity of poverty, respectively. The growth elasticity of 
poverty measures the percentage of the poor who will move out of poverty in response 
to one percent increase in average income (Kakwani, 2001). Similarly, inequality 
elasticity of poverty is defined as the percentage change in poverty rate in response to 
one percent change in inequality measure. The mathematical expressions of both 
growth- and inequality elasticity of poverty can be found in Appendix E.  
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The regression result suggests that the growth-elasticity of poverty for period 
1994-2007 is -2.3 (Table 6.1). This means that a one percent increase in provincial per 
capita real income was associated with a 2.3 percent decrease in headcount poverty rate. 
This may at first seem to be a large impact. However, it is important to stress that the 
elasticity represents percentage change in poverty rate, not the absolute change. In 
addition, the elasticity of 2.3 for Thailand is considered to be reasonable when 
compared to previous researches. Deolailikar (2002) found the elasticity for Thailand 
between 1992 and 1999 to be 2.2. Other studies also found an average elasticity of 
developing countries to be between 2 and 3 (Bourguignon, 2003).  
For the inequality-elasticity of poverty, the result shows a positive relationship. 
A one percent rise in the provincial Gini index would lead to 3.0 percent rise in poverty 
ratio. This value of the inequality elasticity of poverty is also consistent with the results 
in Deolailikar (2002). In his study, the elasticity for years 1992-1999 was 3.2. In 
addition, using a 1.25 US dollar poverty line, Fosu (2010) found the elasticity for East 
Asia and Pacific to be 2.7 for period 1980-2007. Comparing with the results of these 
other studies, the elasticity found here can be considered plausible.  
Apparently, the two variables—per capita income and inequality—affect poverty 
in opposing directions. While an increase in per capita income reduces provincial 
poverty, inequality increases it. This implies that their effects on poverty are ceteris 
paribus. An increase in income can reduces poverty only if the inequality remains 
constant. If inequality also increases during the same period, poverty may decline only 
by a little; remain the same or even increase. This depends on which of the two 
elasticities of poverty dominates. Results also show that income per capita and 
inequality alone can explain as much as 77 percent of the poverty movements during 
1994-2007 (Table 6.1).  
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When other variables are added, the explanatory power increases slightly to 80 
percent. All variables, except share of population aged 0-15 years and that over 60 years 
old, are found to be significant, though at different significance levels. Results in 
column (2) suggest that the poverty ratio had significant positive relationships with age 
of household head and the share of urban population. Meanwhile, it was negatively 
associated with household size, share of population in female-headed households and 
educational attainment. The relationship between poverty and population in female-
headed households is somewhat counter-intuitive. The results suggest that provinces 
with the larger share of population residing in female-headed households were found to 
have a smaller poverty rate. This seems to contradict the common understanding of 
gender and poverty. However, the positive relationship is consistent with Krongkaew 
(1993). He found female-headed households to be associated with lower poverty for the 
year 1981. ADB (1998) also found higher share of poor households among male-headed 
households than the female-headed households in 1992. This could partly be due to the 
fact that female-headed households are concentrated in Bangkok and its vicinity (ADB, 
1998, p. 35). These provinces normally have higher per capita income and lower 
poverty rate than other provinces. Accordingly, provinces with higher share of female-
headed households were expected to have lower poverty rates. Nonetheless, when 
Bangkok and its metropolitan region are excluded, the relationship between the share of 
female-headed households and poverty remained negative.  
The negative relationship between female household heads and poverty rate 
could be related to the household income and size. In general, the gender gap in 
Thailand has been small compared to other countries (Klasen, Lechtenfeld & Povel, 
2011). In 1996, per capita income of female-headed households—on national average—
was higher than that of male-headed households. Based on the raw SES data, this 
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condition continued to hold in 2007. Note here that it is the per-capita income of 
female-headed households—not the household income—that was higher than the male-
headed household. At the household-level, the income of female-headed households has 
still been less than that of male-headed households. However, the size of households 
headed by female was, on average, smaller than households headed by men. As a result, 
when household incomes are divided by the household sizes, the per-capita income of 
female-headed households were higher that of male-headed households. It is also 
possible that households headed by female might receive more financial assistance than 
households headed by men (NSO, 2011). 
Findings in column (3) and the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation gave 
further supporting evidence. Estimation in column (3) shows relationship between 
poverty and all other variables as the per capita income and Gini variables are omitted. 
Meanwhile, the 2SLS estimation is used to portray poverty determinants when variables 
are related in a more complicated way. Deolailikar (2002) found that per capita income 
and inequality might be endogenous to the poverty determinant regression. High level 
of poverty may also cause average provincial income to be low. It may also affect the 
inequality level. For this reason, he employed the 2SLS method with all other variables 
as instruments. With the 2SLS, both per capita income and Gini are treated as 
endogenous variables. Results are displayed in the last two columns of Table 6.1.  
Comparing between column (2) and column (3), the results show consistent 
signs. When per capita income and inequality are omitted from the regression i.e. 
column (3), all variables had the same signs as those in column (2). In addition the share 
of population aged 0-15 years and those 60 years or over became significant variables. 
This means that, when per capita income and the Gini were not controlled for, a larger 
share of elder persons was associated with lower poverty. The result is consistent with 
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that of Deolailikar (2002). This seems to imply that the elder persons in Thailand helped 
generating income in poor households. Such an implication is in fact supported by 
Knodel and Chayovan (2008). They found income from work to be the second most 
common source of income for elder persons in Thailand, after income from children. In 
addition, as much as 48.2 percent of elder men and 25.7 percent of elder women were 
still economically active in 2007 (Knodel & Chayovan, 2008, Table 14).  
Besides, there were also government policies to support financially the poor 
elder persons in Thailand. From 1993 onwards, elder persons have been eligible to 
receive a monthly allowance of 200 Baht—with priority given to the poor (Khamhom, 
Jongsatitmun, Sanitwong na Ayuthaya & Chuantrakul, 1999). The allowance was 
increased to 300 Baht in 1999. There is also an Elder Persons Fund allocated to 
individuals who take care of elder persons in the family. With these policies, households 
with elder persons received government transfers and hence constitute an asset in poor 
households. In other words, these policies help explain the negative relationship 
between the share of households with elderly and poverty. 
There were also consistent results when comparing the estimates in column (1) 
with those using the 2SLS. The coefficients had consistent signs for both per capita 
income and Gini. The values of coefficients for both per capita income and Gini from 
the two methods were also very close. The values of R-squared in the last column 
further support the assumption that income was endogenous to the poverty-determinant 
model. However, note that the 2SLS results shown in Table 6.1 only treat income as an 
endogenous variable. This is because the first-stage regression of other variables on 
Gini suggests that these variables are weak instruments for Gini. The R-squared value 
for all these variables on Gini was only 0.18. In addition, the F-test critical value was 
only 15.50. Although it normally requires F value of more than 10 to pass the weak 
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instruments, 15.50 seemed to still be low. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that they 
are not strong instruments for Gini. As a result, Gini is treated as exogenous variable. 
Table 6.1 Regression Results for Provincial Poverty Determinants in Thailand (Pooled 
Data) 1994-2007 
Independent  Log of Poverty Headcount Ratio (Pooled 94-07) First-stage 
OLS on 
Income 
Variables OLS Estimates  2SLS  
(Pooled 94-07) (1) (2) (3)  Estimates 
Real Income -2.3121 -2.0560   -2.3945  
 (0.0675)*** (0.1278)***   (0.0774)***  
Gini 2.9896 2.7013   2.9247 0.1378 
 (0.2088)*** (0.2101)***   (0.2103)*** (0.0676)** 
HeadAge  0.0705 0.1655   -0.0396 
  (0.0173)*** (0.0213)***   (0.0053)*** 
HHsize  -0.2530 -0.3368   -0.0394 
  (0.1278)** (0.1637)**   (0.0413) 
Fhead  -0.8972 -3.4334   0.7357 
  (0.4265)** (0.5230)***   (0.1338)*** 
EduAttain  -0.2247 -0.6474   0.1858 
  (0.0465)*** (0.0514)***   (0.0129)*** 
Urban  1.3833 1.4169   0.2269 
  (0.2913)*** (0.3697)***   (0.0936)** 
PopUnder15  0.5111 8.0843   -2.1714 
  (1.0531) (1.2636)***   (0.3282)*** 
PopOver60  -0.8186 -5.9099   3.0557 
  (1.6488) (2.0619)***   (0.5174)*** 
Time 0.1559 0.1719 0.1694  0.1589 0.0033 
 (0.0244)*** (0.0236)*** (0.0304)***  (0.0244)*** (0.0076) 
Time2 -0.0098 -0.0113 -0.0118  -0.0098 0.0003 
 (0.0015)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0019)***  (0.0015)*** (0.0005) 
Constant 21.4784 17.9115 -2.4947  22.0193 8.5723 
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.80 0.66  0.77 0.80 
Note:  Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level and * 10 percent level. 
Number of observations for all regressions is 608 for the 76 provinces each year for 8 years 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Table 6.2 Regression Results for Provincial Poverty Determinants in Thailand (Pooled 
Data) 2000-2007 
Independent  Log of Poverty Headcount Ratio (Pooled 00-07) First-stage 
OLS on 
Income 
Variables OLS Estimates  2SLS  
(Pooled 00-07) (1) (2) (3)  Estimates 
Real Income -2.3348 -1.9223   -2.532  
 (0.0917)*** (0.1827)***   (0.1035)***  
Gini 3.3145 2.926   3.1923 0.1905 
 (0.2800)*** (0.2895)***   (0.2833)*** (0.0829)** 
HeadAge  0.0606 0.1314   -0.0279 
  (0.0226)*** (0.0270)***   (0.0063)*** 
HHsize  -0.3301 -0.6886   0.0343 
  (0.1926)* (0.2340)***   (0.0556) 
Fhead  -0.8411 -3.5626   0.9510 
  (0.5406) (0.6191)***   (0.1477)*** 
EduAttain  -0.2620 -0.7243   0.2123 
  (0.0653)*** (0.0644)***   (0.0152)*** 
Urban  1.4117 2.3186   -0.1189 
  (0.3900)*** (0.4709)***   (0.1123) 
PopUnder15  1.2558 11.4821   -3.0999 
  (1.5975) (1.7449)***   (0.4310)*** 
PopOver60  -0.1380 -1.1770   1.1311 
  (2.1701) (2.6596)   (0.6233)* 
Time 0.1156 0.0748 -0.0944  0.1243 0.0660 
 (0.1370) (0.1309) (0.1607)  (0.1364) (0.0376)* 
Time2 -0.0084 -0.0075 -0.0008  -0.0086 -0.0025 
 (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0076)  (0.0064) (0.0018) 
Constant 22.2070 18.3601 0.7561  22.9353 7.7934 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.80 0.70  0.78 0.81 
Note:   Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level and * 10 percent level. 
Number of observations for all regressions is 380 for the 76 provinces each year for 5 years. 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
In order to see whether the poverty determinants have changed after the crisis, 
the regressions covering period 2000-2007 are considered. Results for this post-crisis 
period are shown in Table 6.2. Similar to the results for the entire period (1994-2007), 
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per capita income and Gini continued to show strong relationships with poverty. The 
values of both growth- and inequality-elasticity of poverty also remained stable, with 
that of inequality slightly larger than the results for 1994-2007. When all other variables 
are added to the regression, as shown in column (2), the results remained consistent 
with those in Table 6.1. The relationship of each variable to poverty showed the same 
sign for both periods. The average age of the household head and the share of urban 
population had positive correlation with poverty. Meanwhile, average household size, 
share of population residing in female-headed households and educational attainment 
had a negative association with provincial poverty. The results for the 2SLS are also 
similar to those of the period between 1994 and 2008.  
In summary, the poverty determinants for the post-crisis period did not differ 
significantly from those for the entire period. Even the magnitudes of the per capita 
income and inequality elasticities remained around the same levels. It can be concluded 
that the crisis did not have a significant effect on provincial poverty determinants. The 
effect of inequality on poverty has slightly increased. This means that a percentage point 
increase in inequality was associated with a higher rise in the provincial poverty ratio 
after the crisis. With the same growth-elasticity of poverty, it would imply that a higher 
income increase was required in order to achieve the same rate of poverty reduction.  
 
6.7 Government Policies and Critics 
Anti-poverty Policies 
The targeted anti-poverty policies in Thailand began in 1982. Anti-poverty policies 
were first clearly stated in the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1982-1986). Although policies in the first four National Development Plans (1961-
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1966, 1967-1971, 1972-1976 and 1977-1981) helped improve the welfare of the poor, 
they were not aimed directly toward the poor (TDRI, 2011). This was partly because the 
first four Plans emphasised largely on stimulating economic growth via infrastructure 
development. Although poverty eradication was included as part of the Fourth Plan, it 
was only seen as a mechanism to achieve the income-distribution target (NESDB, 
1977). 
In the Fifth Plan particular attention was paid to reducing rural poverty (NESDB, 
1982). The main anti-poverty project during the Fifth Plan was the Rural Job Creation 
Programme (RJCP). Under the project, rural villagers were hired to build basic facilities 
such as irrigation, transportation networks and rice banks in their own communities. 
There was also an in-kind transfer targeting the poor, which was implemented by the 
Ministry of Public Health in 1984. The low-income cards were given to the poor 
households enabling them to receive free medical services. The programme covered 
approximately 20 percent of population (Shetty et al., 1996).  
The Sixth Plan (1987-1991) basically continued on with the poverty-reduction 
projects implemented in the Fifth Plan. Between 1988 and 1992, the Green Esarn 
Programme (GEP) was implemented in order to specifically improve the living 
conditions in the Northeastern region. In contrast with the Sixth Plan, the Seventh Plan 
(1992-1996) shifted policy toward distribution of income and growth across regions as 
means to alleviate poverty. Accordingly, many new projects were created under this 
Plan. The RJCP and GEP were replaced by Tambon Development Programme (TDP), 
which extended the coverage of the programme beyond facility construction. The TDP 
also covered career development, environmental conservation, strengthening of rural 
institutions as well as inter-Tambon development (TDRI, 2011). In addition, the School 
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Lunch Programme was enacted in 1992 to provide free lunch to students from poor 
households. 
In addition, the Poverty Alleviation Project (PAP) was formed in 1993 to lend 
interest-free loans to the poor. Under this project, households with per capita incomes 
less than 5,000 Baht per year can borrow. The loans have to be used for income-
generating activities such as buying seeds, domestic manufacturing production and 
retail trade. There were also cash-transfer programmes implemented since 1993. These 
programmes include monthly allowances to the elderly and the poor families. Similarly, 
12,500-Baht village funds were set up in 1995. The programme gave village committees 
authority to decide on how to use the funds—with a guideline that assistance was 
intended to help poor households in emergencies. All of these programmes were carried 
on through the Eighth Plan (1997-2001) despite the economic crisis.  
In 2000, the Thai government committed to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) along with 188 other countries around the world. According to the MDGs, the 
Thai government aimed at eradicating extreme poverty by the end of the decade. At the 
same time, the new government led by Thaksin Shinawatra implemented several 
populist policies favouring the poor. These policies include the Village Fund, People’s 
Bank, Debt Suspension and Debt Reduction for Small Farmers, and the 30-Baht Health 
Care Scheme.  
Under the Village Fund, each village received a one million-Baht fund from the 
government to be used as short-term loans to the villagers in need. The borrowers were 
expected to pay back the loans within one year. Along with the funds, the village 
committees were set up to administer and manage the funds. People’s Bank was the 
programme operated by the Government Savings Bank. The poor who had permanent 
addresses could open a savings account for two months before being eligible to borrow. 
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Meanwhile, the debt-suspension and debt-reduction for small farmers was set up for 
farmers in debt to the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). 
Farmers with no more than 100,000 Baht debt can choose to either suspend the debt for 
3 years or reduce the debt burden. For those with the latter option, the government 
agreed to pay 3 percent of the interest rates incurred to the farmers’ debts for 3 years. 
This means that farmers who normally had to pay the interest rate of 8 percent to the 
BAAC would have to pay only 5 percent.  
As for the 30-Baht Health Care Scheme, it was a universal health care scheme 
enacted in April 2001. Everyone not covered by the Social Security Scheme were 
eligible to receive a 30-Baht card. The cardholders only paid 30 Baht for their medical 
services they received at participating health-care units (MOPH, 2006). In 2007, 
according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007, the scheme was made 
free for everyone (MOPH, 2010). 
Policy Evaluation 
Since the start of targeted anti-poverty policies in 1982, the government budget 
for these programmes has increased considerably. The budget rose from approximately 
868 million Baht in FY1982 to 35 billion Baht in FY1999 (NESDB & World Bank, 
2005, p. 48). The budget further increased after several new policies were introduced in 
2001. As of FY2007, the budget for anti-poverty policies stood at 71.9 billion Baht. 
This accounted for 7.2 percent of total government expenditure (NESDB, 2008b, pp. i-
ii).  
Despite continuous increase in the government expenditure, the programmes 
normally suffered from low coverage (Shetty et al., 1996; NESDB & World Bank, 
2005; NESDB, 2008b). This was particularly true for programmes implemented prior to 
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2001. As of 1995, the Tambon Development Programme could only create 30,000 
person days of unskilled employment. With the wage set at the national minimum wage 
rate, which was higher than the provincial rates, the project ended up attracting non-
poor. Similarly, the in-kind transfer programmes i.e. the low-income health card and the 
school lunch programme also had low coverage. Although the programmes were more 
specifically geared toward the poor, they still experienced leakage to the non-poor 
(Shetty et al., 1996).  
Meanwhile, the cash-transfer programmes to elderly poor and poor households 
seemed to succeed in reaching the target groups. However, the small budget allocated 
for the programmes not only resulted in low coverage, but were also unable to pull most 
recipients out of poverty. The Poverty Alleviation Project also set an income criterion 
that was low enough to reach only the very poor. However, the evaluation by Shetty et 
al. (1996) found that a third of participants suffered declines in incomes while in the 
programme.  
With a substantial increase in the budget, the anti-poverty programmes after 
2001 succeeded in solving the low-coverage problem. The universal health care scheme 
covered 96.7 percent of the total poor in Thailand in 2007. Similarly, the school lunch 
programme covered 67.4 percent of all poor students (NESDB, 2008b, p. v). 
Nevertheless, by covering large populations, some of these new programmes ended up 
benefiting the non-poor (NESDB & World Bank, 2005; NESDB, 2008b). Both the 
Village Fund and the debt suspension and reduction programmes seemed to benefit the 
non-poor as much as the poor (Siamwalla & Jitsuchon, 2007). Table 6.3 summarises the 
accessibility of the poor and non-poor to these services.  
Given the above policy evaluation, it is apparent that there is still room for 
improvement in the anti-poverty policies in Thailand. This is particularly true for the 
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programme targeting. Better selection and monitoring procedures are required for these 
programmes to reach the poor more than the non-poor. Perhaps the allocation of the 
anti-poverty budget should be proportional to the density of the poor in the area rather 
than an equal proportion to all areas. In addition, programme evaluations should be 
systematic in order to continuously improve the policy targeting toward the poor (Shetty 
et al., 1996; NESDB, 2008b).  
Table 6.3 Accessibility to Public Services in 2007 
Service  Non-poor Poor  Total 
Elderly allowances  80.4 19.6  100.0 
Disabled allowances  78.9 21.1  100.0 
Scholarships  90.9 9.1  100.0 
Education loans  99.8 0.2  100.0 
People’s Bank  97.9 2.1  100.0 
Village Fund  91.2 8.8  100.0 
Other funds  89.2 10.8  100.0 
Note: NESDB data based on the households Socio-economic Surveys (NSO) 
Source: NESDB (2008b: Table 3)  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at provincial poverty in Thailand. It started off with the definition 
of poverty and how it has been measured in the Thai context. Then, the chapter 
examined provincial poverty situation over the past two decades. While overall poverty 
in Thailand seemed to be declining overtime—except for the crisis—the provincial 
disparities in poverty constantly increased. When Bangkok and the BMR were 
excluded, the disparities continued to show increasing trends. These trends were similar 
to the disparity trend in GPP per capita, as shown in Chapter 3.   
One commonly claimed benefit of sustained economic growth is that it reduces 
overall poverty. The analysis then investigated this relationship at the provincial level 
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for 1988-2008. Using GPP per capita, the evidence suggested a strong positive 
relationship between provincial growth and poverty reduction during the boom period 
(1988-1996). Nonetheless, there was no significant relationship between the two after 
the crisis (2000-2008). On the other hand, provincial growth was found to be strongly 
associated with poverty reduction for all periods when using income data from 
household surveys. With these results, the analysis took a further step by examining the 
determinants of provincial poverty.   
The regression results suggested that income as well as inequality were crucial 
determinants of poverty. Per capita incomes seemed to help reduce provincial poverty 
rates while inequality adversely affected poverty rates. This suggests that income 
growth can only reduces poverty if the level of inequality remains unchanged or 
decreases. In addition, educational attainment, household size, age of household heads, 
share of population residing in female-headed households and the share of urban 
population to the total provincial population also contributed to poverty differences 
across provinces. The 2SLS regression then further suggests that poverty also 
simultaneously determined per capita income at the provincial level. The analysis then 
reviewed the anti-poverty policies implemented in Thailand so far.   
Findings in this chapter provide a better understanding about provincial poverty 
over the past two decades. They also highlighted important factors which contributed to 
poverty in Thailand. Provincial growth undeniably plays a crucial role in reducing 
poverty at provincial level. This implies that stimulating growth at provincial level can 
lead to provincial poverty reduction. While Chapter 5 already examined several factors 
determining provincial growth, there seem to be some other important factors that the 
analysis failed to capture. One possible alternative explanation, it has been argued, 
could be agglomeration forces. The issue of whether this is the case for Thailand, and to 
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what extent agglomeration explains provincial income disparities will be investigated in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Agglomeration Economies and Provincial Output Divergence 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter tries to explain differences in output per capita across provinces using 
economics of agglomeration approach. The analyses in Chapter 5 showed that there was 
provincial GPP per capita divergence during the boom and the post-crisis periods. This 
implies that initially poor provinces grew at slower rates than the initially richer ones. 
Agglomeration theory proposes that this could be due to the agglomeration forces 
stimulating growth in the initially rich provinces. Both firms and labour benefit from 
clustering together in big cities, which normally locate in rich provinces. This in turn 
attracts more firms and labour into such already-established regions. As a result, the 
growth of these provinces becomes self-reinforcing (Krugman, 1995, pp. 46-47).  
This agglomeration theory seems to fit well with economic development patterns 
in Thailand. The country has long been known for its concentration of urbanisation in 
and around Bangkok (Poapongsakorn & Fuller, 1997, p. 145; Webster, 2005, pp. 289-
292). Although there were policies driving economic activities away from Bangkok, 
they could at best move activities to the capital’s surrounding areas. Since the early 
1990s, factories started to relocate to areas out of Bangkok. However, the relocation was 
only toward the Eastern Seaboard and the Central region. All of these provinces are 
within proximity of Bangkok.  
While both Thai researchers and policy-makers had been well aware of the 
dominance of Bangkok, there was not much empirical research on this issue. Perhaps 
201 
 
the first empirical analysis on agglomeration in Thailand was done by Southichack 
(1998). He examined the interaction between agglomeration- and congestion forces 
using provincial employment density and labour productivity. The results suggested that 
agglomeration forces were causing concentration of industrial activities around 
Bangkok during 1975-1995. In addition, provincial labour productivity was also found 
to be negatively associated with the agricultural share of GPP and positively related 
with infrastructure and human capital stock. These relationships were consistent with 
the situation described in agglomeration theory.  
While the industrial sector continued to concentrate in areas close to Bangkok, 
the economic structure of the Thai economy changed after the crisis. In response to the 
devaluation of the Thai baht, manufacturing for exports expanded. At the same time, 
manufacturing for domestic consumption struggled. Some sectors, such as construction 
has not yet reached its pre-crisis level. On the other hand, services sectors—particularly 
the tourism industry have increased their importance as growth drivers. Consequently, 
areas that saw growth in tourism started to develop into new cities. In addition, regional 
integration such as ASEAN, the East-West Corridor and Greater Mekong Sub-region1 
(GMS) also stimulate growth in the trade sector. Together with economic growth in 
neighbouring countries, this enhanced development of border cities (Patmasiriwat & 
Pachuei, 1999).  
With these changes in the Thai economy after the crisis, the agglomeration effect 
on provincial growth may have also changed. It is therefore interesting to re-examine 
the interaction between agglomeration and congestion effect across provinces in 
Thailand once again. Given the rise the New Economic Geography in the 1990s, the 
                                                 
1
 The GMS covers six countries along the Mekong River. It includes the Yunnan Province of China, Lao 
PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. The area was first known as Hexagonal Growth Area, 
which was established in 1992 (Krongkaew, 2004).  
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issue of agglomeration has received much attention worldwide. As for Thailand, there 
were also research works on this issue in recent years, although very limited. 
Sajarattanachote (2006) analysed the relationship between industrial agglomeration and 
spillovers from foreign direct investments to peripheral areas. According to the new 
economic geography, spillovers from industrial-concentrated urban to peripheral areas 
are possible via forward- and backward linkages. Using GPP per capita and firm-level 
survey data, he found limited spillovers from FDI firms to peripheral areas during the 
period 1981-2003. This means that the positive externalities only occurred within and 
around the industrial areas. Here, the results suggest that agglomeration effects 
continued to accelerate provincial income divergence.  
Similarly, Preechametta (2009) examined the existence of the increasing returns 
hypothesis under the new economic geography theory in Thailand. Using manufacturing 
sector growth at provincial level, he found that increasing returns existed during the 
years 2000-2005. This seems to be consistent with the implication drawn from 
Sajarattanachote (2006). Despite the existence of these two research works, there is still 
room for more study on agglomeration in Thailand after the crisis. Both works only 
looked at the manufacturing sector. Although this is sensible as agglomeration arises 
from clustering industrial activities, it would also be interesting to analyse the process 
from a wider perspective. The approach taken by Southichack (1998) seems to offer this 
possibility. Since no empirical analysis of this type is available for the period after 
1995, this chapter therefore fills this gap.  
The chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 looks at the primate city of 
Bangkok and how it has changed over time. Government policies to de-concentrate 
industries away from Bangkok will also be discussed. Then section 7.3 reviews the 
theory on agglomeration and the new economic geography. Model specification and 
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data description are given in section 7.4. Section 7.5 analyses the regression results and, 
finally, section 7.6 concludes.   
 
7.2 Agglomeration in Thailand 
Thailand is considered as a prime case study on agglomeration. The country has been 
known for the dominance of Bangkok. The primacy of Bangkok had been very extreme. 
There are only a few other cities in the world considered as equally primate 
(Kittiprapas, 1999a; Webster, 2005). Bangkok has dominated the country’s urban 
development throughout the process of industrialisation since the 1960s. Efforts to 
develop other urban centres far from Bangkok in the 1980s and 1990s seemed to be 
unsuccessful. Industries only moved to provinces within proximity of Bangkok. As a 
result, the benefits of rapid economic growth had been unevenly concentrated in and 
around the capital city.  
The primacy of Bangkok is largely due to its geographic location as well as to 
economic history. Bangkok is located right in the middle of the country which is also a 
delta plain of the Chao Praya River—the main commercial route. It also is connected to 
the sea through the Gulf of Thailand. This suggests that the location of Bangkok by 
itself is strategically advantageous for both international trade and centralisation of 
power. Historically, Bangkok became the capital of Thailand in 1782 when the Chakri 
Dynasty was founded.  From the beginning, as Glassman (2004) observed, the dynasty 
relied on trade. The government drew income from exporting rice which was produced 
extensively on the Central Plain near Bangkok. To prevent regional powers rising 
against them, the early kings of Chakri Dynasty centralised power in Bangkok. They 
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also suppressed activities in areas that had potential for economic agglomeration (Biggs 
et al., 1990). This consequently induced the primacy of Bangkok.  
Then, Thailand integrated into the world economy when the Bowring Treaty was 
signed with Britain in 1855 (Sajarattanachote, 2006). As exports became a key driver of 
the Thai economy in the 19th centuries, Bangkok grew even further. Meanwhile, the 
outlying regions continued on subsistence farming with limited role in exports. It was 
not until the launch of the First National Economic Plan in 1961 that the roads to other 
parts were built (Biggs et al., 1990). While the First- and Second Plans (1961-1966 and 
1967-1971) emphasised infrastructure development and industrialisation, most activities 
took place in and around Bangkok.  
As problems of income disparities between Bangkok and rural areas got worse, 
the Third Plan (1972-1976) started to look at industrial dispersion. Tax incentives as 
well as industrial estates were set up to encourage industries toward outlying regions. 
However, industries seemed to move only to the surrounding provinces. The failure to 
attract industries to areas far from Bangkok was believed to be due to the first-mover 
agglomeration economies of Bangkok (NESDB & World Bank, 2010). By the time the 
deconcentration policies were implemented, Bangkok already benefited from much 
better transport facilities, economies of scales and centralised administration (Biggs et 
al., 1990). In order to effectively drive industries away from Bangkok, the Fifth Plan 
(1982-1986) initiated the development of the Eastern Seaboard. Given a mega-
infrastructure development under the Eastern Seaboard programme, it was successful in 
drawing industries away from Bangkok. However, it is likely that the success was partly 
due to its close proximity with Bangkok.   
With the relocation of industries out of Bangkok toward surrounding provinces 
and the Eastern Seaboard, the primacy index began to improve. The primacy index 
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presents the numbers of population of the largest city compared to that of the second-
largest city (or to that of the second- to fourth-largest cities combined). As shown in 
Figure 7.1B, population of Bangkok was 27 times larger than the urban population of 
Nakhon Ratchasima—the second largest city in 1983. The index fell to 17 times in 
2000. However, the second largest city was no longer Nakhon Ratchasima, but Samut 
Prakan—the province adjacent to Bangkok. In fact, both second- and third-largest cities 
were in Bangkok’s vicinity (Richter, 2006). This suggests strong agglomeration effects 
causing firms to continue to locate near Bangkok despite better incentives to locate in 
outlying regions. 
It is apparent that the growth of cities surrounding Bangkok, and later the 
Eastern Seaboard, contributed to the fall in primacy index. As these provinces grew 
rapidly, the gap between this so-called Bangkok urban region2 and the rest of the 
country widened. To counter the strong pull of Bangkok, the Thai government kept on 
promoting regional urban growth centres. Following the Third Plan (1972-1976), the 
government continued to build industrial estates as well as transportation networks in 
the outlying regions during the Fourth- to Seventh Plans (1977-1981, 1982-1986, 1987-
1991 and 1992-1996). Investment promotion policy was maintained throughout the 
years with major improvements in 1987. New investment zones were assigned to all 
provinces. The incentive packages were granted in reversal to distance from Bangkok. 
That is, the further was the firm located from Bangkok, the better the tax incentives and 
other privileges the firm could enjoy.   
 
                                                 
2
 According to the NESDB and World Bank (2010), the Bangkok urban region is comprised of provinces 
in the BMR (except Nakhon Pathom), three provinces in the East which made up the Eastern Seaboard 
and Phra Nakhon Si Ayuthaya. Provinces in the BMR are Nonthaburi, Nakhon Pathom, Pathum Thani, 
Samut Prakan and Samut Sakhon. Provinces in the Eastern Seaboard are Chon Buri, Chacheongsao and 
Rayong.   
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Figure 7.1 Primacy Indices 
A. Thailand and other countries 2000 
 
B. Thailand 1981-2000 
 
Sources: The graphs are from Richter (2006, Figure 18).  
 
The Thai economy fell into economic crisis in 1997—the beginning of the 
Eighth Plan (1997-2001). As a result of the crisis, Thailand had to, instead, implement 
adjustment programmes suggested by the IMF—particularly on financial and public 
sectors. At the same time, the crisis also brought about structural changes in the Thai 
economy. Owing to the devaluation of the Baht, exports became even more important as 
the main driver for growth. The tourism sector was booming, partly as a result of 
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government’s tourism-promotion policy. Economic cooperation with neighbouring 
countries was also emphasised, stimulating trade—hence, generating growth in the 
border towns.  
Coming out of the crisis, the Ninth- and Tenth Plans (2002-2006 and 2007-2011) 
emphasised provincial cluster development policy. In addition, projects under the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) cooperation began to materialise. The East-West 
Corridor Road Project linking Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam was 
approved by the ADB in 1999 (Krongkaew, 2004). Then, in 2001 the GMS country 
members also agreed on 11 flagship programmes to be developed in the next decade 
(see Appendix F). Among them, the East-West Corridor, together with the North-South 
and the Southern Corridors were selected as the three priority projects. All of them 
involved Thailand. The construction of roads on the East-West Corridor was completed 
and officially opened on June 11, 2009. Construction on the other two corridors is in 
progress. Once the trade facilitation is completed, it is expected to boost growth in 
regional cities on the corridors. For example, through the East-West Corridor, Khon 
Kean will become attractive for export industries. This is because the corridor will 
connect the Northeast region to Danang Sea Port, which is closer than Bangkok or the 
Eastern Seaboard.   
As a result of these post-crisis changes, together with decades of government 
attempts to promote regional cities, results began to show. Migration destinations 
became more diverse. Instead of moving to Bangkok, regional centres such as Hat Yai 
in the South, Chiang Mai in the North, Nakhon Ratchasima and Khon Kean in the 
Northeast and the Eastern Seaboard became attractive. Moreover, tourism areas such as 
Phuket, Samui and Hua Hin also saw large in-migration (Webster, 2005). This suggests 
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that urban development in Thailand has changed noticeably, particularly after the crisis. 
Despite that, some researchers believed Bangkok and its surrounding areas will 
continue to dominate the growth of Thailand (Webster, 2005; NESDB & World Bank, 
2010). Whether this is the case or not, the role of Bangkok in Thailand’s urbanisation 
context has clearly changed. It is therefore important to examine in which direction the 
urbanisation pattern has changed after the crisis.  
 
7.3 Theoretical Background 
When geography is considered in the field of economics, economists have often asked 
why economic activities are distributed unequally across space. In response to this 
question, several branches of modern economics emerged. Recall from Chapter 2, these 
fields are location theory, urban economics, industrial organisation, economics of 
agglomeration and new economic geography. In addition, new theories of international 
trade and economic growth now also consider the geographical dimension. Among 
these economic fields, the theory of agglomeration tries to explain such uneven 
distribution of economic activities through two simultaneous opposing forces. The 
agglomeration (or centripetal) forces pull resources into the cities while dispersion (or 
centrifugal) forces drive the resources away from the centres.  
There are several forces that lead to agglomeration. Perhaps the most important 
ones are (1) transport and resource advantages, (2) increasing returns to scale, (3) 
positive externalities (Fujita, 1988) and (4) spatial competition (Fujita & Thisse, 1996). 
Obviously, firms as well as labour cluster in cities in order to minimise transport costs 
as well as being close to a large pool of resources. The recent technological 
development and high-speed transportation infrastructure may imply a declining role of 
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this factor to agglomeration. However, Fujita and Thisse (2002) argued that 
“agglomeration happens provided that transport costs (in the city) are below some 
critical threshold” (p.4). In addition, Krugman (1993b) suggested that transportation 
may continue to generate agglomeration forces due to economies of scale in 
transportation. Buses can run more often in a day as there are higher numbers of 
customers in big cities.  
Increasing returns to scale suggest that cities normally have a large variety of 
specialised, non-tradable intermediate services as well as the final goods. These 
specialised products and services have to locate in the city in order to have enough 
demand. On the other hand, having a large variety of such inputs enhances productivity 
of final products. This leads to higher specialisation, which in turn drives the wage 
upward (Mills, 1967; Fujita & Thisse, 2002). The higher wage then attracts more 
resources to flow in, stimulating further growth. As for externalities, the term normally 
refers to benefits which are external to the firm. Externalities are generated through 
interactions among firms, typically in the form of information exchanges (Fujita & 
Thisse, 1996). Having a public-good characteristic, information used by one firm does 
not reduce the amount available to others. Being close to other firms then allows each 
firm to benefit from information-sharing with other firms through interpersonal 
communications. Accordingly, firms would prefer to cluster together. New firms would 
also prefer to be in the cluster in order to benefit from the externalities. As more firms 
are concentrated together, it creates even bigger externalities and hence, stimulates 
further growth in the area.  
For spatial competition, it is suggested that firms in imperfect market 
competition will choose to be close to the market. Hotelling (1929) found that price 
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competition is a centrifugal force pushing firms to be away from others. On the other 
hand, when products are differentiated such that firms are able to set their own price, 
they will choose to agglomerate at a market centre. It is widely argued that most firms 
differentiate their products from others to some extent. By differentiating their products 
from the rest of the same industry, firms are able to avoid getting into the price war. 
Under this monopolistic competition, each firm can—to a certain degree—set its own 
price. In this case, firms will prefer to gather at the centre so that they are close to 
consumers.   
All these four forces normally co-exist and work together to generate 
agglomeration effects. Along with these agglomeration forces, there are also dispersion 
forces. In contrast to agglomeration, dispersion forces push firms and households away 
from urban centres. These forces include congestion, high land rents, and price 
competition. High concentration of economic activities also creates pollution and high 
crime rates. Firms and households tend to move out of the cities if these dispersion 
forces outweigh agglomeration forces.  
The magnitudes of agglomeration as well as congestion effects are normally 
associated with the size of the city. That is, the size of city or industry determines the 
equilibrium between the two opposing forces. For example, the size of market demand 
is expected to give rise to the variety of specialised intermediate- as well as final 
products. This will, in turn, enhance increasing returns to scale. Likewise, the 
economies of scale in transportation also seem to depend on the size of the city. At the 
same time, the dispersion forces increase with the city size.  
Ciccone and Hall (1996) argued that density, rather than size, of the city is a 
more accurate factor determining the two forces. In their study, they used employment 
211 
 
per physical space (acres) as a measure of density, which determines the labour 
productivity within each state of the USA. Following Ciccone and Hall method, 
Southichack (1998) elaborated that size may be important for returns to scale and 
variety of intermediate- as well as final products. However, density seems to have more 
effects on externalities and distance-cost saving. An increase in population density leads 
to a decline in transport costs and search costs. Higher density also reduces learning 
costs for producers e.g. it is easier and cheaper to attend conferences held in the area. In 
addition, the higher density of workers and firms in the same industry increases the 
knowledge spillovers in the industry. Aside from agglomeration effects, density 
simultaneously generates dispersion effects. An increase in density creates congestion 
and drives up the land price.  
The work of Ciccone and Hall (1996) has since been widely adopted for 
empirical studies on agglomeration. Following the conventional practice, the method 
used in this chapter will also be based on Ciccone and Hall (1996). In addition, 
Southichak (1998) adjusted the Ciccone and Hall model to better suit the case of 
Thailand. He proposed that in the case of Thailand, it was important that agricultural 
labour was differentiated from non-agricultural labour. Accordingly, the analysis in this 
chapter will incorporate these sectoral differences into the Ciccone and Hall’s model. In 
addition, Ciccone and Hall (1996) provided evidence that density rather than size of 
employment is a better determinant of productivity. To see if this is also the case in 
Thailand, this chapter will also compare the role of size to that of density in determining 
agglomeration economy.  
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the Ciccone and Hall model is regarded 
as a neoclassical model. It is based on Cobb-Douglas production function with idealistic 
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assumptions—to be discussed in the next section. This means that while the model 
allows us to see the interaction between agglomeration and congestion effects, it also 
limits us to analyse only factors included in the model. Accordingly, as Martin (1999) 
puts it, ‘messy social, cultural and institutional factors involved in spatial economic 
development are neglected.’ In addition, as the model is based on production function, it 
can only explain why productivity—not income—differs across provinces. Although 
provincial labour productivity and per capita GPP are closely related in the case of 
Thailand, they can differ significantly from provincial income per capita. Recall that the 
difference between per capita GPP and income was extensively discussed in Chapter 5. 
Despite these limitations, the use of the model is still beneficial in a sense that it at least 
provides us with empirical evidence on agglomeration. Nonetheless, the results should 
be interpreted with these limitations in mind.  
 
7.4 Methods and Data 
Method—Model Specification for Agglomeration  
To empirically investigate agglomeration economies, most studies used data on labour 
productivity instead of per capita output. This is because the models are based on the 
production function, which is more closely related to the productivity. In addition, 
productivity and per capita output are normally closely related. For Thailand, the simple 
correlation between GPP per capita and labour productivity is 0.952. This means that 
provinces with higher output per worker tended to also have higher output per capita. 
The models used here will be based on methods and concepts introduced by 
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Southichack (1998). In their study, Ciccone and Hall 
(1996) started off the analysis at the county level—a geographic subdivision of the 
213 
 
states in the USA. This is, however, not applicable to the case of Thailand as the labour 
data are not available at the district level—the level equivalent to US county. 
Meanwhile, Southichack (1998) adjusted the Ciccone and Hall model by distinguishing 
between agricultural and non-agricultural labour. He argued that this is necessary 
because the agricultural sector is the major employment sector in Thailand. Despite its 
declining role in the Thai economy, agricultural sector still employed 39.7 percent of 
Thailand’s total labour force3 in 2008. Given the availability of sectoral data at 
provincial level, the models here will start off at the provincial sectoral level.  
Based on the simplest Ciccone and Hall model, the effects of externalities are 
shown through the relationship between density and productivity. The model assumes 
that externalities depend multiplicatively on output density. Output density is measured 
as output per unit of land (y/a). The production function of sector j in province i 
describing output (y) produced by a unit of land (a) and l workers is given by 
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where:  
jy  = output of sector j in province i 
ja  = land area of sector j in province i in Rai 
jl  = number of workers in sector j of province i 
α  = a constant representing elasticity of output with respect to 
employment 
λλ /)1( −  = a constant representing elasticity of output with respect to 
density 
                                                 
3
 The figure is the averaged share of agricultural labor force from four rounds of 2008 Labor Force 
Surveys conducted by NSO. The four rounds were for four quarters of the year. This means that the 
surveys cover all seasons including harvesting season and the slack season.  
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The constant α represents the effect of congestion i.e. dispersion force. It is 
expected to have a value less than one ( 1<α ). This is because the addition of more 
labour into a unit of land can generate inverse effects on productivity. On the other 
hand, the constant λλ /)1( −  represents the agglomeration effect. The value of λ is 
expected to be greater than one ( 1>λ ) as it measures the positive effect of adding more 
labour into a unit of land.  
Assume that workers are distributed evenly across sectoral land area within each 
province, the sectoral output is:  
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Solving the equation for output per Rai yields:  
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where αλγ =  representing an interaction between agglomeration effect ( λ ) and 
congestion effect (α ). If 1>γ , the agglomeration effect dominates the congestion 
effect. This means that an increase in density leads to higher output per Rai.   
From here, the total provincial output can be derived by aggregating the sectoral 
output.  That is, )1( γγ −∑= jji alY  where iY  is the total output of province i.  Dividing both 
sides by total labour ( iL ) gives average labour productivity as follows: 
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Accordingly, the density index is defined as: 
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Now, let D be the national average number of workers per Rai and dj be the number of 
workers per Rai in sector j of province i. The density index can be written as: 
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Here, the density index depends on relation of average provincial density to the national 
density, as well as the sectoral density within each province. The latter factor represents 
the distribution of workers across sectors within a province. If 1>γ , then provinces 
with higher average density relative to the national average tend to have higher labour 
productivity. Similarly, provinces with higher inequality in labour distribution across 
sectors are also likely to have higher labour productivity. 
So far, the model assumed that factors of production only consist of labour and 
land. Capital, both physical and human capital, can be added to the model and equation 
(7.1) becomes: 
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where e is the measure of human capital, k the amount of physical capital, T a Hicks-
neutral technology multiplier and β  a labour share. Following similar rearrangements 
as equation (7.2) and (7.3) yields the function of output per Rai: 
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where αλγ = . Assume that rental price of capital ( r  ) is the same throughout the 
country. Then, the capital demand can be derived from equation (7.7) as: 
y
r
k ⋅−= )1( βα
     (7.9) 
Substituting capital demand in the equation (7.8) with simplification to the results 
yields: 
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where:  
φ  = a constant 
ω  = 
αβ
θ
  the elasticity for technology multiplier 
θ  = 
)1(1 βγ
γβ
−−
  the elasticity of employment density  
Now further assume that human capital ( e ) depends log-linearly on worker’s 
average years of education ( h ). That is, ηhe = , where η  is the elasticity of education. 
Substituting this into equation (7.10) arrives at the total output function as: 
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Finally, dividing both sides by total labour force gives average labour productivity 
function:  
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The density index here suggests that if 1>θ , higher density will lead to higher 
productivity. It also implies that agglomeration effects outweigh congestion effects. 
This equation (7.12) is the base for model specification of this chapter. The actual 
estimation can be done by taking logarithms on both sides of equation (7.12). This 
yields the following:  
i
i
jjj
i
i u
L
ahl
L
Y
+








⋅
+=





−∑ θ
θη
φ
1)(
logloglog
   (7.13) 
Here, the technology is assumed to be log-normally distributed at the country-wide 
level. The measurement error of productivity is also assumed to be log-normally 
distributed with zero mean (Southichack, 1998, p. 110). Also, the production sectors 
will be disaggregated into agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. As mentioned 
earlier, the agricultural sector is the largest employment sector in Thailand. To account 
for this fact, disaggregating into agricultural and non-agricultural sectors should suffice. 
In addition, there is also data limitation on the provincial land utilisation. Total land 
area for each province is only categorised into farm holdings, forest area and non-
agricultural areas. This means that we can only disaggregate provincial land into 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
In addition to density and human capital, regional dummies will be added to the 
regression. This is because productivity differences across provinces may partly be due 
to variation in natural and cultural features. A province may be more productive because 
the area is well-endowed with better soil or located closer to port. To account for these 
exogenous differences across geographical dimension, regional dummies are added. 
Accordingly, the equation (7.13) becomes: 
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Method—Size versus Density Effects 
In order to prove that density is more accurate determinant of agglomeration and 
congestion forces than size of employment, Ciccone and Hall (1996) extended their 
model a bit further. Assume that elasticity of firm output with respect to provincial 
sectoral output is a constant υ . Then the production function becomes: 
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Solving for provincial labour productivity, we obtain: 
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If 0=υ , there is no size effects and the equation (7.16) is the same as equation 
(7.4). On the other hand, if 1=γ , then there is no density effects. Again, the human 
capital can be augmented into the model such that the model specification is: 
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where )1(1 υωσ −= . All estimations will be done using non-linear least squares (NLS) 
method in STATA programme version 11.  
Data 
Data used for estimation in this chapter includes GPP, provincial labour force, 
share of agricultural labour to total provincial labour force, educational attainment of 
219 
 
provincial labour force—categorised into agricultural and non-agricultural labours, land 
area by province and by major sector. The first three variables have already been 
introduced in earlier chapters. Recall that GPP data were fully described in Chapter 3 
while provincial labour data are discussed in Chapter 4. The data sources and 
descriptions of all variables are as follows: 
Gross Provincial Product (GPP): is defined as value-added of goods and 
services produced within a province during one-year period. Recall from Chapter 3 that 
the GPP data have been compiled annually by the NESDB and are available from 1981 
onwards.  
Provincial labour force (L): covers population aged 15 years4 or above who are 
employed or unemployed in a province. Recall from Chapter 4 that the provincial-level 
data on the LFS are available since 1994. Also, the labour force data collected for the 
third quarter (July-September) will be used in this study. In the LFS, disaggregation of 
labour force into production sectors is also available. In this chapter, labour force will 
only be distinguished into agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
Labour force years of education (LFedu): is defined as average years of formal 
education completed by provincial labour force. These data are also available as part of 
the LFS. Although the years of education for total provincial labour force are published 
in the quarterly report The Labour Force Survey, the years of education by production 
sector are not. These data can only be obtained from the raw data of the LFS, which are 
available on request at the NSO. The raw data are processed into years of education by 
major sector i.e. agricultural and non-agricultural sectors using the STATA programme 
version 11. 
                                                 
4
 Note again that in 2001, the definition of labor force has been changed from population aged 13 years 
and over to 15 years and over. 
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It might be worth-noting here that the years of education in the LFS are probably 
less precise than the population years of schooling in the SES. In the SES, household 
members are categorised by the highest educational level achieved. In contrast, in the 
LFS, labour force is categorised only by the highest award achieved. That is, the labour 
force is divided into (1) no education, (2) not finishing lower primary (3) lower primary 
education, (4) primary school diploma, (5) lower secondary school diploma, (6) upper 
secondary school diploma or equivalent, (7) undergraduate degrees or higher. This 
means that a worker who completed the first year of upper secondary education will be 
categorised as having a lower secondary school diploma. Despite that, this 
disaggregation should give a good representation of provincial human capital. It is 
therefore worth examining in this chapter.  
Farm holding land area (AgrLand): is defined as the total number of Rai—a 
Thai unit of land5—within a province’s borders used for agricultural purpose. These 
data are collected and published by the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE), the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Provincial-level data are available from 1986 
onwards.  
Non-agricultural land area (NonAgrLand): is the land area within a province 
not used for agricultural purposes, nor considered as forest area. It is therefore the 
residual of the provincial land subtracted by farm holdings and forest area. These data 
are available as part of the provincial land utilisation collected and published by the 
OAE. They are, hence, available from 1986 onwards.   
Given that the provincial-level LFS data are available from 1994 onwards, 
analysis in this chapter will start from 1994. Since the empirical examination here is a 
cross-country analysis, the estimation will done one year at a time. For this chapter, 
                                                 
5
 Approximately, 1 Rai is equivalent to 0.16 hectare.  
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years 1994, 2001 and 2008 are selected for estimation. This way the evidence of 
agglomeration economies for each year can be seen along with the dynamics of 
agglomeration economies in Thailand over time.  
 
7.5 Results 
Empirical Evidence of Agglomeration in Thailand 
Following equation (7.13) and (7.14), estimation results are shown in Table 7.1. The top 
half of the table show regression results following equation (7.13) i.e. regional dummies 
are not included. When regional labour productivity differences are not controlled for, 
the estimated value of θ is 1.170 for 1994. The coefficient is significant at the one 
percent level. As the estimated value of θ is greater than 1 (θ >1), the agglomeration 
effects outweigh congestion effects in Thailand. An increase in provincial labour 
density would result in an increase in provincial labour productivity.  
Similarly, the estimated elasticity of productivity with respect to labour 
education (η) is 2.577. The coefficient is also significant at the one percent level. This 
highlights the importance of educational level in determining the labour productivity in 
Thailand. The value is much higher than the estimate for the USA in Ciccone and Hall 
(1996), which was 0.410. This is probably due to the larger inequality in educational 
levels across both provinces and sectors in Thailand. In 1994, the average educational 
attainment for agricultural workers was 4.7 years. Meanwhile, educational attainment 
for non-agricultural sectors was 7.6 years—almost doubled that of agricultural sector. 
Educational disparities across provinces were even greater. Mae Hong Son had the 
lowest average years of schooling, which was 4.0 years while Nonthaburi had the 
highest—9.0 years. Highly educated workers seek jobs in non-agricultural sectors, 
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which were concentrated in few provinces of Thailand. Consequently, the elasticity of 
education on labour productivity was very high compared to that of the USA. 
Table 7.1 Non-linear Least Square (NLS) Estimates on Provincial Total Labour 
Productivity in Thailand 1994, 2001 and  2008 
Parameters 1994 2001 2008 
With labour density & human capital 
variables 
   
θ 1.1699 1.2212 1.3787 
 (0.0925)*** (0.0983)*** (0.1122)*** 
η 2.5770 2.4699 1.7226 
 (0.7568)*** (0.8460)*** (0.7608)** 
Constant 0.0352 0.2795 2.6300 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.43 0.40 
    
With labour density, human capital & 
regional dummies 
   
θ 1.0467 1.0441 1.1445 
 (0.0844)*** (0.0839)*** (0.1024)*** 
η 2.1414 2.5191 1.8790 
 (0.6766)*** (0.7735)*** (0.8129)** 
North  -0.6327 -0.5639 -0.7038 
Dummy (0.1481)*** (0.1555)*** (0.1812)*** 
South  -0.2361 -0.3160 -0.4791 
Dummy (0.1570) (0.1588)** (0.1815)* 
NE  -1.0980 -1.0586 -1.1586 
Dummy (0.1384)*** (0.1506)*** (0.1753)*** 
Constant 0.8151 -0.0607 1.6458 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.66 0.62 
Note:   Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level and * 10 percent 
level.   
Number of observations for all regressions is 76 for the 76 provinces of Thailand. 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
The NLS regressions for the years 2001 and 2008 produced similar results. The 
estimated values of θ were 1.221 and 1.379 for 2001 and 2008, respectively. As for η, 
they were 2.470 and 1.723 for the same periods. All coefficients are significant at the 
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one percent level, except for η in 2008 which is significant at the five percent level. 
Considering the estimation results over time, it suggests that agglomeration effects 
became bigger between 1994 and 2008. Meanwhile, the elasticity of education on 
labour productivity became smaller. Apparently, agglomeration economies played a 
crucial role in generating provincial output divergence in Thailand.  
The increasing role of agglomeration overtime seems to be consistent with the 
results in Chapter 5. Recall from Table 5.5-5.6 that the adjusted R2 decreased from 0.70 
for the period 1994-2008 to 0.56 in 2000-2008. This means that the explanatory powers 
of provincial growth determinants in Chapter 5 declined over time. Results in Table 7.1 
imply that this decline must be due to an increase in the role of agglomeration. The 
agglomeration effects significantly determine provincial labour productivity, which in 
turn is closely associated with GPP growth. The agglomeration economies therefore 
played a vital role in explaining GPP growth divergence in Thailand. 
In addition to labour density and human capital variables, regional dummies are 
added to the regressions. Results are shown in the bottom half of Table 7.1. When 
regional dummies are added, the explanatory power of overall determinants increased 
noticeably. The values of adjusted R2 increased from 0.38 to 0.67 for the year 1994, 
from 0.43 to 0.66 in 2001 and from 0.40 to 0.62 in 2008. Accordingly, the regional-
specific factors seem to be important in explaining the variation in labour productivity 
across provinces. This is further supported by looking at the significance of the three 
dummies. Both North and Northeast dummies are significant at the one percent level for 
all three years. The geographical and cultural features of the North- and Northeast 
regions must contribute to labour productivity of provinces within these two regions. On 
the other hand, the South dummy was not significantly different from zero in 1994. It 
was found to be significant at the five percent level in 2001 and at the ten percent level 
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in 2008. This implies that region-specific factors did not play a major role in explaining 
productivity variations between the Southern provinces and the rest of the country.   
Once the regional productivity differences are controlled for, the value of θ fell 
from 1.170 to 1.047 in 1994. This is very close to the value found the Ciccone and Hall 
(1996) for states in the USA, which was 1.052. The values of θ for 2001 and 2008 also 
fell from 1.221 to 1.044 and from 1.379 to 1.145, respectively. The fall in θ after 
controlling for regional dummies further supports the conclusion that regional factors 
were significant determinants of provincial productivity. It also implies that the 
agglomeration forces within each region were not as strong as the agglomeration forces 
across all provinces. The values of θ over time suggest that, even when regional factors 
were controlled for, agglomeration forces became stronger between 1994 and 2008. 
This trend is consistent with the regression results without regional dummies.  
The stronger agglomeration forces over time in the case of Thailand here clearly 
support the agglomeration theory. The theory proposed that an economy with highly 
concentrated activities tends to grow fast due to several so-called ‘agglomeration 
forces.’ Recall from earlier sections that these forces are increasing returns of scale, 
transport and resource advantages, positive externalities and spatial competition. The 
results in Table 7.1 show that densely populated provinces tended to have higher labour 
productivity, which attract more labour into them. As these provinces became denser, 
labour productivity further increased. Hence, provinces with a head start continued to 
grow faster and stay ahead—a result consistent with agglomeration theory.  
This positive relationship between density and labour productivity across 
provinces is clearly displayed in Figure 7.2. Here, the density index for each province is 
calculated from equation (7.5) using estimated values of θ from the last three columns 
of Table 7.1. The density index and provincial labour productivity showed positive 
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relationships for both 1994 and 2008. The simple correlation was 0.58 in 1994 and 0.50 
in 2008.  
Figure 7.2 Density and Productivity by Province 1994 and 2008 
A. Year 1994 for θ = 1.0467 
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Figure 7.3 Labour Educational Attainment and Productivity by Province 1994, 2008 
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Figure 7.4 Labour Educational Attainment and Density by Province 1994, 2008 
A. Year 1994 for θ = 1.0467 
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Obviously, Bangkok had the highest employment density in Thailand both in 
1994 and 2008. It also had the highest labour productivity in 1994. Nonetheless, 
Bangkok’s rank in productivity fell to the sixth in 2008—with provinces in its vicinity 
and Eastern Seaboard surpassing productivity of Bangkok. Comparing Figure 7.2A to 
Figure 7.2B, it is also apparent that employment densities of provinces in the BMR 
were catching up with that of Bangkok. In fact, except for Phuket6, the six densest 
provinces were Bangkok and its vicinity in 2008. This seems to suggest that workers 
continued to prefer to be close to Bangkok despite its decline in labour productivity. 
Figure 7.3 displays relationship between average labour educational attainment 
and provincial labour productivity. Similar to the density results, labour education also 
positively correlated with provincial labour productivity with simple correlation of 0.71 
in 1994 and 0.44 in 2008. Here, the top-ranked provinces in term of educational 
attainment were the same as those with highest density appeared in Figure 7.2. It 
implies that high-skilled labour was clustered together in small number of rich 
provinces. Comparing Figure 7.3A and 7.3B, the relationship between educational 
attainment and productivity became less strong in 2008. Nonetheless, the high-skilled 
labour continued to concentrate in certain provinces, particularly Bangkok and its 
surroundings. This can be seen in Figure 7.4. 
Apparently, Bangkok—the densest province had the highest average labour 
educational attainment for both 1994 and 2008. In addition, four out of five provinces 
following Bangkok in terms of density and educational attainment were those adjacent 
to Bangkok. The simple correlation between density and educational attainment was 
0.72 in 1994 and 0.67 in 2008. While labour productivity of provinces in the Eastern 
Seaboard and Central region surpassed that of Bangkok, high-skilled labour continued 
                                                 
6
 Phuket had high employment density because the province specialises in tourism. 
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to stay in and around Bangkok. This confirms the continued existence of agglomeration 
forces around Bangkok.  
Figure 7.5 Agricultural Labour Share and Density by Province 1994 and 2008 
A. Year 1994 for θ = 1.0467 
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the agricultural sector is expected to play an 
important role in the Thai labour markets. This is because the agricultural sector 
accounted for the largest share of labour force. Figure 7.5 shows the relationship 
between agricultural labour share and provincial density. The simple correlation equals 
to -0.68 in 1994 and -0.76 in 2008. Clearly, provinces with a high density index had a 
low agricultural share of labour.  
When comparing Figure 7.5A and 7.5B, Chon Buri emerged as one of the 
provinces with the highest density and lowest agricultural labour share in 2008. Recall 
from Figure 7.2, it can be seen that Chon Buri had high productivity in 1994. This high 
productivity possibly attracted more concentration of non-agricultural activities in Chon 
Buri. Consequently, the province experienced a fall in the agricultural labour share and 
a rise in the density index between 1994 and 2008. Meanwhile, provinces in the BMR 
also witnessed further reduction in agricultural labour share and higher density. This 
suggests that density in the non-agricultural sector generated agglomeration forces, 
which induces even higher concentration of these activities within and around the area. 
Size versus Density Effects 
Ciccone and Hall (1996) showed in their study that density effects were more 
relevant in generating agglomeration economies. To see if this is the case in Thailand, 
an estimation using equation (7.17) is examined. Results are shown in Table 7.2. When 
there are no size effects, the estimation results are the same as those in the top half of 
Table 7.1. The estimated density parameters are 1.170, 1.221 and 1.379 for period 1994, 
2001 and 2008, respectively.  
When there is no density effects, the estimated size parameters (σ ) are 0.9778 
for 1994, 1.0296 for 2001 and 1.1137 for 2008. They are all smaller than the 
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corresponding estimated density parameters. In addition, the explanatory powers of the 
size-effect estimations are also lower than those of the density-effect estimations. The 
adjusted R2 was 0.34 for the estimation with size effect parameter in 1994. This was 
slightly lower than the adjusted R2 of 0.38 when size effect parameter was replaced by 
density effect parameter. Similar conclusions can be drawn when looking at results for 
the year 2001 and 2008. This clearly suggests that labour density effects are more 
important than labour size in generating agglomeration economies in Thailand. 
Table 7.2 NLS Estimates for Size- and Density Effects in Thailand 1994, 2001 
and 2008 
Parameters   1994  2001  2008 
DENSITY EFFECTS        
θ   1.1699  1.2212  1.3787 
   (0.0925)***  (0.0983)***  (0.1122)*** 
η   2.5770  2.4699  1.7226 
   (0.7568)***  (0.8460)***  (0.7608)** 
Constant   0.0352  0.2795  2.6300 
Adjusted R2   0.38  0.43  0.40 
SIZE EFFECTS        
σ   0.9778  1.0296  1.1137 
   (0.0956)***  (0.0982)***  (0.1280)*** 
η   3.4014  3.5412  2.9929 
   (0.7832)***  (0.9402)***  (1.1771)** 
Constant   -1.9426  -3.0307  -3.1608 
Adjusted R2   0.34  0.38  0.28 
Note:   Standard error terms are in parentheses.  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 
** 5 percent level and * 10 percent level.   
Number of observations for all regressions is 76 for the 76 provinces of Thailand. 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated agglomeration economies in Thailand between 1994 and 
2008. The analyses in Chapter 5 suggested that there was a provincial growth 
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divergence in Thailand during the period 1988-2008. This implies that initially rich 
provinces grew faster than those with initially lower per capita GPP. An investigation of 
provincial growth determinants indicated that it was the industrial sector share of GPP, 
rather than initial GPP, that played a key role. Despite that, the magnitude of the effect 
was found to be small. This led to the question of whether there were other factors 
causing growth divergences in Thailand.  
Theorists in the recent decades proposed that the underlying factors causing such 
divergence were the agglomeration forces. The higher income in the rich provinces 
normally attracts resources to flow into those provinces. Consequently, these rich 
provinces enjoy better and cheaper transport and resource advantages. In addition, 
increasing returns to scale and positive externalities are created as resources cluster 
together in these rich provinces. This stimulates further growth in the rich provinces, 
causing them to grow faster than the poor ones. Although concentration of resources 
also creates adverse effects, they tend to be smaller than the agglomeration effects. 
Hence, the rich provinces continue to grow faster. This chapter therefore analysed 
whether agglomeration forces were the major factor behind provincial growth 
divergence in Thailand.  
Following methodology developed by Ciccone and Hall (1996), results 
suggested that agglomeration effects did play a significant role in explaining growth 
divergence in Thailand. In 1994, doubling employment density would increase 
provincial labour productivity by 4.67 percent, controlling for regional productivity 
differences. The agglomeration effects were found to become even stronger over time. 
In 2008, doubling of density—number of labour per Rai—would increase labour 
productivity by as much as 14.45 percent, again controlling for regional differences.  
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Moreover, the educational attainment of labour was also found to be significant 
in creating agglomeration effects. It is apparent that highly educated workers in 
Thailand came to search for non-agricultural work in urban centres. Bangkok and its 
vicinity continued to be main destinations with provinces in the Eastern Seaboard and 
the Central region catching up as major centres. This seems to further stimulate growth 
in these provinces. Clearly, the top-ten provinces in labour productivity in 2008 
continued to be the same as those in 1994. 
The findings here suggest that the economic development in Thailand is likely to 
continue to be uneven. With even stronger agglomeration effects over time, the growth 
across provinces may diverge even further. It is therefore important that government 
policies are at least not stimulating such divergence. In order to come up with proper 
policy suggestions, all findings in this thesis need to be summarised first. The next 
chapter summarises the empirical results of this thesis followed by policy implications 
and further research recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
 
8.1 Research Conclusion 
This study has examined the pattern of provincial income disparities in Thailand over 
the past few decades. It mainly covers the period between 1988 and 2008. This period is 
particularly interesting as the Thai economy went through several phases of economic 
development. From mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the country experienced an economic 
boom. The rapid growth ended in 1997 with a bust followed by an economic crisis. 
From 1999 onwards, the Thai economy was gradually recovering from the crisis. 
Accordingly, this study examines how the provincial income disparities changed 
through these phases of the Thai economy. In addition, patterns of provincial disparities 
in other social aspects e.g. education, health, and poverty and how they relate to the 
pattern of income disparities are also examined. Finally, this study investigates the 
determinants of provincial disparities in Thailand including agglomeration economies. 
Conducting a study on provincial disparities in the late-2000s is considered to be 
timely for many reasons. First, the new economic geography, which was developed in 
the 1990s, has become well-established. Though still considered a new area of study, 
the new economic geography has received a remarkable attention over the past two 
decades. Empirical methods were also developed, making this study possible. Despite 
that, in Thailand studies on the geographical dimension of economics, particularly at the 
provincial level has so far been limited. Findings in this research therefore fill the 
empirical gap in geographical economics in Thailand.  
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The second reason why it is timely to conduct this research now has to do with 
data availability. Although the GPP data have been available since 1981, other 
provincial-level data in Thailand only became available in the 1990s. Now that more 
than a decade has passed, time-series analyses at provincial level can be possible. 
Thirdly, it is now a good time to examine the Thai economy in the post-crisis period. 
Thailand fell into economic crisis in 1997, posting adverse effects on both economic 
and social aspects of national development. With indicators showing that the economy 
has partially returned to normal since 2000, conducting research now enables us to 
analyse the provincial disparities in the post-crisis period. Some comparisons with the 
pre-crisis period can also be made. 
This research began by examining the pattern of provincial income disparities 
over the period 1981-2007. This was followed by analyses on other aspects of 
provincial disparities, namely labour productivity, government expenditure, educational 
attainment and health services. Given that income disparity is considered to be one 
dimension of growth convergence, the research then moved on to look at another 
dimension. Here, the provincial income β-convergence and provincial growth 
determinants were investigated. Then, the issue of provincial poverty and its 
determinants were analysed. Finally, agglomeration economics were considered 
whether it plays a major role in causing provincial disparities in Thailand. The findings 
are summarised below.  
The σ-Convergence: Provincial Disparities 
In Chapter 3, the pattern of provincial income disparities during the years 1981 
to 2008 was examined. Two measures of provincial per capita income—the GPP per 
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capita and the household income were used1. Results showed that income disparities 
across provinces narrowed during the rapid economic growth in the 1990s. This was 
evident for both measures of provincial income. It implies that the benefits of rapid 
economic growth did spread to all other provinces aside those in and around Bangkok.  
However, the downward trends in provincial disparities did not seem to continue 
after the crisis. In fact, the patterns of disparities for the two measures showed different 
trends in the post-crisis period. Using GPP per capita, provincial disparities widened 
over time particularly those excluding Bangkok and the BMR. This was due to the 
export boom after the crisis. In result of the baht devaluation, exports became the single 
main driver of Thai economic growth. As export activities were concentrated in the East 
and Central regions, provincial disparities in GPP per capita increased. On the other 
hand, when household income is used as a measure of income, the disparities continued 
to narrow after the crisis. Nonetheless, the declining disparities only occurred when all 
provinces were considered. Once Bangkok and the BMR are excluded, disparities in 
household income showed widening trends. This reflects the catching up of household 
income in the East and Central regions with the BMR, hence deviating from the rest of 
the country.  
It can be implied from the above findings that the industrial sector play a major 
role in determining the pattern of income disparities. This was made clearer in the 
analysis in Chapter 4. The decomposition of disparities into three sectors showed that 
disparities in industrial output displayed the closest trends to those in GPP per capita. 
The simple correlation between the two was 0.885. Moreover, from 1995 onwards the 
industrial sector provided the largest and increasing contribution to the overall 
                                                 
1
 According to the data availability, the time periods used for the two measures differ slightly. For GPP 
per capita, the analysis covered the years 1981-2008. For income data from household surveys (SES), the 
analysis only covered the years 1988-2007. 
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disparities. From 2002, disparities in industrial output alone explained more half of 
disparities in GPP per capita.  
In addition to the decomposition of provincial output disparities, Chapter 4 also 
explored three other aspects of provincial disparities in Thailand. These aspects are 
disparities in labour productivity, government expenditure and social indicators. The 
disparities in overall labour productivity showed a continuously increasing trend 
between 1995 and 2008. This upward pattern was very similar to that of GPP per 
capita—reflecting a close relationship between the two. The simple correlation between 
GPP per capita and provincial labour productivity further suggests that provinces with 
high labour productivity also had high GPP per capita. In addition, the disparities in 
labour productivity by sector were also examined. Results showed that disparities in 
overall labour productivity had the closest correlation with disparities in industrial 
labour productivity. However, these disparities did not display similar trends when 
Bangkok and the BMR were excluded. Bangkok and the BMR seemed to play a 
significant role in causing the disparities in overall labour productivity, but less so in 
agricultural- and industrial labour productivity. Particularly after the crisis, disparities in 
industrial labour productivity excluding Bangkok and BMR exceeded those for all 
provinces. This was due to the clustering of highly capital-intensive industries in the 
Eastern provinces. As labour productivity of these industries was much higher than the 
labour productivity of labour-intensive sectors in all other provinces, the disparities 
between them became very large.  
For disparities in government expenditure across provinces, the results are 
somewhat ambiguous. This was mainly due to the centralised fiscal system of Thailand. 
Having all of the ministries located in Bangkok, the salaries for the government officials 
in Bangkok alone accounts for 25.2 percent of the total personnel budget in FY2007. In 
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addition, there are also some expenditure items e.g. contingency budgets that are kept at 
the central government but normally spent elsewhere. With these items included as 
government budget in Bangkok, it distorts the true picture of government spending. 
Without Bangkok, the disparities seem to be narrowing between 2000 and 2007. This is 
particularly apparent when looking at the disparities in capital expenditure on transport 
and communication. It implies that the government expenditure has been distributed 
more equally over time. The disparities using the BMA’s budget as Bangkok’s 
expenditure confirmed trend toward more equal budget distribution.  
Similarly, the disparities in educational attainment and health service personnel 
across provinces also narrowed over time. Provincial variation in average years of 
schooling in population aged 25 years or over decreased between 1988 and 2008. The 
role of Bangkok as a cause of disparities also declined. This was largely due to 
government’s intensified educational expansion since the 1980s. For health services, the 
disparities across provinces displayed downward trend during the period 1994-2008. 
This was also due to the government policy, particularly the implementation of 
universal health care in 2001. It can be concluded here that the geographical dimension 
had not been entirely ignored by the Thai government. Although development of 
Eastern Seaboard caused income disparities to widen over time, the Thai government 
has at least tried to ensure that social services are distributed more equally. 
The β-Convergence: Provincial Growth 
Chapter 5 took a look at another dimension of development across geographical 
units. While σ-convergence focuses on the gap across provinces, β-convergence 
examines whether the poor provinces grow faster than the rich. If β-convergence 
persists for long period of time without external shocks, per capita income of the poor 
provinces will catch up with the rich. Like the analysis on σ-convergence, two measures 
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of income—GPP per capita and household income—were examined. Using GPP per 
capita, no evidence of absolute β-convergence was found during the period 1981-2008. 
When dividing into four sub-periods, β-convergence occurred during the steady growth 
(1981-1985) and the crisis (1997-1998) sub-periods. Meanwhile, no evidence of β-
convergence was found during the boom (1986-1996) and the post-crisis (1999-2008) 
sub-periods.  
When per capita income data from household surveys were used, absolute β-
convergence was evident during the period 1988-2007. Evidence of β-convergence was 
also found for all sub-periods. However, the rate of convergence and the significant 
level declined over time. During the boom sub-period, per capita income among 
provinces converged at the rate of 6.8 percent per year. The estimate was statistically 
significant at the one percent level. By the post-crisis sub-period, the rate of 
convergence was 1.7 percent per year and this estimate was statistically significant at 
the ten percent level. This means that over time the poor provinces were catching up 
with the rich but at the slower rate.  
The difference between the results of these two data sets was mainly due to the 
change in income composition of rural households. As the Thai economic structure 
shifted toward the industrial sector in the 1980s, rural farmers started to diversify their 
income by engaging in the industrial sector. It became common that farmers migrated to 
find wage-labour jobs during the slack season. Consequently, the results using GPP 
data—measuring income where it is generated—differed from those using household 
surveys which measures income where it is received. Despite that, results from the two 
measures seem to suggest similar long-term trends. That is, the evidence of β-
convergence has worsened over time. These trends are also consistent with the σ-
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convergence results in Chapter 3. Disparities in GPP per capita across provinces 
widened while those in per capita income narrowed down at slower rate over time.  
In order to tackle the worsening provincial disparities, the analysis then looks at 
factors contributing to provincial growth in Thailand. As expected, growth in GPP per 
capita for the period 1994-2008 was found to be driven mainly by the industrial sector. 
Provinces that were able to expand their industrial sector would grow fast. The 
relationship was even stronger in the post-crisis period. As mentioned earlier, high-tech 
manufacturing for exports became the main growth engine for the Thai economy after 
the crisis. With these high-tech firms concentrated in the Eastern and Central regions, 
these provinces saw their GPP per capita grow rapidly. Clearly, the concentration of 
industrial growth within only few provinces was the major cause of worsening 
provincial income disparities.  
Provincial Poverty and its Determinants 
In relation to growth, researchers and particularly policy-makers are usually 
interested in the extent to which growth translates to poverty reduction. Chapter 6 looks 
at poverty disparities, the growth-poverty relationship and poverty determinants at 
provincial level. Poverty disparities in Thailand displayed widening trend between 1988 
and 2008. Only during the crisis—between 1998 and 2000—did poverty disparities 
narrow down. The narrowing disparities were a result of rich provinces being harder hit 
by the crisis; hence they experienced a larger increase in poverty than poor provinces.  
The widening poverty disparities over the past two decades also imply that the 
rate of poverty reduction varied across provinces. Accordingly, factors contributing to 
provincial poverty reduction should be investigated. Since economic growth was widely 
accepted as a crucial factor for poverty reduction, the poverty-determinant analysis 
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began by examining growth-poverty relationship. Results suggested that per capita 
income growth did lead to poverty reduction at the provincial level during the years 
1988-2008. This means that provinces with higher GPP per capita also had a higher rate 
of poverty reduction. Despite that, when divided into sub-periods, this relationship was 
not evident in the post-crisis period. In other words, provincial growth was not related 
to poverty reduction after the crisis. To find out what are the factors contributing to such 
results, poverty determinants were then examined. 
Regression results suggested that, aside from provincial income growth, 
inequality within each province also played crucial role in determining provincial 
poverty. In fact, the inequality-elasticity of poverty was even higher than growth-
elasticity of poverty. For the period 1994-2007, the growth-elasticity of poverty was -
2.4 while inequality-elasticity of poverty was 2.9. Apparently, income growth and 
inequality affect poverty in opposite directions. This means that if inequality increases 
at the same time as provincial income increases, the poverty rate may not fall.  
When considering only the post-crisis period (2000-2007), the results showed 
that the inequality-elasticity of poverty became larger while the growth-elasticity 
remained more or less the same. This must be the major factor explaining why the 
positive relationship between growth and poverty reduction was not evident after the 
crisis. In addition to income growth and inequality, other factors were also added to the 
regressions as determinants. The OLS results showed that household characteristics also 
play important roles in determining poverty. Provincial poverty was negatively related 
to household size, the share of population residing in female-headed households, the 
share of households with elderly members and educational attainment. On the other 
hand, it was positively associated with age of household head, share of households with 
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children, and share of urban population to the total provincial population. For the post-
crisis period, these relationships did not differ significantly from the entire period.  
Furthermore, the 2SLS method was also employed in poverty-determinant 
analysis as income might be simultaneously determined by provincial poverty. Results 
supported the assumption that provincial income was endogenous to poverty-
determinant model in the case of Thailand. In summary, the provincial income growth 
was crucial for poverty reduction at provincial level. However, the growth effect on 
poverty would be reduced if inequality level also increases during the same period. It is 
therefore important that inequality level within each province is at least kept constant, if 
not reduced.  
Agglomeration Economics 
In Chapter 7, the analysis took an alternative approach to explaining the 
increasing GPP per capita disparities in Thailand. Based on the agglomeration theory, 
the widening disparities were caused by agglomeration forces stimulating more growth 
in rich provinces. This seems to be consistent with the development pattern in Thailand. 
Despite government policies encouraging industries to locate in outlying regions, 
industries continued to concentrate near Bangkok. While both Thai researchers and 
policy-makers have long been aware of the dominance of Bangkok, empirical works on 
this issue are rather limited. Accordingly, Chapter 7 provided empirical evidence on 
agglomeration in Thailand.  
For empirical analysis on agglomeration, most studies used output per worker 
instead of output per capita2. This is because the models are based on production 
functions, which are more closely related to productivity measures. Following the 
                                                 
2
 The use of output per worker here should be valid in the case of Thailand as it is closely correlated with 
the output per capita. The simple correlation between the two measures is 0.9521 for pooled provincial 
data between 1994 and 2008. 
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empirical model developed by Ciccone and Hall (1996), an increase in labour density 
within an area normally creates two opposing effects. Agglomeration forces attract 
more labour, hence generating more productivity growth. On the other hand, dispersion 
forces discourage labour to stay in the area. The regression results for Thailand in 1994, 
2001 and 2008 all suggested that agglomeration forces outweigh dispersion forces. An 
increase in density—particularly in already highly productive provinces—would 
increase productivity even further. This implies that the rich provinces tended to grow 
faster than the poor provinces. Not only that, the agglomeration effects seemed to be 
increasing over time.  
In addition to labour density, the regression model also added labour educational 
attainment and regional dummies as other productivity-determinants. Results showed 
that education was crucial in increasing labour productivity in Thailand. The elasticity 
of productivity with respect to labour education was 2.577 for the year 1994. The value, 
however, decreased over time to 2.470 in 2001 and 1.723 in 2008. As average 
educational attainment has become more equal across provinces, the degree to which 
education contributes to productivity declined. For regional dummies, results suggested 
that regional-specific factors also play an important role in determining provincial 
productivity.  
When plotting provincial density against productivity, Bangkok and its 
surroundings dominated both in terms of density and productivity. As expected, 
Bangkok was the densest province in Thailand throughout the study period, followed by 
its 5 adjacent provinces. Although Bangkok’s rank in productivity fell from the first in 
1994 to the sixth in 2008, it continued to attract more workers into it. This clearly 
suggested that workers and firms still preferred to be close to the capital city. Finally, 
the analysis further looked into sectoral density and productivity. Results showed that it 
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was the density in non-agricultural sectors that generated agglomeration forces, which 
induces even higher density in these already-dense provinces.  
In summary, all findings in this study seem to suggest that provincial growth in 
Thailand has been driven mainly by the growth in industrial sector. While the 
government tried to stimulate industrial growth in outlying regions, they only succeeded 
in bringing industries to provinces close to Bangkok. This was clearly due to the 
agglomeration forces of the capital city. It is therefore the main factor causing 
provincial disparities in GPP per capita to widen over time. Nonetheless, when looking 
at provincial household income per capita, the disparities were somewhat different. 
Overall disparities seemed to be narrowing over time, although disparities excluding 
Bangkok slightly widened in recent years. The differences between the two data sets 
suggested that provinces where income is generated differ from those where it is 
received. Thus, there must be some mechanisms redistributing income across provinces 
in Thailand. Aside from income transfer programmes by the government, the main 
mechanism was the change in household income composition. However, even with such 
mechanisms, growth in provincial household income no longer translated into poverty 
reduction during the post-crisis period. This was due to the increase in inequality levels 
within provinces.  
Linking back to the experiences in other countries explored in Chapter 2, the 
findings here show similar patterns with China and the Philippines. The persisted, if not 
widening, disparities in provincial per capita output seemed to be caused mainly by 
trade openness in all three countries. Trade openness stimulated the growth of 
manufacturing for exports in geographically-advantaged or government-promoted areas. 
These areas are the coastal area of China, the export-processing zones in the Philippines 
and the BMR and the Eastern Seaboard of Thailand. In addition, attempts to 
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deconcentrate industries away from the old cores ended up with reconcentration in the 
nearby areas. Again, this pattern was found in all three countries. The case of Thailand, 
therefore, adds more support to the theory of agglomeration.  
There are two major development issues that come out of this study. First, the 
agglomeration forces around Bangkok were indeed strong. They seem to become even 
stronger over time. The second issue has to do with inequality level. Inequality 
problems have persisted to the point that they have started to dampen poverty reduction 
in Thailand. It is, therefore, important that policies regarding these issues are explored 
so that effective policy recommendations can be given.  
 
8.2 Policy Summary and Recommendations 
Regional Development Policy 
As already mentioned in Chapter 7, the Thai government has been aware of the primacy 
of Bangkok since the Third Plan (1972-1976). Consequently, policies to disperse 
growth centres to other regions have been included in the national development strategy 
since the Fourth Plan (1977-1981). These policies include the BOI investment 
promotion packages from the Fourth Plan onwards, development of regional cities in 
the Fourth- and Fifth Plans (1982-1986) and the development of Eastern Seaboard and 
other economic zones in the Sixth- and Seventh Plans (1987-1991 and 1992-1996).  
Despite these many policies, most of them did not find much success in drawing 
industries away from Bangkok, except for the Eastern Seaboard. The success of the 
Eastern Seaboard was partly due to its proximity to Bangkok. In addition, the complete 
infrastructure development i.e. roads, sea ports and industrial facilities for the project 
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itself also contributed significantly to its success. This seems to suggest that 
government infrastructure is crucial for urban development in Thailand. 
Following the Eastern Seaboard, the Thai government also proposed 
development of Southern- and Western Seaboards in the Eighth Plan (1997-2001). 
Unfortunately due to the crisis in 1997, the two projects were put on hold. Then, after 
the crisis, regional integration with neighbouring countries has been promoted as a tool 
for economic development. Thailand has also been actively involved in several regional 
integration programmes. These programmes include the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
(GMS) programme, Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Bay of 
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Corporation (BIMSTEC) 
and ASEAN. As these programmes, particularly the GMS and IMT-GT focus on 
infrastructure development, both SSB and WSB became parts of these wider regional 
integration projects (NESDB, 2011a).  
Recall from Appendix F that the GMS main projects include road networks 
linking Thailand with Myanmar, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Cambodia and China. Once 
complete, the project is expected to stimulate growth in cities and provinces along these 
roads—specifically those in the North and the Northeast regions. As these two are the 
backward regions of the country, the programme will therefore help them catch up with 
other regions. Similarly, the IMT-GT also involves improvement of infrastructure and 
transport networks of the region, including the Southern provinces of Thailand. It would 
allow these provinces to catch up with the fast-growing Central and Eastern regions. 
Ultimately, the catching up of the South, North and Northeast regions will cause 
regional disparities to narrow.  
It may still be too early to see the clear result of these programmes at this time. 
The road network for the East-West Corridor was just completed in 2009 while the rest 
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of the GMS programme is still ongoing. Meanwhile, the development under IMT-GT 
has not yet been implemented to date. Despite that, increase in movement of labour 
from the neighbouring countries into Thailand and the growth of border towns have 
already been apparent (Sciortino, Caouette & Guest, 2008). It is, therefore, very likely 
that the regional integration will progress further. This will stimulate growth in 
provinces away from Bangkok and hence bring down the role of Bangkok as the 
agglomeration core.   
In addition to regional integration, creating strong linkages between rural and 
urban areas should also help spread the benefit of the growth more equally. Despite 
continuous expansion of rural road development in Thailand, ten percent of all the roads 
are still unpaved. Regular users of the non-paved roads were found to incur higher fuel 
consumption as well as higher vehicle-maintenance costs than those of the paved roads 
(NESDB, 2011b, p. 59). As these non-paved roads are in rural areas in lagging 
provinces, these higher costs must also contribute to the provincial income disparities. 
Making transport and communication across areas more easily connected should 
therefore help narrowing provincial income disparities.  
Tourism Promotion 
Tourism-promotion has been recently used as another tool for economic 
development. Tourism policy has been included as part of the National Economic and 
Social Development Plans since the Fourth Plan. However, it did not become the main 
policy until after the crisis (Tourism Authority of Thailand [TAT], 2000). The 
devaluation of the baht in 1997 boosted not only the export-, but also the tourism 
sectors. Being seen as a potential growth engine, the Thai government became more 
active in promoting the tourism sector. This can be depicted from the launch of the 
“Amazing Thailand” campaign in 1998. The campaign aimed at both attracting foreign 
248 
tourists as well as encouraging domestic tourism among Thais. Accordingly, the Ninth- 
and Tenth Plans (2002-2006 and 2007-2011), along with administrative 
decentralisation, encouraged each province to set up a provincial tourism strategy. The 
Plans also emphasised tourism at the provincial-cluster level e.g. beautiful beaches 
cluster, world heritage cluster and national park cluster. The linkages between tourist 
attractions and other tourist activities in each area were seen as a channel for sustainable 
income distribution.  
As a result, the number of foreign tourists more than doubled from 7.7 million in 
1998 to 14.5 million in 2007. At the same time, domestic tourist statistics also increased 
from 51.7 million trips to 83.2 million (TAT, 2008). While such impressive increases in 
tourism figures must imply a considerable increase in tourism revenue and output, these 
data are not yet available in Thailand3. Accordingly, the role of the tourism sector on 
provincial disparities cannot be analysed. For now, it is probably most important that 
these data are developed and made available on a regular basis as soon as possible. 
Policy to Tackle Inequality 
Unlike anti-poverty policy in Chapter 6, inequality and income distribution 
received less priority in Thailand’s development policy. Though included since the 
Third Plan, income inequality had usually been approached indirectly via poverty-
reduction and rural development policies. This is probably because there were no clear 
targets on income distribution stated in any of the Plans up until the Eighth Plan. These 
indirect policies include expansion of basic infrastructure and government services to 
outlying regions and remote areas, measures to raise income of the poor, rural job-
                                                 
3
 There was a pilot project on compilation of the Tourism Satellite Account (TSA) in Thailand in 2001. It 
was conducted by the Tourism Authority of Thailand (Amnuaysilp, 2001). The TSA is a satellite account 
under the National Account System, which measures tourism economic impacts on the national economy 
(OECD, 2011). The findings from the pilot project was, however, not available to public. The World 
Travel and Tourism Council estimated that for 1998-2005, tourism sector generated around 13 percent of 
total GDP of Thailand—both directly and indirectly (Wattanakuljarus, 2007, p. 7).  
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creation project, tax incentives for low-income housing projects and administrative 
decentralisation. Nonetheless, income across five income groups did not become more 
equal during these Plans. Similarly, the income differences between urban and rural 
areas did not narrow over time. This is mainly because these policies did not receive 
much attention in practice. Both resources and budgets were allocated with priority 
given to export-oriented industrialisation. With such limited resources, these income-
distribution policies were rather ineffective. 
The inequality issue seemed to receive more serious attention from policy-
makers in the Eighth Plan. The target was clearly set that the lowest three quintiles 
should get 50 percent of national income by the end of the Plan. Unfortunately due to 
the economic crisis, policies in the Plan were barely implemented and the target was not 
met. In the Ninth Plan (2002-2006), there was no inequality target clearly stated in the 
Plan. This was possibly because the government at the time focused on their populist 
policies, which already targeted the poor. Recall from Chapter 6 that the major policies 
were the Village Fund, Universal Health Care Scheme and Debt Suspension 
programmes. While these policies helped improve the living conditions of the poor, the 
inequality did not show any improvement during the Ninth Plan (NESDB, 2011b).  
In the Tenth Plan (2007-2011), the inequality target was set once again. This 
time, the target was for income of the richest quintile to be no more than 10 times that 
of the poorest quintile. Similar to all the previous Plans, this target was to be achieved 
by indirect policies e.g. further expansion of infrastructure and government services, 
building strong community financial institutions and devolution of the fiscal system. 
Although the result at the end of the Tenth Plan has not yet been available, the data in 
2009 showed quite an improvement. The ratio between the richest quintile and the 
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poorest quintile fell from 12.8 times in 2007 to 11.9 times in 2009 (NESDB, 2011b, 
Table 51).  
Yet, the inequality level is still considered very high. Perhaps income inequality 
may improve faster if the direct policy on income distribution is implemented. One 
important mechanism is the tax policy. Tax structure in Thailand has been biased 
toward the rich—particularly the capital owners. It relies heavily on indirect taxes, 
which means that low-income individuals end up paying more tax as a share of their 
income than the high-income individuals. As of 2010, indirect taxes accounted for 51.8 
percent of total tax revenues while direct taxes accounted for 36.6 percent (NESDB, 
2011b, p. 68). In addition, wealth and property tax bases have not been adjusted for 
decades4. This also benefits the better-off individuals who own land in more developed 
areas.  
It is apparent that the tax structure in Thailand has been favouring the better-offs 
more than the poor. This means that there are still various points in the tax structure that 
can be made fairer to the lower-income individuals. By doing that, the income 
inequality should be reduced. Although there were many attempts in the past, none of 
them has succeeded in pushing these fairer tax adjustments into practice. This was due 
to the lack of commitment by Thai politicians and the intervention by capitalists, who 
would be adversely affected. In order to make such changes, a strong commitment by 
the Thai government is critically required. This may start by stating clearly in the next 
National Economic and Social Development Plan that the tax structure must be made 
fairer. 
                                                 
4
 Land tax is currently based on average land prices 1978-1981. This makes taxes in, for example, 
Bangkok suburban areas very low compared to their current land prices. In addition, there are also various 
channels for tax reduction which favour those in the high-income brackets (see NESDB, 2011b).  
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In addition to tax adjustments, inequality may also be tackled by improving the 
selection process and monitoring system of existing anti-poverty programmes. Recall 
from Chapter 6 that existing anti-poverty policies already proved to help the poor. 
However, better targeting of these programmes can make them even more effective. 
This would consequently help the budgeting for these programmes to be more 
sustainable. With continuation of these anti-poverty programmes for a long period of 
time, income inequality should constantly decline.  
To seriously tackle the inequality, it may also require looking at other 
geographical dimension of inequality—the rural-urban differences. While the rural-
urban inequality was not explored in this thesis, it does not mean that it is unimportant. 
Like the provincial disparities, rural-urban income differences have also widened after 
the crisis. In 2000, the average total income in urban areas was 1.72 times that of the 
rural areas. In 2007, the ratio increased to 1.96 times (NSO, 2009). Accordingly, policy 
to close this rural-urban gap is also another way to reduce the overall income inequality 
in the country.  
Sustainable Development Policy 
Perhaps it is important to note here that, regardless of the policy to pursue from 
now on, the issue of sustainability should not be ignored. This is a lesson learned from 
previous development results. While the development of Eastern Seaboard proved to be 
a success, it also posed environmental problems. Both water and air quality in the 
Eastern Seaboard area was found to be lower than the standard limits. They were 
polluted by heavy metal e.g. zinc, manganese and volatile organic compounds (Kunjara 
na Ayuttaya & Chanda, 2011, p. 8-9). This was due to the lack of enforcement and 
monitoring mechanisms in Thailand. Moreover, there were also changes in the land-use 
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zoning from housing areas to industrial zones, which caused the pollution to exceed the 
limits.  
Similarly, there were also environmental problems occurring in tourism-driven 
locations such as Phuket and Pattaya. Not only was there environmental degradation but 
also invasion of resorts into agricultural land areas (NESDB, 2007b). As their beautiful 
nature is the selling point, degradation of environment and congestion of resorts can 
adversely affect the tourism business in the future. This, therefore, seems to suggest that 
regional development from now on should put sustainability concerns as a priority. 
Environmental standards and regulations should be strictly enforced. Environmental 
awareness should also be widely promoted. Moreover, land-use regulations must also be 
strictly monitored. This is to make sure that regional development goes according to 
land potential. With sustainability as a fundamental, improvement of people’s lives as a 
result of development policies should be permanent.  
 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
It has become clear in this research that geographical inequality is quite severe in 
Thailand. Provincial output per capita disparities continuously widened over the past 
few decades. Not only that, there was no evidence of provincial GPP per capita 
convergence, particularly after the crisis. This means that initially poor provinces did 
not seem to be catching up with the initially rich provinces. By looking at the past 
policies in Thailand, we can see that the Thai government did try to expand 
development into less-developed regions. However, only the large, fully-committed 
programmes such as the Eastern Seaboard ended with success. This seems to suggest 
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that the only way to develop lagging provinces is through a mega-industrial 
infrastructure project.  
Despite saying that, there are in fact many opportunities through which 
provincial disparities can be reduced. This is because, in this dynamic globalised world 
market, the Thai economy is continuously changing. After the crisis, the tourism sector 
was seen as both a potential growth-driver and a regional development tool. It has been 
heavily promoted at all administrative levels. Also, several regional integration 
programmes recently emerged as neighbouring countries integrated into the world 
economy. These programmes, particularly the Greater Mekong Sub-region should 
stimulate growth in lagging regions. It is, however, too early to see the actual results of 
these recent development activities on provincial growth and disparities. Research work 
on this issue in the future should therefore be encouraged.  
As the Thai economy has continuously changed along with the global market, 
the political dimension has also become more dynamic. In the past few years, the 
country has seen larger population—particularly those from the rural areas, taking more 
active role in the Thai politics. With an on-going political conflict, it is largely believed 
that geographical inequality is one of the underlying causes. Despite that, no thorough 
research has been done on this issue so far. A study on the relation between 
geographical inequality and the political divide should, therefore, be very interesting. 
Meanwhile, inequality at all other dimensions is also likely to continue to be a 
challenging issue for Thailand’s economic development. Serious attention should thus 
be given to these dimensions as well. This is to ensure that the Thai economy move 
forward in a more equitable and sustainable direction.  
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APPENDIX A—DERIVING GINI COEFFICIENT 
The Gini coefficient can be calculated in two ways. The direct method is to 
calculate the index from the mathematical formula. For income, the formula is as 
follows: 
∑∑ −
−
=
j
ji
i
yy
NN
Gini )1(
1
µ
 
where  
µ  = the mean of the variable e.g. income 
N = total number of observations 
iy , jy  = income per capita of i
th
 and jth province, respectively 
  
Secondly, the Gini index can be derived from the Lorenz Curve. The Lorenz curve has 
been widely used to assess the distributional properties of income and wealth. For 
income, the Lorenz curve shows a relation between cumulative percentages of 
population and the cumulative percentages of income. The Gini coefficient is defined as 
the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line to the area of the 
entire diagonal triangle (see Figure 4.4). The Gini coefficient takes a value between 
zero—indicating perfect equality across regions, and one—indicating perfect inequality.  
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Figure A.1 The Lorenz Curve of Income 
 
Source: Haughton& Khandker  (2009) 
256 
 
APPENDIX B—BARRO & SALA-I-MARTIN MODEL 
Based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), the model specification is written as 
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where:  
0iy  = initial per capita income 
iTy  = per capita income of the final year 
*y  = the steady-state level of per-capita income 
Tiu ,0  = error term 
  
The coefficient β represents the speed of convergence. Per capita income convergence 
exists when the value of β > 0. The term [ ] )ln(1( *yTe T ⋅− −β implies that the per capita 
income growth rate also depends on the steady-state level of income. The positive value 
of β, therefore, means that the poorer economies grow faster than the rich after 
conditioning on the steady state. 
For within-country analysis, the steady-state income *y  is normally assumed to 
be the same across provinces. Consequently, the equation (B.1) becomes 
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where c = B + [ ] )ln(1( *yTe T ⋅− −β  and wi is a disturbance term. Here, if  β > 0, the 
economies with lower initial per capita incomes grow faster than those with higher 
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income and converge to the same long-run steady state (Balisacan, 2007, p. 405). That 
is, “absolute convergence” exists.  
Comparing equation (B.2) with the equation (5.2) in Chapter 5, they only differ 
in the coefficient of )ln( 0iy . That is, the term [ ]Te Tβ−−− 1(  here, as compared to a 
linear estimator –β used in the chapter. The term [ ]Te Tβ−−− 1(  means that the 
coefficient gets smaller as time T gets larger. This means that as time period of study 
becomes longer, the impact of initial per capita income on growth declines. The linear 
estimator –β in equation (5.2) does not take this into account. Nonetheless, the 
estimators β’s from both equations do not differ largely from one another. The 
difference is only at 0.001 digits at most. Because the analysis extends beyond absolute 
convergence in chapter 5, it is more convenience to follow Balisacan (2007) than Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991). 
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APPENDIX C—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 
PROVINCIAL GROWTH MODEL 
Table C.1 Descriptive Statistics for Cross-Sectional Estimation of Provincial Growth 
Determinants 1994-2008  
Variable  Description  Mean S.D. Min Max 
GPP 94  Log of per capita GPP 
1994 
 10.206 0.694 9.134 11.977 
GR 9408  Average annual growth 
of per capita GPP 
1994-2008 
 0.022 0.023 -0.023 0.134 
PopGr 9408  Growth rate of 
population between 
1994 and 2008 
 16.379 13.644 -3.122 66.033 
Gini 94  Income Gini ratio 1994  0.451 0.055 0.327 0.625 
EduAttain  Change in average 
years of schooling 
1994-2008 
 5.124 0.870 3.095 8.309 
Electricity  Change in share of 
households with 
electricity 1994-2008 
 5.784 6.477 -2.310 38.050 
Agperlabour  Change in agricultural 
value-added per unit of 
labour 1994-2008 
 54.034 72.440 -67.200 483.84 
FDI 94  Ratio of FDI to GPP 
1994 
 5.819 12.339 0.000 76.490 
AgrShare 94  Share of agricultural 
sector to GPP 1994 
 24.406 13.156 0.560 62.810 
IndShare 94  Share of industrial 
sector to GPP 1994 
 28.544 18.559 8.71 81.34 
∆ IndShare  Change in industrial 
sector share of GPP 
1994-2008 
 0.905 8.782 -16.12 23.68 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Table C.2  Descriptive Statistics for Cross-Sectional Estimation of Provincial Growth 
Determinants 2000-2008  
Variable  Description  Mean S.D. Min Max 
GPP 00  Log of per capita GPP 
2000 
 10.265 0.774 9.152 12.538 
GR 0008  Average annual growth 
of per capita GPP 2000-
2008 
 0.032 0.020 -0.005 0.117 
PopGr 0008  Growth rate of 
population between 
2000 and 2008 
 6.837 4.509 -0.964 20.417 
Gini 00  Income Gini ratio 2000   0.449 0.053 0.318 0.590 
EduAttain  Change in average years 
of schooling 2000-2008 
 5.900 1.134 3.068 10.012 
Electricity  Change in share of 
households with 
electricity 2000-2008 
 2.005 4.648 -4.038 36.843 
Agperlabour  Change in agricultural 
value-added per unit of 
labour 2000-2008 
 25.932 47.297 -72.590 289.21 
FDI 00  Ratio of FDI to GPP 
2000 
 4.301 13.418 0.000 87.490 
AgrShare 00  Share of agricultural 
sector to GPP 2000 
 23.760 13.379 0.120 56.920 
IndShare 00  Share of industrial 
sector to GPP 2000 
 28.068 22.298 8.500 88.310 
∆ IndShare  Change in industrial 
sector share of GPP 
2000-2008 
 1.381 5.432 -15.940 25.450 
Source: Author’s own calculation.  
 
260 
 
APPENDIX D—SPATIAL PRICE INDEX 
In calculation of poverty lines by region and community type, it is important that spatial 
price indices (SPI) are derived and employed in the process. Let rf  be the population 
share of each area to the national population and r be the nine regions used for the nine 
food baskets. They are comprised of rural and urban areas of the four regions—Central, 
North, Northeast and South, and Bangkok. The SPI can be derived as follows: 
1. Calculate the national average price for each food item ( ip ) using average price 
of each area weighted by population share of that area. That is,    
∑∑
==
=
9
1
9
1 r
r
r
riri fPfp      (D.1) 
2. Derive normalised price for each area ( rip ) by dividing average price of the area 
by the national average.   
iriri pPp =      (D.2) 
3. Calculate SPI for each income quintile of each region and community type using 
the normalised price weighted by share of food expenditure to total expenditure 
in households of each income quintile ( qiE ).   
∑∑=
i
qi
i
qiriqr EEpSPI      (D.3) 
The SPI for the year 2002 are presented in Table D.1 below. Note that for poverty line 
calculation, only the SPI for the lowest income quintile (q=1) will be used.  
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Table D.1 Spatial Price Indices by Income Quintile and Area 2002 
Region/Area  Income Quintile  Total 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Municipal         
   Bangkok  112.53 112.52 112.96 113.56 112.49  112.83 
   Central  103.31 103.34 103.78 104.36 104.72  104.15 
   North  101.91 101.40 101.21 100.91 100.72  101.06 
   Northeast  104.98 105.88 107.00 108.48 109.58  107.93 
   South  107.88 108.00 108.46 109.42 109.69  109.01 
         
Non-municipal         
   Central  97.38 97.01 96.49 95.75 95.31  96.05 
   North  93.77 93.64 93.15 92.32 91.80  92.60 
   Northeast  96.82 97.05 97.12 97.07 99.37  99.34 
   South  99.67 99.36 99.07 99.34 99.37  99.34 
         
National Average  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 
Source: Jitsuchon et al. (2004, Table 4) 
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APPENDIX E—GROWTH- & INEQUALITY ELASTICITY OF 
POVERTY 
The mathematical expressions on both growth- and inequality elasticity of poverty here 
follow those derived by Kukwani (2001).  Let F(x) denotes distribution function of 
individual income and z the poverty line. Then, H = F(z) is the proportion of the poor in 
the society, where H is the headcount ratio. A more general term of poverty, which can 
be applied to all other measures of poverty can be written as 
∫=
z
dxxfxzP
0
)(),(θ       (E.1) 
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and P(z,x) is a homogeneous function of degree zero 
The degree of poverty depends on two factors: average income and inequality. 
This can be written as  
))(,( pLµθθ =       (E.2) 
where µ  is average income and L(p) is the Lorenz function representing income 
distribution of the bottom p percent of population. The growth elasticity of poverty 
measures the change in θ with respect to the change in µ  while keeping L(p) constant. It 
can be written as 
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The value is always negative as 0<
∂
∂
x
P
.  
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For inequality elasticity of poverty, it is more complicated as inequality can 
change in infinite way. Following Kukwani (1993), the Lorenz curve is assumed to shift 
by 1 percent. Here, the Gini index is used as the measure of inequality. The elasticity of 
poverty with respect to Gini is given by 
∫ −∂
∂
=
z
dxxfx
x
P
0
)()(1 µ
θ
εθ       (E.4) 
If the economic growth raises the Gini index by 1 percent, the poverty will increase by 
εθ  percent. 
264 
 
APPENDIX F—THE GREATER MEKONG SUB-REGION 
(GMS) PROGRAMME 
The Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Programme (GMS 
Programme) was established in 1992 comprising of six countries along Mekong River. 
These countries are Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Thailand and Vietnam. The programme aims at promoting economic and social 
development in the region (Krongkaew, 2004). The cooperation involves nine areas; 
transportation, telecommunication, trade facilitation, investment, agriculture, 
environment, tourism and human resource development.  
While the development projects under the programme were continuously 
implemented since the establishment in 1992, the programme took a major step at the 
Tenth Ministerial Conference in November 2001. The ministers agreed on strategic 
framework of the GMS for the next ten years along with the eleven flagship 
programmes. These programmes, in the priority order, are: 
(1) North-South Economic Corridor 
(2) East-West Economic Corridor 
(3) Southern Economic Corridor 
(4) Telecommunications Backbone 
(5) Regional Power Interconnection and Trading Arrangement 
(6) Facilitating Cross-border Trade and Investment 
(7) Enhancing Private Sector Participation and Competitiveness 
(8) Developing Human Resources and Skills Competencies 
(9) Strategic Environment Framework 
(10) Flood Control and Water Resource Management 
(11) GMS Tourism Development 
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Figure F.1 Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Corridors 
 
Source: ADB (2012, p.11) 
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Among these, the first three are considered the most important projects. The 
economic corridors are shown in Figure F.1. The corridors involve mainly the 
construction of road networks connecting cities along the corridors. The road network 
between Thailand, Lao PDR and Vietnam on the East-West Corridor was completed 
and opened on June 11, 2009 (Ministry of Commerce [MOC], 2010). Construction of 
road and other transport networks on North-South and Southern Corridors are also in 
progress.  
In addition to the transport infrastructure, the GMS countries also agreed to 
implement GMS Cross-border Transport Agreement (CBTA). Under the CBTA, there 
will be a single-stop inspection at the border, simplified visa regulations and exchange 
of traffic rights. This will reduce transport costs among countries in which each corridor 
passes through. Hence, the CBTA is expected to enhance transportation, tourism, trade 
and investment across member countries. The implementation of CBTA, however, not 
yet been succeeded. This is mainly due to the difficulties in integrating the border 
control and customs regulations across countries (MOC, 2010).  
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